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HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM: 
PATTERNS AND FACTORS OF SPATIAL CONCENTRATION IN CLEVELAND 
 
MISEON PARK  
ABSTRACT 
Housing Choice Voucher Program is the single largest housing subsidy program 
in the USA with the goal of poverty deconcentration and race desegregation. This study 
aims to identify the presence and locations of voucher holders‟ spatial concentration, and 
to investigate the factors associated with the location outcomes of voucher recipients in 
Cleveland from 2005 to 2009. Analyzing voucher recipients‟ information from Cuyahoga 
Metropolitan Housing Authority, this dissertation found meaningful results for the 
voucher program performances.  
Hotspot analysis indicated that location patterns of voucher recipients do not 
show even distribution over the study area. Additionally, voucher holders have clustered 
together and their concentrations have changed during the five years. Voucher recipients 
were highly concentrated in the east part of Cuyahoga County, and over time, 
concentration patterns spread out from the central city to suburbs. Spatial concentrations 
were significantly different by race and ethnicity, but not by income.  
Regression analysis identified several factors associated with voucher recipients‟ 
concentration, which include race, availability of affordable housing, poverty rates, 
vacancy rates, and accessibility to public transportation. The spatial error model 
estimation and Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) account for spatial 
autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity. The GWR model substantially improved the 
vii 
 
explanatory power compared to the OLS and spatial models, and revealed spatial 
variation of estimated coefficients. Factors showing a spatial non-stationarity were 
confirmed by Monte Carlo tests.  
Results from the dissertation presented the limited potential of the voucher 
program since voucher holders are still clustered in specific neighborhoods, even though 
they tend to move in less poor neighborhoods over time. However, in terms of poverty 
deconcentration, the voucher program has been successful to disperse low-income 
households in suburbs. On the other hand, desegregating minority population seemed to 
be hard to achieve through the voucher program alone because voucher holders are found 
in neighborhoods where minorities are predominant. A promising tendency is that they 
tend to move in suburban neighborhoods where white population is the majority. In order 
to overcome these limitations, policy makers should consider ways to encourage 
landlords‟ participation in the program, and to make neighborhoods accessible to public 
transportation.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Research background 
 
Since the 1970s, housing policies in the United States could be characterized by a 
turn away from the direct provision of large scale public housing by government and a 
turn towards indirect subsidies of low-income families using market mechanisms 
(Schwartz, 2006; Katz &Turner, 2007; Grigsby & Bourassa, 2004). During the 1970s and 
1980s, there were growing concerns over the negative effects of concentrated poverty and 
resistance to locating public housing projects; HUD had increasingly turned to tenant-
based rental assistance rather than constructing new public housing developments as the 
primary means of expanding the stock of housing affordable to very-low income 
households. Emphasis of housing policy has been shifted from supply side provision to 
demand side subsidies (Orlebeke, 2000; Grigsby & Bourassa, 2004).  
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Initially launched in 1974, the Housing Choice Voucher program is the single 
largest housing subsidy in the United States, enabling almost two million low-income 
households to choose their residence in the private rental housing markets (Goering & 
Feins, 2003). This program is seen as a way of delivering poverty deconcentration and 
race desegregation through the use of a portable voucher. Expected to address the 
problems of public housing, the voucher program was understood as a mechanism for 
freeing public housing tenants from poverty and segregation. As Utt (1996) noted, 
In contrast with public housing, vouchers allow the assisted family to choose its 
place of residence from private landlords in the community, provided that the 
required rent stays within the established limits. This freedom allows assisted 
families to escape the worst urban communities. (p.2) 
 
Stimulated by William Julius Wilson‟s (1987) contentions about the deleterious 
consequences of concentrated poverty, substantial literature has addressed the negative 
effects of poverty concentration (Massey & Denton, 1993; Ellen & Turner, 1997; 
Jargowsky, 1997). Policy makers have considered various ways of creating diverse 
environments of neighborhoods (Lane, 1995; Hoffman, 1996). Residential mobility 
programs, which help low-income families move to low-poverty areas, are one approach, 
which is being studied in Chicago‟s Gautreaux program (Rosenbaum, 1995) and in the 
national MTO program (Hanratty, McLanahan, & Pettit, 1998; Katz, Kling, & Liebman, 
1999; Ladd & Ludwig, 1997). With mobility, the voucher program allows low-income 
household to live in mixed-income neighborhoods expecting positive outcomes for the 
underprivileged. Expected benefits have encompassed social, economic, and educational 
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opportunities, such as providing social role models and social control, reducing anti-
social behavior, increasing employment, school performance, mental health, and 
neighborhood satisfaction (Katz, Turner, Brown, Cunningham, & Sawyer, 2003; 
Arthurson, 2002; Sarkissian, 1976; Mills et al., 2006; Tunstall & Fenton, 2006). 
Changing living environments from high-poverty, racially segregated to low-poverty, 
racially mixed neighborhoods will be expected to lead behavioral changes of the poor.  
On the other hand, the dispersal policy aimed to mitigating the degree of poverty 
concentration has been criticized as a social engineering approach assuming that the 
underprivileged will change their behavior simply because they have been exposed to 
different physical environments such as neighborhoods with better schools and low 
poverty rates. Dispersal program is not the program to address the poverty concentration 
issue, rather it simply the poor invisible by spreading out over space. On this regard, it is 
no surprise that the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) demonstration found no effects on 
employment after four years (Orr et al., 2003) and the use of a voucher had no effect on 
employment over a 3.5 year time frame (Mills et al., 2006).  
However, scholars and policy analysts have become concerned that voucher users 
are increasingly moving into certain low-income and minority neighborhoods (Husock, 
2004; Galster, Smith, Santiago, & Petit, 2003). Based on this reason, vouchers have been 
a target of criticism of producing a reconcentration of poverty, rather than serving as a 
way of deconcentrating poverty. Here is the importance of examining spatial patterns to 
assess the program‟s achievement, whether the voucher program contributes to poverty 
deconcentration and race desegregation, and which factors affect the spatial outcomes of 
voucher recipients.  
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1.2 Previous research 
 
Studies on location outcome of vouchers have been conducted by comparison of 
neighborhood poverty levels and racial composition by different time, different 
geography, and/or different types of housing programs. Analyses at the level of national 
aggregation presented that the voucher program seemed to achieve its poverty 
deconcentration goal (Devine et al., 2003; Varady & Walker, 2000; Patterson et al., 2004; 
Mills et al., 2006). Also, many research reported that the voucher program had at least 
some effect on diminishing minority concentration (McClure, 2008; Teater, 2008; Gubits, 
Khadduri, & Turnham, 2009; Mills et al., 2006). Moreover, a comparison between 
project-based programs made a convincing argument that this program is successful in 
desegregating minorities and deconcentrating poverty (Newman & Schnare, 1997; 
Hartung & Henig, 1997; Deng, 2007). On the other hand, recent evidences tend to reveal 
that vouchers are not helping renters locate in low-poverty areas any more effectively 
than other project-based program (McClure, 2008; Williamson, Smith, & Strambi-
Kramer, 2009; DeFilippis & Wyly, 2008; Guhathakurta & Mushkatel, 2000; Climaco, 
Finkel, Nolden, & Vandawalker, 2006). However, those approaches are characterized as 
a-spatial, simply comparing non spatial cross tabulation across geographies. Recently, 
more research have been done considering spatial aspects of voucher locations (Oakley & 
Burchfield, 2009; Wang & Varady, 2005; Wang, Varady, & Wang, 2008; Wyly & 
DeFilippis, 2010). The researchers have attempted to find whether there is spatial 
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concentration of voucher recipients and where they are clustered. When considering 
spatial aspects, research findings revealed that voucher holders still tend to cluster to 
some degree and in specific neighborhoods depending on several factors. 
Studies on factors affecting vouchers‟ location outcomes have mainly identified 
three categories: personal preferences, racial segregation, and market conditions. As 
residential segregation is caused by both voluntary and involuntary processes (Bourne, 
1981), voucher holders‟ personal preferences and non-personal barriers play a significant 
role in their location outcomes. Voucher recipients choose their residence simply because 
of proximity to family, friends, churches, and services (Varady, Walker, & Wang, 2001; 
Varady & Walker, 2007). At the same time, due to their income level, they are inevitably 
constrained by a location choice in an area served by public transportation (Varady et al., 
2001; Popkin & Cunningham, 2000). A second influencing factor is related to race such 
as racial discrimination, segregation, fear, or preference of the same race. Many voucher 
holders expressed their fears of encountering discrimination when they began to search 
for housing (Popkin & Cunningham, 2000; Basolo & Ngyugen, 2005). The severity of 
racial segregation even outweighed the influence of the weak market conditions in terms 
of voucher concentration (Deng, 2007). A third set of studies examined the effect of 
market conditions on voucher location. Market conditions refer to various indicators 
depending on the focus of the research. However, market conditions can be divided into 
three groups in terms of factors affecting vouchers‟ location based on previous 
researches: the availability of affordable housing, vacancy rates, and landlords‟ 
participation in the program, which are related to each other. Generally, weak markets 
tend to provide more opportunities to finding voucher housing in areas other than the 
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central city (Finkel & Buron, 2001; Deng, 2007). Since weak markets show low housing 
sales prices, high vacancy rates, and low rent levels, landlords have an incentive to 
participate in the program that ensures stable rent based on the fair market rent, which 
would not be expected otherwise (Turner & Cunningham, 2000; Cunningham, Sylvester, 
& Turner, 1999; Finkel & Buron, 2001). One of the most important factors influencing 
location pattern is the availability of affordable housing. Location patterns of voucher 
families tend to mirror the geographic distribution of affordable rental housing units. 
Several studies confirm the relationship between voucher location and the availability of 
affordable housing (Devine et al., 2003; Ladd & Ludwig, 1997; Turner & Wilson, 1998; 
Turner & Cunningham, 2000). 
 
1.3 Limitations of previous study 
 
Various attempts have been made to examine the locational outcomes and factors 
limiting voucher recipients‟ spatial choice. The majority of research tried to evaluate the 
performance of the voucher program by comparing neighborhood indicators with 
different time or different types of housing projects (Devine et al., 2003; Newman & 
Schnare, 1997; Hartung & Henig, 1997; Deng, 2007; Pendall, 2000a; Guhathakurta & 
Mushkatel, 2000; Williamson et al., 2009; McClure, 2008; Basolo & Ngyuen, 2005; 
Kingsley, Johnson, & Petit, 2000). However, only a relative handful of studies (Oakley & 
Burchfield, 2009; Wang & Varady, 2005; Wyly & DeFilippis, 2010) have utilized spatial 
approach and specifically identified the spatial clusters of voucher households in several 
areas including Chicago, Cincinnati, and New York.  
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Research efforts have been also devoted to identifying the factors important to 
account for voucher holders‟ spatial choice: personal preferences, racial discrimination, 
and market conditions (Popkin & Cunningham, 2000; Goetz, 2003; Finkel & Buron, 
2001; Turner, 2003; Varady et al., 2001; Turner & Wilson, 1998; Ladd & Ludwig, 1997; 
Cunningham et al., 1999). However, not much has tested the significance of the factors 
(Finkel & Buron, 2001; Oakley & Burchfield, 2009; Pendall, 2000a; Wyly & DeFilippis, 
2010). Furthermore, most analysis focused on one of the factors such as race (Oakley & 
Burchfield, 2009), poverty (Wyly & DeFilippis, 2010), vacancy rate (Finkel & Buron, 
2001); they failed to incorporate comprehensive impact. Specifically, despite the 
emphasis on public transportation in voucher holders‟ location (Varady et al., 2001; 
Popkin & Cunningham, 2000), no research has been conducted to examine the 
significance and the degree of effect on voucher locations.  
Furthermore, most of the research that adopted regression analysis did not 
properly deal with spatial issues: spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity. Data 
on voucher recipients have spatial characteristics. Yet, regression analysis without 
considering spatial issues when dealing with spatial data cannot provide unbiased 
estimates, thus misleading the results of analysis. However, research utilizing spatial 
regression did not detect spatial variation or local differences of parameter estimates 
since OLS and spatial regression provide one estimate for each independent variable with 
the assumption that the effect of the variable is constant over space. Given the intrinsic 
uniqueness of space, sophisticated analysis is necessary to detect the local variations of a 
factor. 
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1.4 Importance of the study area 
 
Cleveland, as a case study area, is a unique example of weak housing markets as 
well as severe racial segregation. Cleveland area has experienced declining population in 
its central city, an unprecedented foreclosure crisis, and high rates of abandoned and 
vacant properties. Cleveland as a central city of Cuyahoga County has lost more than a 
half of its residents during the last six decades, decreasing from over 900,000 in 1950 to 
less than 400,000 in 2008. Recently, the number of foreclosure filings has quadrupled 
from 1995 to 2007, which puts already vulnerable neighborhoods at a further 
disadvantage (Coulton et al., 2007; Coulton et al., 2010). The Cleveland area ranked in  
the top ten foreclosure filings in the nation (Schiller & Hirsh, 2008). At the same time, 
Cleveland has suffered weak economic conditions and stagnant housing prices, which 
leave almost one out of five its inhabitants living below the poverty level (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2009). Furthermore, Cleveland has left a substantial portion of its land vacant; 
vacancy rates reach 22% in Cleveland as of 2008, generating negative externalities for 
the community (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). More specifically, rental vacancy rates 
around the Cleveland metropolitan area have ranked high among 75 largest metropolitan 
areas. Rental housing vacancy rates in the fourth quarter of 2009 are 14.2% in Cleveland-
Elyria-Mentor MSA, which is above the national average of 10.7% (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010).  
Locational outcomes of the voucher holders have been affected by tightness of the 
local housing market and the severity of racial segregation. Weak market conditions 
would provide voucher recipients with more chances to find housing, since landlords are 
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less likely to find tenants under the conditions of high vacancy rates, especially when 
rental vacancy rates are high (Finkel & Buron, 2001). On the other hand, the severity of 
racial segregation tends to affect the residential choice negatively (Deng, 2007). The 
scarcity of information on the spatial outcomes of the voucher program in Metropolitan 
Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, is regrettable. This is because Cleveland has been 
recognized as a highly segregated area in the country (Abramson, Tobin, & VanderGoot, 
1995; Glaeser & Vigor, 2001; U.S. Census Bureau, 2002), even though there is evidence 
that the absolute level of segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas has declined since 1970s 
(Glaeser & Vigdor, 2001). Furthermore, efforts have been devoted to reduce racial 
segregation and promote racial integration in housing in the suburbs of metropolitan 
Cleveland since 1960s (Keating, 1994). However, Cleveland is one of the places that 
residential segregation remains strikingly high (Massey & Denton, 1989, 1993; Logan, 
Stults, & Farley, 2004; Chandler, 1992). Hence, Cleveland is the place that needs the 
program to promote racial and economic integration in neighborhoods. Nonetheless, 
knowledge is very limited thus far on where the voucher families are located and which 
factors contribute to their spatial concentration in Cleveland metropolitan area. 
Without knowing where the voucher families live, it is hard to confirm whether 
the voucher program achieves its goal to deconcentrate poverty and contribute to making 
neighborhoods diverse. Thus, this study will examine the spatial patterns of voucher users 
and examine the factors that are influential to spatial outcomes in Cuyahoga County, 
which includes the central city of Cleveland. In doing so, this study will fill the gap in 
paucity of research and provide policy makers with useful information on how the 
voucher program works in a unique place which needs race and income integration.  
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1.5 Uniqueness of the study 
 
This study will identify the location of voucher clusters over space, changing 
patterns over time, and the factors associated voucher locations using a case of 
Metropolitan Cleveland. In doing so, there are three distinguishing components of this 
analysis from previous researches: block group as a unit of analysis, spatial approach, and 
spatial regression analysis. First, a finer geographic level than previous researches will 
highlight a more detailed picture of voucher locations. The majority of researches have 
adopted census tract as a unit of analysis when investigating voucher location outcomes. 
Specifically, all of previous researches considering spatial aspects analyzed census tract 
level or a higher level such as community area (Oakley & Burchfield, 2009). Even 
though census tract is the most widely used geographic level as a proxy for a 
neighborhood, finer geography such as block group will provide more rich analysis and a 
clearer picture of voucher locations. Thus, this dissertation will adopt block group as a 
unit of analysis, enabling richer results and capturing more in detail.  
Second, spatial analysis will be considered to identify the spatial concentration. 
Contrary to the traditional a-spatial approach usually comparing poverty rates in census 
tract, this research will incorporate spatial consideration using the exploratory spatial data 
analysis approach. Not only will this study utilize the traditional a-spatial approach to 
describe the relationship between voucher concentration and the level of poverty, and 
racial composition in block group, but it will also incorporate the spatial approach to 
identify the locations of spatial concentration over space, as well as to analyze the change 
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of spatial patterns over time. This study will employ several techniques including dot 
mapping, density map, and hot spot analysis.  
Last but not least, spatial regression and Geographically Weighted Regression 
(GWR) analysis will shed light on the impact of factors affecting voucher locational 
outcomes. Not much has been done to identify the factors constraining voucher locations 
employing statistical analysis. Studies on factors influencing voucher location have often 
used focus group interviews or surveys. Even though many research efforts pointed out 
that the accessibility to public transportation plays a critical role in voucher holders‟ 
location choice, no research has been conducted to confirm the statistical significance of 
this factor. Thus, this study will test the degree of several factors affecting voucher 
locations with the regression model. Moreover, considering the characteristics of voucher 
data, spatial aspects should be taken into account. Spatial regression and GWR account 
for spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity which OLS regression often fails to 
carry out when dealing with spatial data.  
 
1.6 Research issues and approach 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine how the voucher program works in terms 
of poverty deconcentration and race desegregation in Cuyahoga County. The research 
questions being asked in the dissertation consist of two parts: patterns of voucher 
recipients‟ spatial concentration and factors associated with their spatial concentration in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Thus, this research seeks to;  
(1) Identify the presence of spatial clustering of voucher recipients. 
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(2) Identify the locations of spatial concentration of voucher recipients by their 
races, ethnic backgrounds, and income levels. 
(3) Examine the factors associated with voucher recipients‟ spatial concentration. 
(4) Examine the spatial variation of influencing factors. 
 
The remainder of the dissertation starts with evolution of public housing policy 
which provides background to understand how the housing choice voucher program was 
initiated. Also, brief overview on characteristics and performance of the voucher program 
is presented in Chapter II. This chapter is followed by theoretical backgrounds and 
literature review in Chapter III. Theories are categorized into seven groups in explaining 
residential segregation by income and race. These are Chicago school‟s invasion-
succession (Park & Burgess, 1925), personal preferences (Schelling, 1971; Granovetter, 
1978), economic and structural aspect (Wilson, 1987), cultural explanation (Lewis, 1966), 
racial discrimination (Massey & Denton, 1993), government role (Schill & Watcher, 
1995), and resistance of landlords and neighborhoods. The following literature review 
focuses on the locational outcomes of voucher recipients in terms of whether the voucher 
program has been successful in terms of poverty deconcentration and race desegregation. 
This chapter is also devoted to identifying factors affecting voucher recipients‟ location 
outcomes. Chapter IV explains methodologies adopted in this dissertation, including 
hotspot analysis, spatial regression analysis, and GWR. Next, Chapter V investigates 
patterns of spatial concentration of voucher recipients from 2005 to 2009, utilizing 
hotspot analysis as well as description of voucher holders‟ demographic characteristics 
and neighborhood conditions. Chapter VI identifies factors associated with voucher 
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recipients spatial concentration and spatial variation of these factors over space. A series 
of regression analyses is conducted from traditional OLS, spatial error model estimation, 
to GWR. Final chapter concludes with summary findings of the study, policy implication, 
limitations, and further research issues.  
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CHAPTER II 
HOUSING POLICY AND HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER 
PROGRAM 
 
 
2.1 Public Housing Policy 
 
The public housing program in the United States was authorized by the U.S. 
Housing Act of 1937. It was the first major federal program aimed at providing low-rent 
housing to low-income families. Although housing problems had been acknowledged for 
decades, it was not until the Great Depression in the 1930s that the federal government 
became involved with housing on a large scale. The U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) administers federal aid to local public housing authorities 
(PHAs) that manage the housing for low-income residents at rents they could afford. 
Public housing was to be limited to low-income families and individuals. 
The Housing Act of 1949 reauthorized the public housing program and committed 
the nation to build 810,000 units over the subsequent six years, which did not reach the 
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goal until 1970 (Schwartz, 2006). Racial segregation, crime, unemployment, and social 
isolation among residents increased greatly in the 1970s and 1980s since high-rise, high-
density, and large scale public housing projects were often built on cheap and undesirable 
land. In the past three decades, more resources have gone to the preservation and 
redevelopment of public housing projects than to the production of new public housing 
(Schwartz, 2006).  
According to Katz and Turner (2007), public housing policies in the United States 
have evolved with three distinct programs: public housing production programs, tenant-
based assistance programs, and place-based transformation programs. Since the 1930s, 
production programs have stimulated the construction of millions of publicly subsidized 
housing units. Since the 1970s, tenant-based assistance programs have helped millions of 
renters to live in neighborhoods with better quality access to public services. In addition, 
since the mid-1990s, the place-based, demolition and replacement of distressed public 
housing has transformed the economic and physical landscape of the most distressed 
projects in the United States.  
 
2.1.1 Public housing production program 
As a major source of providing affordable housing for extremely low income 
families, public housing production programs have evolved in three distinct phases. 
During the first phase, from the 1930s through the 1960s, the federal government 
financed the construction of over 1 million public housing units through contracts with 
PHAs. These contracts required the PHAs to maintain the affordability of public housing 
units in perpetuity. During the second phase, dominant from the 1960s to the early 1980s, 
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the federal government subsidized the construction of over 1.3 million units of privately 
owned affordable housing through a combination of below-market financing, income tax 
preferences, and operating support. Under these programs, the federal government 
executed contracts directly with for-profit and non-profit developers of affordable 
housing rather than with local PHAs. The current phase of federal production policy, 
dominant since the mid-1980s, has delegated key decisions to state and local 
governments. These governments have a responsibility for allocating federal tax credits 
and block grant funding in accordance with federally mandated affordability plans. In 
general, these federal resources have been used to produce quality affordable housing in 
low-income neighborhoods often through community-based housing providers. The key 
subsidy programs of this period were the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
program, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), and the HOME investment 
Partnership Program (Katz & Turner, 2007).   
Public housing was originally intended to provide decent and affordable 
accommodations to low-income families for whom market rents were out of reach. 
Overall, public housing production programs have been successful in terms of stimulating 
the production of the affordable housing. The public housing stock reached its peak of 1.4 
million units in 1994; as of 2004, it had declined by 12% to 1.23 million units (Schwartz, 
2006).  
However, by the end of the 1980s, public housing was widely considered as a 
failure. The problems due to mass concentration of public housing included extreme 
racial and economic segregation and inadequate public services. Due to historical 
discrimination, deliberate neglect, and prejudice, public housing tenants suffered from 
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racial and economic segregation from outside of the society. In addition, poor 
construction, inadequate management and maintenance, high crime and disorder in public 
housing aggravated the problem. The combination of intense poverty, physical 
deterioration, and social disorder called for a radical approach to revitalization of public 
housing policy in the United States. Responding to the failure of public housing, housing 
programs increasingly tried to blend low-income households with more affluent 
neighbors. Governments responded in two basic ways. One approach, called the dispersal 
program or tenant-based assistance program, helps underprivileged public tenants and 
low-income households move into middle-income, often suburban neighborhoods. The 
other tries to put households with varying levels of income within the same building or 
development (Schwartz, 2006). Housing choice voucher programs are an example of the 
former, HOPE VI (Homeownership Opportunities for People Everywhere) program can 
be the latter. 
 
2.1.2 Tenant-based assistance program 
Several poverty dispersal programs have been implemented in the US over the 
last several decades, beginning with the Gautreaux Program, which served as a model for 
a tenant-based dispersal approach. The 1976 Gautreaux Demonstration was the first 
large-scale attempt at reversing a history of discriminatory housing practices (Rubinowitz 
& Rosenbaum, 2000). The Gautreaux program resulted from the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling, which charged the Chicago Housing Authority had employed racially 
discriminatory policies in the administration of low-rent public housing programs with 
the tacit approval of HUD. As a result, between 1976 and 1998, over 7,000 African 
18 
 
American families moved, over half of them to suburban communities. A new round of 
the Gautreaux program began in 2002, and until recently, it has moved hundreds of 
families (Duncan & Zuberi, 2006). 
A recent study showed that both Gautreaux programs provided beneficial 
outcomes: female-headed African American families moving from Chicago‟s housing 
projects to predominantly middle-class white suburbs secured better jobs for themselves 
and better schooling for their children than mothers placed within Chicago‟s city limits. 
In terms of poverty rates, Gautreaux One played a substantial role in reducing 
neighborhood poverty rates by more than half; on average, families came from 
neighborhoods with poverty rates of 42%. They have since moved to neighborhoods with 
poverty rates of 17% (Duncan & Zuberi, 2006). However, the new Gautreaux program 
fails to confirm the suburban advantages found in the previous experience. In terms of 
criminal records of Gautreaux children, suburban placement helped boys but not girls 
(DeLuca, Duncan, Keels, & Mendenhall, 2010). Nevertheless, the latest research on the 
new Gautreaux program revealed that families moved back into poor segregated 
neighborhoods because they felt social isolation, had poor integration into new 
neighborhoods, struggled with distance from relatives, and children faced negative 
reactions to their new neighborhoods (Boyd, Edin, Clampet-Lundquist, & Duncan, 2010). 
The Gautreaux program endeavored to place families in low-poverty, racially integrated 
neighborhoods; however, about one-fifth of families was placed in high-poverty, and 
highly segregated neighborhoods due to the difficulties of finding neighborhoods that met 
these criteria. Since participating families have moved into better communities, their 
neighborhood conditions have significantly improved.   
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Moving to Opportunity (MTO) is a more recent example of a people-based 
poverty deconcentration program. The MTO program, first implemented in the early 
1990s, provided Section 8 vouchers to public housing residents so that they could move 
into low poverty areas. The goal of the experimental program was to examine the impact 
of the new neighborhoods on the life chances of participants through an experimental 
design. Participants in the MTO demonstration were randomly assigned to three different 
situations: an experimental group that had received vouchers, counseling, and had to 
move to neighborhoods with less than 10% poverty; a comparison group that had just 
received vouchers; and a control group that had remained in public housing (Briggs, 
Popkin, & Goering, 2010). 
The MTO demonstration program has to date shown mixed results: encouraging 
evidence for security, safety, and health; at the same time, no significant effect on 
employment, education, and boys‟ behavior. As a result of the strength of the initial 
design, interim evaluations of the MTO program provide strong evidence of some of the 
merits of moving from high poverty to low poverty neighborhoods over the short to mid-
term (1-6 yrs) (Orr et al., 2004). Positive MTO findings include dramatic improvements 
in housing and neighborhood conditions; enhancing sense of safety and security; 
significant improvements in both mental and physical health of adults; significant mental 
health improvements and less risky behavior in girls ages 15 to 19; significant but small 
effects on the characteristics of the schools children attended, (although most families 
remained within the same, central-city school district). However, several less than 
desirable outcomes were also witnessed, including no significant impact on educational 
performance, employment, earnings, or welfare receipt; and worse mental and behavioral 
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outcomes in teenage boys. And lastly, un-counseled subsequent moving was more likely 
than for the treatment group, and they were more likely to be return to high-poverty areas 
than the comparison or control groups (Orr et al., 2004). 
In order to answer the unexpected results of the social experiments, researchers 
focused on MTO families‟ experiences in detail, adopting qualitative interviews and 
ethnographic field research (Briggs et al., 2010). The findings revealed the discrepancy 
between planners‟ ideal expectation and families‟ desperate needs. Unexpected positive 
outcomes in regards to security and safety could be explained by the primary motives of 
the MTO participants who wished to escape their former public housing in order to be 
safe, and not to get better schools or job opportunities. However, planners of the program 
expected that moving to opportunity neighborhoods that have lower poverty rates would 
give participants better chances of living in terms of housing, education, and employment. 
This was the typical example of the planner‟s expectations which were apart from reality. 
Rather, the poorest and most vulnerable families were considered only with living in a 
safe environment. As Briggs et al. (2010) noted, “many MTO parents were focused on 
safety first, last and always, viewing getting away from the pervasive violence and 
disorder as the most important thing they could do for themselves and their children” 
(p.89).  
A kin-centered community played a pivotal role not only in organizing social life 
around MTO families but also in pulling them back to high poverty neighborhoods. Any 
benefits gained by living in safer communities could be quickly lost once MTO families 
return to those distressed neighborhoods. Hence, researchers took the kin-oriented 
relationship as a mixed blessing at best (Briggs et al., 2010). 
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Compared to the Gautreaux program, the MTO program creates modest changes 
in participants‟ living conditions: MTO participants moved shorter distances, into 
neighborhoods with higher poverty and unemployment rates, more disproportionate 
minority rates, and poorer school systems (Rosenbaum & Zuberi, 2010). Different 
outcomes could be explained by the different program designs (Rosenbaum & Zuberi, 
2010), different motives of participants, or different support systems enabling participants 
to stay in better neighborhoods (Briggs et al., 2010). Merely changing neighborhoods 
does not necessarily guarantee the success that policy makers were hoping for, such as 
more work and higher earnings, greater independence from welfare, and intergenerational 
success (Duncan & Zuberi, 2006). 
In any case, tenant-based dispersal programs have limited potential, considering 
the heavy reliance on market mechanisms and choices available to participants. Finding 
affordable housing in lower poverty neighborhoods is significantly hindered by both 
supply and demand. As for the supply side, the scarcity of affordable housing and a 
landlord‟s voluntary participation in the program are critical. As for the demand side, 
participants‟ preferences, lack of information, and kin-oriented relationships constrain 
their location choice.   
 
2.1.3 Place-based transforming program 
In the past decade, the federal government has endeavored to change the face of 
public housing: demolish the worst public housing projects and replace them with 
housing that is more economically mixed, better designed, less dense, and integrated into 
local neighborhoods. The HOPE VI program has had success meeting four goals: (1) 
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demolition of severely distressed housing units, (2) replacement with higher quality units, 
(3) increased sense of safety and well being, (4) and a reduction in poverty rates. 
However, the program has had failures in the following: (1) a low rate of returnees, (2) a 
reduction of public housing stock, (3) and less frequent social interaction than expected.   
The HOPE VI program has accomplished its most basic goal to demolish severely 
distressed housing units and to replace them with new, high quality mixed income 
housing containing innovative design, management, and financing. The HOPE VI 
program, funded with annual appropriations of $300 to $500 million, has been central to 
the transformation of public housing since the early 1990s. Focusing on the most 
distressed public housing development, HUD allocated a total of $4.55 billion from 1993 
to 2002 to demolish 78,000 units of public housing and to transform these projects into 
mixed income housing developments (Schwartz, 2006).  
HOPE VI relocation has provided former residents with safety benefits. Through 
HOPE VI, many former public housing residents received vouchers and were able to 
relocate to better housing in safer neighborhoods (Popkin et al., 2004). More recently, 
HOPE VI Panel Study illustrated that HOPE VI movers have gained a dramatically 
improved sense of safety and a reduced fear of crime through relocation to the private 
market or new mixed-income developments (Popkin & Cove, 2007).
 1
 Similar to the 
MTO experiences, successful participants with vouchers reported improved mental health 
                                               
1 The HOPE VI Panel Study and the HOPE VI Tracking Study are the first systematic, multi-city studies 
commissioned by the US Congress in 1999, in order to examine what happened to the original residents of 
HOPE VI developments. The Tracking Study was intended to provide a snapshot of living conditions and 
well-being of former residents of eight HOPE VI sites where redevelopments began between 1994 and 
1998. The HOPE VI Panel Study focused on the longer-term effect in five sites, in terms of neighborhood 
conditions, physical and mental health, and socioeconomic outcomes for 887 original residents (Popkin, 
2006; Buron et al., 2002).  
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and less behavior problems among their children (Popkin, 2010).
2
 In addition, HOPE VI 
has generated benefits for the neighborhoods surrounding public housing (Popkin et al., 
2004). 
At the neighborhood level, HOPE VI redevelopments have a positive impact on 
residents‟ living environments, including poverty rates. Nationwide research on HOPE 
VI developments in 48 cities confirmed that the majority of relocates from the HOPE VI 
program moved to neighborhoods that have lower poverty rates than those they left 
behind (Kingsley et al., 2003).  Percentage of relocates by the type of neighborhoods 
indicated that most of residents (91.5%) lived in neighborhoods where the poverty rates 
are at least over 30% before HOPE VI developments; while after development this figure 
decreased to 38.7%. In contrast, the percentage of relocatees living in better 
neighborhoods with poverty rates below 10% has increased from 0.2% to 12.5% due to 
HOPE VI projects. In a study of 9,200 mixed income multifamily federally funded 
housing projects, Khadduri and Martin (1997) concluded that successful mixed income 
housing was more likely to succeed in low poverty neighborhoods than in high poverty 
ones. However, they also found that mixed income projects might work in high poverty 
areas in tight market conditions where there is little alternative accommodation for 
working families.  
Several issues have resulted from the implementation of the HOPE VI program: 
the low rate of returnees, reduction of public housing stock, and less frequent social 
interaction than expected. The first issue related to the HOPE VI program is whether the 
original tenants would return to the new mixed-income housing. Studies revealed that 
                                               
2 On the contrary, movers to another traditional public housing did not gain the similar benefits of 
increasing a sense of safety (Popkin, Levy, & Buron, 2009). 
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only a relatively small number of residents had moved into new housing, varying from 
less than 10% to 75%; while government expected 46% of residents to return on average 
(Buron, Popkin, Levy, Harris, & Khadduri, 2002; Holin, Buron, Loke, & Cortes, 2003; 
Popkin et al., 2004). There are diverse reasons that original residents did not return. The 
low level of return is partly by design itself: most HOPE VI sites built fewer public 
housing units than they demolished. Other reasons relate to personal preferences, and 
regulations on eligibility contribute as well. Former tenants of public housing decided not 
to come back since they are happy with their new housing, do not want to move again, 
and simply distrust promises that the new housing will really be better (Popkin, 2010). 
However, former residents could not move back due to the strict screening criteria 
requiring employment history, no criminal records, and no history of delinquency of 
paying bills as well.
3
 Often, long periods of time delay between demolition and 
completion of the new developments are associated with low rates of return (Wilen & 
Nayak, 2006; Popkin, 2010). 
Another reason to prohibit returning is attributed to loss of affordable housing 
units available for former residents. HOPE VI developments typically have fewer public 
housing units than the projects they replace by demolishing high-rise public housing 
projects into a smaller scale and mixed-income projects. Only about half of the public 
housing units demolished under HOPE VI were replaced with new public housing. The 
217 HOPE VI redevelopment grants involved the demolition of 94,500 public housing 
                                               
3 Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) requires tenants to meet the criteria for moving into the new mixed-
income developments. Under the CHA‟s minimum tenant selection plan, families must be up to date on 
their rent and utilities, have no outstanding debts or lease violations, pass a three-year criminal background 
check, provide documents that all children are attending school on a regular base, and require that all 
household members over the age of 18 must be employed at least 30 hours a week (Popkin, 2010). 
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units from 1993 through 2003, and the replacement of 95,100 units. However, only 
48,800 of these new units can be considered equivalent to public housing necessary to 
support households with very low incomes (Schwartz, 2006). 
Infrequent social interaction undermines the weights of mixing different groups of 
residents in proximity. HOPE VI research showed that there was relatively little 
interaction between higher- and lower-income residents, and also that the interactions that 
did occur were relatively superficial (Popkin et al., 2004). Similar outcomes appeared in 
Chicago where residential segregation is severe and place-based programs are active 
(Rosenbaum, Stroh, & Flynn, 1998). There have been efforts in an attempt to identify the 
factors curtailing active social interaction. For example, a study in the case of Seattle 
indicated several factors influencing the interaction among residents: proximity within 
the development, community events, and the presence of children in the household. 
Differences in socioeconomic background including language and family composition 
impede social interaction between households of different incomes and housing tenures 
(Kleit, 2005). HOPE VI residents‟ tracking study revealed similar results and causes of 
low level social interaction. The low levels of interaction were associated with a lack of 
opportunity, language or cultural barriers, and personal preferences for keeping social 
distance from neighbors (Buron et al., 2002). Another research focused on mixed-income 
developments in Chicago, also confirmed a lack of social interaction across income levels. 
Joseph (2008) examined the reasons in several aspects from physical design to lack of 
common interests. Minimal shared public space did not provide a chance of interacting. 
Plus, homeowners expressed reluctance in living with former public housing residents in 
close proximity. In an effort to build community in mixed-income developments, 
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Chaskin and Joseph (2010) suggested that resident meetings, associations, common 
interests, and shared needs would function in bringing residents together as a catalyst for 
social interaction. 
The place-based transforming program is both promising and controversial. On 
one hand, it provides an opportunity and the resources to improve the terrible living 
conditions of many public housing residents. On the other hand, these efforts have 
significantly reduced the number of permanent public housing units, and disrupted the 
lives of residents at many sites. Plus, they cost millions of dollars of public money with 
little evidence that lower poverty neighborhoods help achieve the desired favorable 
outcomes such as frequent social interactions. 
 
2.2 Housing Choice Voucher Program 
 
2.2.1 Origin and evolution 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, housing vouchers have emerged as the most 
substantial subsidized housing program in the United States. Vouchers are the most direct 
way to deal with the affordability problems of the poor since vouchers allow the 
recipients to decide where to live. As Goering and Feins (2003) asserted, the housing 
voucher program can be utilized to mitigate racial and economic segregation by reversing 
the historic practice of concentrating poor minority households in distressed 
neighborhoods. By helping families relocate from high-poverty to low-poverty 
neighborhoods, the housing voucher program has the potential to lead to significant 
improvements in their living conditions and well-being.  
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By 1974, Congress was convinced that tenant-based housing assistance was a 
viable alternative to public housing. The Housing and Community Development Act of 
1974 authorized the Section 8 program. The Section 8 program included two different 
forms: Section 8 New and Section 8 Existing. The former refers to Section 8 project-
based assistance for existing, which is for newly constructed or rehabilitated housing. The 
latter refers to Section 8 existing housing program, which is a newly created housing 
assistance program to be administered by PHAs provided tenant-based subsidies. The 
Section 8 existing program was also known as the rental certificate program. By mid-
1980s, the rental voucher program was formally authorized as a program in the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1987. The program was similar to the rental 
certificate program, but it allowed families more options in housing selection. Major 
differences between the rental certificate and rental voucher programs were: (1) the rental 
voucher program did not have a fair market rent limitation and (2) the rental voucher 
program provided assistance to families based on a pre-determined amount of assistance. 
The 1998 Public Housing Reform Act authorized the merger of the certificate and 
voucher programs into a single program with a single set of regulations. The change 
started the housing choice voucher program, effective October 1, 1999 (HUD, 2000; 
HUD, 2001).  
 
2.2.2 Program overview 
Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) play a central role in administering the 
voucher program. Appropriated by Congress, funding for the voucher program is 
provided by HUD to PHAs. The annual contributions contract between HUD and PHA 
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specifies the PHA‟s responsibilities, obligations, and funding for housing assistance to 
very-low income households. Under the contract with HUD, the PHAs are responsible for 
the voucher program‟s administration such as determining family eligibility; maintaining 
the waiting list and selecting eligible families; calculating family portions of rent and 
housing assistant payments; approving units with housing inspections and rent 
reasonableness tests; and conducting outreach to landlords (HUD, 2001). 
The voucher program includes several steps, such as application, selection of 
eligible family, housing searching, unit inspection and approval, housing subsidy contract, 
and annual reexamination. In order to receive rental assistance through the voucher 
program, families should apply to the waiting list. An applicant has to be added to the 
waiting list and be selected as an eligible household since the voucher program is a 
discretionary program, not entitlement. Entitlement will allow everyone who has an 
income below a certain income level with high rent the right to apply for housing support 
and to receive a housing benefit irrespective of the funding levels (Priemus, Kemp, & 
Varady, 2005). Due to the need for housing assistance and limited budgets, it takes time 
to be selected to receive housing subsidies. As of 2008, the average waiting time was 26 
months (HUD, 2010c). Eligibility for the voucher program is based on family definition, 
income limits, citizenship status, and eviction history for drug-related criminal activity. 
Considering the criteria, applicants are selected by priority or by random choice. Income 
limits are determined by HUD, based on family size and the metropolitan area where the 
PHA is located. HUD also announces the income targeting requirements: at least 75% of 
the families who are admitted to PHA‟s voucher program during the PHA fiscal year 
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must be extremely low-income where their income is at or below 30% of the area median 
income (HUD, 2001).  
 
Figure 2-1 Relationship in the Housing Choice Voucher Program 
 
Source: Adapted in part from HUD (2001, p.1-12) 
 
Once the eligible families are selected, they receive the voucher, which is a 
document issued by the PHA given them for admission to the program. This indicates the 
terms of the voucher, authorized bedroom size, and family obligations. Using the voucher, 
families start to find housing units to meet their needs and rent level. When the family 
finds a housing unit, the unit should pass the inspection that ensures the housing quality 
standards. In addition, the rent level should be at or below the Fair Market Rents (FMRs) 
level that is determined by HUD annually. FMRs represent the 40th percentile value of 
rents, which is the dollar amount below 40 % of the standard quality rental housing units. 
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 FMRs vary by bedroom size, and include utility costs. The 40th percentile rent is 
obtained from the distribution of rental units occupied by movers who are renter moved 
into their unit within the past 15 months (HUD, 2007a). As of 2010, FMRs in Cleveland-
Elyria-Mentor MSA is $735 for two bedroom housing unit (HUD, 2010d). HUD‟s 
published FMRs are based for calculating housing assistance payments that the PHA pays 
to the owner on behalf of the family leasing the unit. Average FMRs for a two bedroom 
unit has increased from $625 in 2000 to $899 in 2009 as shown in Table 2-1.  
 
Table 2-1 U.S. Average two bedrooms Fair Market Rent 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
FMR $625 $646 $696 $735 $754 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
FMR $762 $786 $812 $861 $889 
Source: HUD (2010d), FMR History 
 
Fair Market Rents vary by housing markets. In fiscal year 2010, the FMR for a 
two bedroom unit ranged from $ 399 in Puerto Rico to $1,800 in Stamford-Norwalk, 
Connecticut, followed by $1,760 in San Francisco, California. FMRs tend to be higher in 
the nation‟s major metropolitan areas. As shown in Table 2-2, the mean FMR for the 50 
largest metropolitan areas in 2010 is $1,045 for a two bedroom unit, and almost a half of 
these areas have FMRs greater than $1,000. As described, FMRs are flexible since they 
vary by regions and housing sizes; however, they also limit residential choice because of 
FMRs ceiling. 
                                               
4 Standard quality rental housing units have the following attributes: occupied rental units paying cash rent; 
specified renter on 10 acres or less; with full plumbing; with full kitchen; unit more than 2 years old, and 
meals are not included in rent (HUD, 2007a). 
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Table 2-2 2010 Fair Market Rent in 50 largest metropolitan areas 
Metropolitan Area FMR($) Metropolitan Area FMR($) 
San Francisco, CA 1760 Austin-Round Rock, TX 954 
Orange County, CA 1594 VA Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 934 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 1592 Denver, CO 921 
Washington, DC-VA-MD 1494 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 919 
San Jose, CA 1438 Atlanta, GA 912 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 1420 Minneapolis-St.Paul, MN-WI 899 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ 1379 Dallas, TX 894 
Oakland, CA 1377 Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 892 
New York, NY 1359 Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 861 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 1358 Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 858 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 1357 Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 839 
San Diego, CA 1324 Salt Lake City, UT 836 
Newark, NJ 1279 Kansas City, MO-KS 834 
Miami, FL 1206 Nashville, TN 807 
Baltimore, MD 1203 Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 806 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 1108 Detroit-Warren, Livonia, MI 796 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 1095 San Antonio, TX 796 
Hartford, CT 1095 St. Louis, MO-IL 771 
Las Vegas, NV 1063 Indianapolis, IN 754 
Seattle-Bellevue, WA 1056 Columbus, OH 750 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 1052 Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 735 
Sacramento, CA 1039 Pittsburgh, PA 730 
Chicago, IL 1015 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 728 
New Orleans, LA 982 Cincinnati-Middleton, OH-KY-IN 726 
Tampa-St.Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 959 Greensboro-High Point, NC 703 
Source: HUD (2010d), FMR History 
 
Under the voucher program, voucher holders locate a suitable rental unit in the 
private market and generally pay 30% of their adjusted gross income directly to the 
landlord for rent. The voucher program subsidizes the remaining portion of the contract 
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rent that is the difference between 30% of the tenant‟s income and the FMR for the area. 
So, the housing choice voucher program provides flexibility and options, by issuing 
vouchers to eligible households to help them pay rent in privately owned apartments of 
their choice. Additionally, HUD requires annual reexamination of the voucher 
participants and the units: the family must be recertified to determine continued eligibility 
for the program, and the housing units must be inspected and meet housing quality 
standards annually (HUD, 2001; CMHA, 2009b).   
 
2.2.3 Program performance and characteristics of voucher recipients 
The housing choice voucher program has experienced significant growth not just 
in size, but in importance as an appropriate method for providing housing assistance for 
very low income families (HUD, 2000). Since 1970, HUD‟s housing voucher program 
has grown from about 30,000 households to about 2 million vouchers today. Table 2-3 
shows the growth of vouchers from 1975.
5
 For many years, the primary source of 
increased assistance for very poor households was new annual appropriations for 
additional vouchers, called incremental vouchers. Since 1990s, however, no incremental 
vouchers were funded during 1995 through 1998, and from 2003 to 2007. After 2007, 
Congress appropriated funding for 15,000 incremental vouchers in fiscal year 2008; 
                                               
5 A total of 225,000 non-incremental vouchers were included from 1995 to 2004 periods. During the 
periods, half of the voucher growth derived from increases in the number of new, incremental vouchers, 
and other half reflected transfers of households from public housing and other project-based subsidy 
programs to the voucher program (Schwartz, 2006). 
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13,000 new vouchers in FY 2009; and 11,000 new vouchers in FY 2010 (National Low 
Income Housing Coalition, 2010).
6
  
 
Table 2-3 Cumulative issuance of Section 8 Certificates and Vouchers, 1975-2010 
Year Period total Cumulative total 
1975-1980 624,604 624,604 
1981-1985 287,334 911,938 
1986-1990 301,523 1,213,461 
1991-1995 186,544 1,400,005 
1996-2000 110,000 1,510,005 
2001-2005 338,000 1,848,005 
2006-2010 39,000 1,887,005 
Sources: HUD, 2000; Schwartz, 2006; National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2010 
 
According to resident characteristics reports in the HUD PIH information center, 
in the United States, a total of 1,885,987 units received voucher subsidies as of June 30, 
2010. Since the voucher program is one of the major federal programs intended to bridge 
the gap between the cost of housing and the household income, the households have low 
income levels. The average household annual income is $12,644, and the majority (66%) 
of households falls into extremely low income categories (HUD, 2010a). The low income 
level of voucher recipients reflects federal eligibility standards that give priority to 
extremely low income households. As Table 2-4 illustrates, less than 1% of recipients 
have income above the low income level.  
 
 
                                               
6 For FY 2010, the housing choice voucher program is funded at $18.18 billion (National Low Income 
Coalition, 2010). 
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Table 2-4 Voucher recipients‟ income level 
Income category Extremely low Very low Low Above low Unavailable 
Count 1,238,863 383,412 77,650 4,796 181,264 
Percent 66 20 4 0 10 
Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report 
 
In addition, over 70% of families have income less than $15,000 per year, and 
less than 10% of families earn over $25,000 annually. 
 
Table 2-5 Voucher recipients‟ income distribution 
Income 
level 
$0 
$1-
$5,000 
$5,001-
$10,000 
$10,001-
$15,000 
$15,001-
$20,000 
$20,001-
$25,000 
Above 
$25,000 
percent 3 10 32 24 14 7 8 
Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report 
 
As the voucher program intended, participants tend to pay about 30% of their 
income for rent. Total Tenant Payment (TTP), typically consists of 30% of voucher 
recipients‟ income, which is $294 per month on average. Female-headed households with 
children pay $307 TTP per month. Families of elderly with children tend to pay more rent 
than other types of families. 
 
Table 2-6 TTP by family type 
 
No Disabled Disabled 
 
Elderly Non Elderly Elderly Non Elderly 
No Children $301 $286 $279 $254 
With Children $403 $303 $385 $347 
Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report 
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As Table 2-7 shows, slightly over half of families are white (51%), followed by 
African American 45%. Less than one out of five (18%) recipients report their ethnicity 
as Hispanic or Latino. 
 
Table 2-7 Distribution of family race 
Race 
category 
White 
only 
Black/ African 
American only 
Asian 
only 
American Indian or 
Alaskan Native only 
Other 
race 
Percent 51 45 2 1 < 1 
Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report 
 
The voucher program is successfully serving different types of families. Of the 
1,885,987 families currently being served, 52% have children, and 39% are persons with 
disabilities. Specifically, almost half (49%) of families are female-headed families with 
children. 
 
Table 2-8 Distribution of family type 
 
No Disabled Disabled 
 
Elderly Non Elderly Elderly Non Elderly 
No Children 128,829 7% 193,123 10% 207,594 11% 367,352 19% 
With Children 7113 0% 812,478 43% 13,344 1% 156,154 8% 
Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report 
 
Two bedroom housing units are the most commonly found types of housing for 
families with vouchers (36%), followed by 3 bedrooms (31%) and then 1 bedroom (24%). 
Finally, Table 2-9 shows how long voucher holders have resided within their current 
units. About 30% have been in the same place for 5 to 10 years, 24% for 2 to 5 years, and 
19% for more than 10 years, while 16% of families moved in their homes last year. 
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Table 2-9 Voucher recipients‟ stay period 
Stay 
period 
Moved in 
past year 
1 – 2 
years 
2 – 5 
years 
5 – 10 years 
10 – 20 
years 
Over 20 
years 
Count 309,157 216,474 449,065 551,602 293,136 61,477 
Percent 16 11 24 29 16 3 
Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
Since the 1970s, providing public housing has widely recognized as a failure in 
American public housing policy. In response to residential segregation by income, race, 
and geography (central city versus suburbs), public housing policy has adopted radical 
approach, resulting in demolition of older, dysfunctional public housing projects and 
dispersal of subsidized households (Goetz, 2010). The Housing Choice Voucher program 
intends to mitigate residential segregation by utilizing a portable voucher that gives 
families a choice in their house in the private market. Funded by HUD, PHAs administer 
the voucher program within their jurisdiction. HUD provides FMRs annually, which set a 
standard for rental subsidies. FMRs vary by regions and tend to be higher in the nation‟s 
major metropolitan areas. Voucher holders find their housing unit that meets the 
requirement of proper rent levels and housing quality standards.  
The voucher program has expanded its volume and importance. As a single 
largest housing program, the voucher program serves about 2 million households today. 
Also, the voucher program plays an important role in providing decent house for 
vulnerable households. The majority of voucher recipients fall into extremely low-
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income households; almost half of them are female-headed families with children; and a 
significant portion of families are elderly or person with disabilities. As Sard (2001) 
noted, the voucher program should be a major component of future housing policy for the 
lowest income families since the voucher program meets the needs of and provides 
flexibility for those families who, unless otherwise, have hardships in living in decent 
house. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
3.1 Theoretical Background of Spatial Segregation 
 
Large metropolitan areas in the United States are segregated (Massey & Denton, 
1987), in the face of significant efforts to mitigate housing discrimination. From 1960 to 
1990 the poor were becoming increasingly concentrated by race and income into ghettos, 
barrios, and slums (Jargowsky, 1997). Research efforts have been devoted to explain the 
cause of spatial separation by income and race. None of factors can exclusively explain 
the cause of the residential segregation. Yet, mechanisms of spatial separation fall into 
following seven categories: natural process (Park & Burgess, 1925), personal preferences 
(Schelling, 1971; Granovetter, 1978), economic and structural aspect (Wilson, 1987), 
cultural aspect (Lewis, 1966), racial discrimination (Massey & Denton, 1993), 
government role (Schill & Watcher, 1995), and resistance of landlords and 
neighborhoods (Turner, Popkin, & Cunningham, 2000; Saints, Flavell, & Fox, 2009). 
This section reviews the major theoretical perspectives on causes of residential 
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segregation by income and race. These theoretical backgrounds illustrate how the housing 
choice voucher program was structured to counteract the concentrated poverty and 
minority population in the central cities.  
 
3.1.1 Natural process: Invasion and succession  
The Chicago school of sociologist used the term “invasion-succession” to 
describe the replacement in one neighborhood with different racial or income groups. 
Borrowing the concept from ecology, scholars of the Chicago school proposed human 
ecology to explain the process of city growth. Burgess (1925) illustrated the typical 
process of the expansion of a city as a series of concentric circles; the loop, zone in 
transition, zone of workingmen‟s homes, residential zone, and commuters‟ zone.  In this 
model, working class homes are closely located to the central business district and 
affluent households reside further from the city center. The expansion of cit ies was 
explained by the process of invasion-succession. As a city grows, demand for space push 
into the next outer ring (invasion), and residents who lived in the inner ring take over the 
space of next zone (succession).  Park (1936a) explicitly referred succession as the 
movement of immigrant groups from the settlement near the centers of cities to areas of 
second and third settlement, toward the periphery of the city. According to Park (1936b), 
the driving force behind invasion-succession is competition between culturally defined 
groups over land use. 
As a result of invasion-succession process, residential areas were inevitably 
segregated and poverty tended to concentrate in the area close to the central city while 
suburbs were occupied by residents who can afford larger single family house and 
40 
 
commuting costs. Even though Park and Burgess (1925) did not explicitly point this out, 
their work implied the racial conflicts during succession process since the current 
residents of the inner zone, minorities, tend to invade, succeed, and eventually occupy the 
outer zone where whites were once the majority.  
Developed at a time when the city grows quickly with the influx of new 
immigrants, the human ecological model provided a logical explanation for the process of 
city expansion and residential differentiation. However, the human ecological perspective 
has been criticized for its linear nonreversible view on residential change. As Aldrich 
(1975) argued, “succession generally begins with invasion along a fairly coherent line of 
expansion, and, once begun, the process is rarely, if ever reversed” (p.334). Such a 
conclusion may be correct when dealing with areas that are transforming from primarily 
white to black or Hispanic dominant neighborhoods. However, the expansion of lower-
income groups may be halted or even reversed when middle-class groups reoccupy those 
areas through the urban revitalization or gentrification process (Hudson, 1980). 
The Chicago school explained residential differentiation as a natural process of 
city growth; however, the residential segregation is also explained by the personal 
preferences of others to live near people of similar backgrounds.  
 
3.1.2. Personal preferences: Tipping point hypothesis and threshold 
 
3.1.2.1 Schelling’s residential segregation model  
Individual preferences are attributed to residential segregation either by race or by 
income. Schelling (1971) contends that racial change is purely driven by preferences. 
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Schelling (1971) was the first to suggest that threshold effects could play a significant 
role in neighborhood change. He created a theoretical model that showed that different 
racial groups prefer to be surrounded by different percentages of other racial groups, with 
their group being the majority. When a certain threshold share of another group is 
reached, tipping will occur as one or more of the other racial groups depart.  
According to Schelling (1972), tipping is the mechanism that occurs “when some 
recognizable minority group in a neighborhood reaches a size that motivates the other 
residents to begin leaving” (p.157). Schelling (1972) asserted that tipping is not merely a 
phenomenon that causes change in neighborhood occupancy, but is a mechanism or 
process that generates the observable departure of the group that was formerly the 
majority. For example, racial makeup of a white neighborhood will dramatically change 
once the percentage of blacks in a neighborhood exceeds some threshold level; the black 
population in the area will continue to increase until the neighborhood becomes mostly 
black. Through individual preference, Schelling‟s model explains how neighborhoods 
change their racial composition, furthering residential segregation. Schelling‟s 
neighborhood segregation model has become widely cited and examined since residential 
segregation is a serious social and political issue in the USA.  
One of the most remarkable aspects is that Schelling‟s model accounts for 
individual motives that give rise to change at the aggregate level. Even if some people 
wished to live in mixed neighborhoods, the sum of the individual free choices would 
generate still segregated communities. Not only is Schelling‟s model unusually simple, 
but it also illustrates the idea of unintended consequences resulting from the interaction 
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between individuals. Segregation occurs even though no individual explicitly chooses 
this. 
 
3.1.2.2 Granovetter’s threshold model of collective behavior 
In addition to Schelling, Granovetter also demonstrated how collective outcomes 
can be paradoxical and inconsistent with the intentions of the individuals. As Schelling 
(1972) suggested, the tipping point represents a threshold (percentage of non-white 
residents) at which whites are no longer comfortable moving into a racially mixed 
neighborhood. Granovetter (1978) defined threshold as “the point where net benefits 
begin to exceed net costs for … particular actor” (p. 1420). Based on this definition, 
Granovetter showed how collective results occurred regardless of individuals‟ motives.  
Granovetter (1978) argued that knowing the norms, preferences, motives, and 
beliefs of participants in collective behavior can only provide a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the explanation of outcomes. This is because outcomes cannot be 
determined by any simple counting of preferences. So, he provided the model that the 
collective outcomes can seem paradoxical, inconsistent with the intentions of the 
individuals who generate them. 
In his threshold model of collective behavior, Granovetter (1978) set several 
assumptions. Actors have two distinct and mutually exclusive behavioral decisions. The 
individuals are assumed rational; they act so as to maximize their utility. The crucial 
concept is that individuals have a different threshold when they decide to move or not. 
Thus, the threshold is that “point where the perceived benefits to an individual of doing 
the thing in question exceed the perceived costs” (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1422).  
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This model is valuable in helping to understand situations where outcomes do not 
seem intuitively consistent with the underlying individual preferences. These collective 
behaviors can be applied to explain residential segregation and neighborhood change as 
well as migration patterns and rioting. 
After Schelling and Granovetter‟s work, many researchers have tried to identify 
the tipping point that causes racial segregation in a neighborhood (Goering, 1978; Clark, 
1991; Galster, Quercia, & Cortes, 2000; Quercia & Galster, 1997; Laurie & Jaggin, 2003; 
Granovetter & Soong, 1988; Galster, 1990). In the review of empirical research 
conducted prior to 1978, Goering (1978) did not find concrete evidence in support of or 
against the racial tipping hypothesis because there are other significant factors affecting a 
household‟s decision to move that would cause a shift in neighborhood racial 
composition. However, the tipping points for whites in the articles reviewed ranged from 
a neighborhood black population reaching 25 to 30 percent. More recently, Galster 
(1990) examined residential turnover rates in the Cleveland area. As a result, Galster 
found that census tracts with 55 percent or more black population in 1970 experienced 
the highest rate of racially motivated turnover in 1980. Also, tipping points varied from 2 
to 47 percent black within one standard deviation of the mean level of white‟s 
segregationist sentiments. The tipping points or threshold effects that have been widely 
adopted in explaining neighborhood change or social disorder are income, unemployment 
rate, crime rate, high school dropouts, welfare recipients, and housing investments 
(Quercia & Galster, 2000). Based on the evidence of racially motivated neighborhood 
change, scholars pointed out the importance of integration policy at the neighborhood 
level (Glaster, 1990; Keating, 1994). 
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However, the tipping point hypothesis was criticized by the presence and stability 
of racially mixed neighborhoods since it assumed that once the black population exceeds 
certain point, the threshold, then the neighborhood will inevitably become mostly 
segregated black (Ottensmann, 1995; Ellen, 1998; Ellen, 2000). Due to the fact that 
poverty concentration and racial segregation in urban space are not solely driven by 
individual preference level, scholars attempted to explain the segregation and poverty 
phenomenon considering structural, economic change as a whole.  
 
3.1.3 Structural aspect of poverty concentration 
As opposed to aforementioned theories that the neighborhood spatial segregation 
are caused by natural process and personal preference, Wilson (1987) argued that poverty 
concentration should be understood in the context of urban structural change.  
Wilson (1987) explained the process of poverty concentration and racial 
segregation in inner city neighborhoods as the result of economic structural change. An 
influx of young minority population in central cities occurred at a time when the basic 
economy transformed from production to a service oriented structure. The flow of 
migrants was associated with age structure and unemployment since black migrants in 
central cities had been relatively younger, predicting lower probability of high income 
than for whites. Also, a young demographic structure would explain disproportionately 
increasing rates of social dislocation in the central city such as crime. At the same time, 
unskilled minority workforces were vulnerable to economic shifts that require higher 
levels of education. The structural economic changes included the “shift from goods-
producing to service-producing industries, the increasing polarization of the labor market 
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into low-wage and high-wage sectors, technological innovation, and the relocation of 
manufacturing industries out of the central cities ” (p.39). As a consequence, there were 
significant job losses in industries with lower education requirements while job growth 
concentrated in industries requiring higher levels of education. Furthermore, the 
movement of middle and working class black professionals from the inner city had 
resulted in a concentration of disadvantaged black poor, which Wilson called the ghetto 
underclass. Thus, under the environment of economic shifts and residential movement, 
unprepared young minorities had less chance to survive and find stable job opportunities, 
and were left behind in central cities resulting in spatially concentrated poverty and racial 
segregation. 
Wilson (1987) stressed the importance of middle and working class families 
whose presence acts as role models in ghetto neighborhoods. The author referred to those 
families as a social buffer that help demonstrate the importance of regular employment 
and education as well as prevent concentration effects. The presence of a sufficient 
number of working- and middle-class professional families acts to “absorb the shock or 
cushion the effect of uneven economic growth and periodic recessions on inner-city 
neighborhoods” (p.144). 
The concentration effects were used to capture the differences in the experiences 
of low income families who live in the inner city areas from the experiences of those who 
live in other parts of the central city. As a result of social transformation of the inner city, 
a disproportionate uneducated and poor black population was concentrated. Along with 
the social buffer, concentration effects are important to understand the significance of 
structural change of the inner city. As Wilson (1987) defined, 
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Concentration effects refer to the constraints and opportunities associated with 
living in a neighborhood in which the population is overwhelmingly socially 
disadvantaged – constraints and opportunities that include the kinds of ecological 
niches that the residents of these communities occupy in terms of access to jobs, 
availability of marriageable partners, and exposure to conventional role models. 
(p.144) 
 
Those vulnerable poor minorities in the inner city have less chance to get stable 
jobs, resulting in joblessness, poverty, female-headed families, and welfare dependency 
in the face of economic change since 1970, despite the creation of several new policies 
such as Great Society programs and antidiscrimination and affirmative action programs. 
Wilson (1987) suggested policy implications to alleviate the problems of 
concentrated inner city poverty. The most realistic approach would be to provide the 
disadvantaged families with the resources that promote social mobility, which will lead to 
geographic mobility. In addition, elimination of government practices that enhance 
poverty concentration will improve the economic and educational resources of inner city 
residents; those practices include the location of public housing in poor neighborhoods 
where the minorities are concentrated and the manipulation of zoning and land use 
controls to prevent construction of affordable housing. Confronting conservative 
arguments which are skeptical to this approach and favorable to the culture of poverty 
concept, Wilson asserted that “cultural values emerge from specific circumstances and 
life chances and reflect an individual‟s position in the class structure” (p.158). 
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Wilson‟s (1987) work sheds light on the importance of urban structural change in 
understanding the cause of poverty and minority concentration in the inner city. 
Consistent exposure to an environment that lacks role models reinforces social 
dislocation and constrains social mobility of poor people. Researchers have empirically 
confirmed a consistent relationship between spatial isolation and social dislocation such 
as high rates of teenage pregnancy, poor school performance, and welfare dependency 
(Jargowsky, 2003; Clark, 1991; Crane, 1991).  
 
3.1.4 Racial discrimination 
Massey and Denton (1993) stressed the importance of racial discrimination as a 
major motive of poverty concentration. As illustrated earlier, Wilson (1987) pointed out 
the role of neighborhood sorting, one of the causes contributing to the concentration of 
poor minorities in inner city, which refers to the flight of working- and middle-class 
black populations from the inner city resulting in poverty concentration and economic 
segregation. Massey and Denton (1993), however, challenged this hypothesis. They 
claimed that racial discrimination and segregation play a pivotal role in poverty 
concentration, not the economic segregation that Wilson proposed. Massey (1990) 
illustrated the mechanism of how racial segregation acts to concentrate poverty without 
the movement of middle-class minority members from the ghetto. 
According to Massey and Denton (1993), many Americans view the residential 
segregation of blacks as a natural outcome of impersonal social and economic forces; 
however, they argue that this is not the case, 
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This extreme racial isolation did not just happen; it was manufactured by whites 
through a series of self-conscious actions and purposeful institutional 
arrangements that continue today. (p.2) 
 
Due to residential segregation, blacks inevitably face an environment that is 
abundant in poverty, joblessness, out-of-wedlock birth, welfare dependency, educational 
failure, and social and physical deterioration, which are similar to what Wilson called 
social dislocation. As Massey and Denton (1993) argued, the effect of persistent exposure 
to this destructive environment on personal well-being is not individual but structural. It 
limits the opportunities of black people beyond individual motivations and personal 
characteristics. Even further, Massey and Fischer (2000) provided the evidence that the 
degree of racial and ethnic segregation can cause differences in the effects of changes in 
socioeconomic structure. Hence, racial segregation is of central importance in 
understanding residential segregation.  
Based on empirical analysis, however, Jargowsky (1997) contended that racial 
segregation plays a lesser role than Massey and Denton purported, because they failed to 
explain why increases in concentrations of poverty occurred despite reduction in racial 
segregation during the 1970s and the 1990s. According to Jargowsky (1997), although 
racial segregation is fundamental in understanding the presence of poverty stricken black 
neighborhoods, the empirical evidence to support their thesis that racial segregation plays 
a direct role in the increase of such neighborhoods is mixed at best. Instead, Jargowsky 
(1997) argued that “racial and economic segregation play secondary roles, and their 
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importance varies depending on whether we are examining the levels of ghetto poverty in 
1970, 1980, and 1990 or the changes in ghetto poverty in recent decades” (p.144). 
Nonetheless, a series of studies to address residential segregation by race 
confirmed the presence of racial discrimination and geographic steering that cause 
residential segregation. From the results of paired testing conducted over the last several 
decades confirmed the presence and significance of housing discrimination based on race 
and ethnicity. As a tool to enforce fair housing laws that outlaw discrimination in housing 
on the basis of race and ethnicity, paired testing used a pair of employees who acted 
actual home-seekers with the same financial ability, expressing the same preference but 
the only differences between the two were the race and ethnicity. They separately visited 
real estate or rental agents to ask about available housing.  
Two previous paired-tests, conducted in 1977 Housing Market Practice Study and 
the 1989 housing discrimination study, revealed a significant degree of racial and ethnic 
discrimination in the housing market, both rental and sales, nationwide. The recent study 
in 2000, launched by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
was conducted in twenty two large metropolitan areas with rigorous design. Each house 
or apartment was randomly selected through local advertisements; one white and one 
minority tester were assigned to visit each house or apartment to visit; they were identical 
with the same level of income, debt, and assets except the race or ethnicity (Turner & 
Ross, 2005). 
The housing discrimination study in 2000 indicated that minorities still face 
significant discrimination even though the level of discrimination has generally declined 
since 1989. The presence of housing discrimination is not place specific but rather is a 
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national phenomenon. More importantly, geographic steering was identified as an 
important form of discrimination while other measures of discrimination were less 
prominent when compared with the previous study. Minorities are steered to mixed or 
minority neighborhoods: African Americans are told about fewer neighborhoods overall; 
are shown less homes in predominantly white neighborhoods; hear favorable things about 
less affluent neighborhoods. On the contrary, whites are encouraged to consider more 
affluent neighborhoods and more predominantly white neighborhoods than comparable 
blacks or Hispanics (Turner & Ross, 2005). The presence of geographic steering may 
help create and sustain residential segregation by race and ethnicity. 
 
3.1.5 Cultural explanation 
One of the explanations of the causes of persistent poverty is the cultural aspect. 
Cultural explanations for the poor can be traced to the work of Oscar Lewis who 
identified a culture of poverty. Based on observations and life history data in Latin 
American poverty, Lewis (1966) described the culture of poverty as “both an adaptation 
and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly 
individuated, capitalistic society” (p.21). However, Lewis also viewed the traits of culture 
of poverty as intergenerational influence, stating  
Once the culture of poverty has come into existence it tends to perpetuate itself. 
By the time slum children are six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic 
attitudes and values of their subculture. Thereafter they are psychologically 
unready to take full advantage of changing conditions or improving opportunities 
that may develop in their lifetime. (p.21) 
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Because the members of the marginal communities believe success is impossible 
to achieve, they respond to their hopelessness and despair in a way that is called culture 
of poverty, typified by a lack of impulse control, a strong present-time orientation, and 
little ability to defer gratification. Hence, culture of poverty as a subculture of ghetto 
communities has been internalized and influenced behavior over the generations. 
Although Lewis stated the connection between these cultural traits with structural 
conditions in society, Lewis‟ explanation has been widely criticized as “blaming the 
victim” because he argued that the culture of poverty had intergenerational influence, and 
it became an independent cause of poverty. In addition, Lewis‟s culture of poverty thesis 
has been criticized for being too deterministic and diverting attention away from the 
structural causes of poverty (Curley, 2005). According to Massey and Denton (1993), 
black disadvantages were attributed not to a defective culture but to the persistence of 
institutional racism in the United States. Wilson (1987) also criticized that the culture of 
poverty by placing strong emphasis on the autonomous character of the cultural traits 
once they come into existence. As Jargowsky (1997) pointed out, “neighborhood poverty 
is not primarily the product of „the people who live there‟ or a „ghetto culture‟ that 
discourages upward mobility” (p.193). Rather, the cultural traits of the poor should be 
viewed more appropriately as symptoms and consequences, not as the root cause of 
poverty and community distress (O‟Connor, 2001). 
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3.1.6 Government’s role in concentrated poverty and creating housing 
segregation 
The government has played a significant role in the concentration of poverty and 
minority populations through its implementations of housing policy. Public housing has 
historically been located in the poorest neighborhoods and contributed to poverty 
concentration due to the income limitations that usually accompany subsidized housing 
projects. Schill and Wachter (1995b) examined how the public housing program has 
contributed to the concentration of poverty in the inner city. They pointed out several 
factors affecting poverty concentration in the central city such as government structure, 
local mismanagement, and income limitations. First of all, the federal government was 
removed from the decision of where to place public housing after the Louisville case in 
1935, which decided that providing housing for low income workers was “not a public 
purpose and beyond the scope of the government‟s eminent domain powers” (p.1291). 
After this court decision, local governments became responsible for choosing the location 
of public housing in their jurisdiction. Instead of being dispersed through metropolitan 
governments, public housing was primarily placed in the central city since most suburban 
authorities did not accept construction of housing for the poor. Along with suburban 
reluctance to participate in the program, the requirement known as “equivalent 
elimination” also played a role in excluding suburbs because this provision mandated that 
one unit of substandard housing should be eliminated for each unit of public housing 
constructed. Suburban governments were sometimes unable to participate in the public 
housing program simply because most suburbs did not have enough substandard housing 
(Schill & Wachter, 1995b).  
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Locating public housing in central cities often resulted in high density 
developments since the land values in central city were relatively higher than the 
periphery. Mass construction of high density towers ensured anonymity among residents, 
causing security problems and losing sense of community. Along with poor management 
by local public housing authorities, public housing have also been isolated from outside 
of the projects and often occupied by minorities. In addition, income requirements 
exacerbated the situations. Contrary to the intention to provide decent housing for the 
poor, income limitations ensured the poor would live in housing that was already filled 
with poor households. Plus, the income ceiling forced those who exceed maximum 
income levels to move out of the public housing (Schill & Wachter, 1995b). Through 
those processes, the inner city has been overconcentrated with a poor minority population, 
especially in public housing sites. Contrary to their poor investment in underprivileged 
areas, the federal government has actively promoted home ownership among the working 
poor and the middle class through mortgage assistance programs. According to Schill and 
Watcher (1995b), these programs have sometimes had the effect of destabilizing inner-
city communities and contributing to their transformation into ghettos.  
Goetz (2003) also made a similar argument to Schill and Watcher (1995b). Goetz 
identified the implementation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 as a contributor to the 
flight of the black middle class from inner cities. Plus, homeownership assistance 
programs provided middle class blacks and whites the opportunity to move to new 
suburbs, while the poor were left behind in the inner city neighborhoods with few 
resources that could help stabilize neighborhoods or help them move to the suburbs.  
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At the local government level, the practice of zoning systems is also attributable 
to residential segregation. Local governments have utilized zoning ordinances to maintain 
socially and economically homogeneous neighborhoods, resulting in a stable tax base. 
Common use of zoning ordinances includes minimum lot size, minimum floor space, 
restriction of building multi-family housing, maximum density limitations, and other land 
use controls. Zoning regulations affect the land prices that comprise a substantial portion 
of housing prices. Under the circumstances, the construction of affordable housing 
becomes costly, and limited, or sometimes prohibited; effectively excluding low income 
minorities (Seitles, 1998). 
Downs (1991) indicated three reasons that local governments‟ regulations exclude 
affordable housing in their jurisdictions. The reasons are economic, social, and political 
motivation. The economic reason is that homeowners fear the lower-priced housing in 
proximity to their own, which would reduce the market prices of their homes. Since 
housing is the single largest asset of most homeowners, they tend to be afraid of lowering 
value of that asset. The second motive is primarily social. Invasion of low-income 
residents might produce negative externalities in mostly middle and upper-income 
suburbs. Undesirable consequences include rising crime rates and drug use. In addition, 
construction of high density housing could cause congestion of local facilities. Hence, 
residents in affluent suburbs support local regulations that cause residential and economic 
segregation. The third motive is more political and fiscal. Local governments desire 
ensuring a community‟s tax base by keeping local housing prices rising steadily. By 
excluding high-density housing for lower-income residents, the local governments can 
maintain a tax base without increasing tax rates. As Downs (1991) mentioned, “this gives 
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the members of local government itself a strong motive for maintaining high housing 
prices in their communities” (p.1116). 
The underlying structure enabling local government to restrict housing for low-
income households lies in the fragmented political system that has resulted in 
independent local governments. The issue about land use remains in the hand of state 
governments because the U.S. Constitution says little about it. Historically, land use 
decisions delegated to local governments from state governments. Local governments 
have been responsible to handle the local zoning regulations. Initially started from desires 
of landowners and municipalities to restrict nuisance, local land regulations have evolved 
to separate people of different income and color, to stabilize property values, and to 
protect single-family homes. Only recently they have begun to embrace regional 
approaches such as growth management. Only a few states, such as California, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Oregon, require local governments to provide housing 
opportunities to all income groups (Nelson, Pendall, Dawkins, & Knaap, 2002; Pendall, 
Puentens, & Martin, 2006).  
Researchers found that there is a relationship between the types of land use 
regulations and the availability of affordable housing. Metropolitan areas that adopt 
traditional land use regulations are more likely to have low densities and less likely to 
provide housing opportunities for lower-income residents than those that have embraced 
growth management tools (Pendall et al., 2006). Specifically, Pendall (2000b) referred to 
the process as “chain of exclusion”. Discriminatory results of land use controls affect the 
housing market, excluding minorities from wealthy communities. As a consequence, 
areas that utilize restrictive land use control, such as low-density zoning, tended to reduce 
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rental housing in their jurisdiction, and substantially limit minority residents as well 
(Pendall, 2000b). 
 
3.1.7 Landlord’s resistance and NIMBY phenomenon  
In reality, residential separation is caused by individual discrimination or 
collective action of neighborhoods. Low-income households with rental subsidies have 
faced landlords‟ rejection in renting an appropriate house. More collectively, residents in 
wealthier neighborhoods have resisted locating housing projects for lower-income 
households through land use politics.  
Since the voucher program has operated based on voluntary participation of 
landlords, many voucher holders have had hardships in finding their house when 
landlords discriminate voucher holders. Even though participating in the voucher 
program ensures landlords stable rents, it has not been enough to appeal many landlords 
to accept voucher holders. The Census Bureau (1998) reported several reasons on this 
issue. According to a survey conducted in 1995 for property owners and managers who 
have rental units, over 42% of property owners responded not to accept voucher holders. 
One of the most frequently mentioned reasons of refusing subsidized tenants involved the 
program structure itself. Participating in the voucher program requires landlords to 
comply with regulations such as housing quality standards and periodic inspections. 
Landlords pointed out “too many regulations” and “too much paperwork” as the causes 
of reluctance to join the program. Additionally, the survey found out that many landlords 
were not well informed with the program: less than one in six owners of rental units were 
familiar with the voucher program. Even further, property owners of affordable units 
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were less likely to be familiar with the program than owners of more expensive ones. 
This fact is consistent with findings from Kennedy and Finkel (1994). Using focus group 
study, they concluded that most participants ended up renting from the same set of 
landlords who are familiar with the voucher program.  
At the same time, discrimination against voucher holders is related with 
behavioral problems and stereotypes. The survey (Census Bureau, 1998) pointed out that 
landlords expressed concerns about problems with tenants. In particular, landlords fear 
that renting to poor families would cause property damage, noise, crime, overcrowding, 
and illegal activities, since voucher holders tend to have many children and are more 
likely to stay at home all day because of unemployment (Turner et al., 2000; Johnson-
Spratt, 1999).  Furthermore, as Beck (1996) described, voucher recipients faced 
discrimination simply because of receiving rental subsidies. 
Regardless of their eventual success or failure in finding housing, most recipients 
experience discrimination from at least one landlord because of their Section 8 
status. Possession of a Section 8 subsidy marks its holder as a low-income person, 
a status that with it a multitude of negative stereotypes. (pp.161-162)  
 
In response, several states and local governments prohibit discrimination against 
voucher holders based on the source of income. For example, city ordinances, county 
ordinances, or state statutes are providing in some jurisdictions of California, Maryland, 
and Washington. However, these protections have faced judicial challenges, questioning 
whether such laws are appropriate (Sterken, 2009). 
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In addition to individual landlords, the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) 
phenomenon, especially in the suburbs, has effectively limited most lower-income 
housing to inner cities. Saints et al. (2009) described this process as land use politics. 
Zoning regulations are created, amended, and enforced at the local level, which makes 
zoning a local issue. Local land use is mostly controlled by local ordinances and local 
boards. Local politicians do their best in response to residents in order to reelect or keep 
their position safe. Local residents oppose a project that would adversely affect their 
property, which is usually the single most important investment for their lives. Citizens 
raise their voices based on their perceptions and accordingly act to oppose change in their 
neighborhoods. These changes, so called LULU (locally unwanted land uses), usually 
include public housing projects and affordable housing for low-income households. As 
Saints et al. (2009) noted, 
Land use proposals affect people‟s perceptions – and in politics, perception is 
reality. His perception of the potential danger is real, and it is irrelevant whether 
the perception reflects objective truth. What counts is that the person believes it 
and acts accordingly.  … What people think and believe informs how they act, 
speak, and vote, even (or especially) if they are, objectively speaking, wrong. (pp. 
3-5) 
 
As a result, individually or collectively, property owners have tried to limit 
exposure to externalities, reduce competition for public services, keep neighborhood 
homogeneous, and protect their property values, consequently excluding poor minority 
households. 
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3.1.8 Conclusion  
As reviewed above, residential segregation by income and race cannot be solely 
explained by a single theory since it has involved various aspects encompassing from 
individual preferences and prejudice, economic structural changes, institutional 
discrimination, to policy practices and land use regulations. The Housing Choice 
Voucher Program was created to challenge race and economic segregation by 
encouraging program participants to move into mixed income, racially diverse 
neighborhoods which are usually located in the suburbs. Residents living in 
neighborhoods with high poverty and minorities would be consistently exposed to the 
risk of being unemployed, poor, and dependent to welfare. As Wilson (1987) asserted, in 
order to alleviate the problems of concentrated poverty, one of the pragmatic approaches 
is to give the poor a chance to live outside of the distressed neighborhoods in the inner 
cities. The voucher program is designed to counterbalance previous federal policies that 
caused poverty and minority concentration in the inner city. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The Housing Choice Voucher Program seeks to promote choice or mobility 
among its recipients by enabling them to select the housing of their choice and to 
promote economically mixed-income neighborhoods by utilizing the private market to 
provide housing for low-income individuals and families (U.S. House, 2003).  Due to 
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portability, the voucher program enables qualified families to choose their place to live, 
expecting to move into more affluent neighborhoods than they lived before. Many 
believe that the voucher program offers recipients greater locational choices, contributing 
to poverty deconcentration and race desegregation. 
There are broadly two categories of literature relevant to answering the questions 
regarding whether the voucher program has contributed to achieving deconcentration and 
desegregation goals: location outcomes of voucher recipients and factors affecting their 
location outcomes. Numerous studies have attempted to find the location outcomes of 
voucher recipients from the onset of the program. The majority have analyzed location 
outcomes of vouchers using traditional a-spatial analysis, while spatial analysis has been 
utilized more in recent literature to identify the location of concentrations.  
Research efforts have identified the factors limiting or enlarging voucher holders‟ 
location choice; these factors include individual needs of voucher households, 
accessibility to public transportation, availability of affordable housing, race, market 
conditions, and landlords‟ participation in the program. 
 
3.2.2 Location outcome of voucher recipients 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has encouraged 
housing voucher families to relocate to low-poverty neighborhoods through housing in 
the private market. Often, this goal has been regarded as a success, while sometimes the 
findings do not confirm the goal has been achieved. The evaluation of the voucher 
program has usually been conducted by a comparison of the poverty rate and a proportion 
of minority groups in the census tract by different time, and/or different types of housing 
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projects. The extent to which the housing choice voucher program meets the goal of 
deconcentration of poverty varies by location, such as the inner city or suburban areas, 
and is relatively positive when compared to public housing residents. To date, vouchers 
appear to have been less effective in promoting racial and ethnic integration than in 
helping to deconcentrate poverty. 
However, the majority of studies are a-spatial since they compare several 
indicators in a format of simple cross tabulation. Recently, the spatial approach has 
increased in use when identifying the location of voucher concentrations over space 
(Oakley & Burchfield, 2009; Wang & Varady, 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Wyly & 
DeFilippis, 2010). In the following section, research efforts are reviewed as to how well 
the voucher program contributes to poverty deconcentration and race desegregation, 
incorporating the traditional a-spatial approach and the spatial approach.  
 
3.2.2.1 Poverty deconcentration 
The voucher program has effectively addressed some of the serious shortcomings 
of traditional, project-based housing programs. Many research efforts have found that the 
voucher program has contributed to poverty deconcentration of residents, specifically 
compared to public housing residents. One of the recent comprehensive researches from 
HUD, Devine, Gray, Rubi, and Taghavi (2003) investigated the locational patterns of 
housing voucher recipients residing in the 50 largest metropolitan areas using the 
Multifamily Tenant Characteristics Study and the 1990 census data. They discovered that 
almost 30% of voucher recipients live in the low poverty census tract with poverty 
concentrations below 10%, and less than 10% of voucher holders live in the high poverty 
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census tract with poverty concentrations above 40%. However, the poverty 
deconcentration also varied by location; central city residents were more likely to live in 
a high poverty area. Only 6% of residents who live in suburban areas live in the high 
poverty census tract with poverty concentration above 30% compared to more than 33% 
of recipients in the central city. 
In research to evaluate the Welfare to Work Voucher program, Mills et al. (2006) 
also reported that voucher recipients had a better residential location such as lower 
poverty rate, lower minority concentration. HUD intended to assess the net impacts of the 
Welfare to Work Voucher program on housing conditions, employment outcomes, and 
family well being. This was the result from the five-year research period using total 
sample of 8,371 families who was randomly assigned over the six sites in the country. 
Varady and Walker (2000) found that households relocated from four distressed 
developments in Baltimore, Newport News, VA, Kansas City, MO, and San Francisco 
resided in less impoverished neighborhoods. Likewise, Patterson et al. (2004) discovered 
that participants in the Welfare to Work Voucher Program moved to better 
neighborhoods with voucher subsidies.  
Early evidence suggests that Section 8 vouchers can be successful in helping 
public housing residents relocate to low-poverty neighborhoods. Kingsley et al. (2003) 
found that public housing residents who received vouchers as a result of relocation 
through the HOPE VI program moved to neighborhoods that were less distressed than 
their original neighborhoods. 
When compared to project-based housing, voucher housing is likely to be located 
in lower poverty neighborhoods. One of the most distinguished results was from 
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Newman and Schnare‟s (1997) work. They discovered that only 5.3% of voucher 
recipients nationwide lived in high-poverty neighborhoods, while 36.3% of public 
housing and 12.6% of other HUD-assisted units did. In addition, Hartung and Henig 
(1997) analyzed the census tract data for racial deconcentration and economic integration 
of tenant-based housing and public housing in the Washington D.C. Metropolitan area. 
They found that voucher holders tend to be located in census tracts with higher median 
household incomes compared to public housing, while public housing tends to be located 
in census tracts of low median household incomes. Also, they discovered that voucher 
recipients were more evenly spread throughout the city and suburbs than project based 
housing units. In addition, Devine et al. (2003) also reported the similar results. Whereas 
22% of tenant-based voucher families live in neighborhoods that are at or above the 
moderate-poverty threshold, close to 46% of those participating in project-based section 8 
and fully two-thirds of those participating in the public housing program live in such 
neighborhoods. In fact, almost one-half of public housing families live in neighborhoods 
above the 40% poverty threshold. Similarly, Turner and Wilson‟s (1998) study in six 
metropolitan areas indicated that, compared with public housing residents, voucher 
holders are less likely to live in high-poverty neighborhoods. 
As shown above, there are several results supporting the facts that the voucher 
program helps low-income families move into low-poverty areas; however, there are also 
different outcomes of the voucher holders‟ location pattern. When Feins and Patterson 
(2005) examined the geographic mobility of families with children who entered the 
voucher program between 1995 and 2002, they found inconclusive results. Overall, about 
75% of the families moved during the same period and moving at least once was 
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associated with small improvements in neighborhood quality. Voucher families with 
children moved to neighborhoods which have a slightly lower poverty concentration than 
the ones from which they moved. However, the degree of change in concentrated poverty 
was very small; based on this study, it is hard to confirm that the voucher program 
contributes to poverty deconcentration. In addition, a comparison with Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) did not provide evidence as to how well the voucher 
program facilitates poverty deconcentration. Comparing the effect of vouchers and 
LIHTC in six metropolitan areas, Deng (2007) found that voucher recipients were less 
likely than LIHTC tenants to live in very low-income neighborhoods, but more likely to 
live in low-income neighborhoods. 
On the contrary, there is also contradictory evidence that voucher holders tend to 
cluster in specific neighborhoods which are not significantly different from public 
housing residents. Guhathakurta and Mushkatel (2000) examined the locational patterns 
of three types of subsidized housing, including conventional project-based, Section 8, and 
shelter plus care supported housing in Phoenix, Arizona. The results showed that these 
programs were reinforcing the existing concentration of subsidized housing in some 
neighborhoods, and voucher programs did not achieve the goal of deconcentration of the 
poor. Rather, the census tract with the concentration of voucher housing reflected the 
similar socioeconomic attributes of project-based public housing concentration, such as 
low incomes, high percentage of minorities, and high unemployment.  
Research on public housing relocates also found that even though voucher 
contributed to relocate former public housing tenants to low-poverty neighborhoods, they 
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tended to cluster in minority neighborhoods with moderate poverty rates (Kingsley et al., 
2003).  
Combined with LIHTC projects, voucher holders tend to live in poverty 
concentrated neighborhoods which provide incentives to construct LIHTC projects. One 
of studies discovered that almost one half of all LIHTC developments had at least one 
resident with a voucher (Climaco et al., 2006). In addition, a recent study also showed 
that over 30% of LIHTC units in poverty concentrated neighborhoods had voucher 
holders. The LIHTC housing in poverty concentrated areas was more likely to be 
occupied by voucher recipients. This location outcome of vouchers may cause even 
greater concentrations of poor households in troubled neighborhoods that already suffer 
from a high concentration of the poor (Williamson et al., 2009). The LIHTC is a potential 
source of housing for voucher holders; however, it is difficult to prove that living in 
LIHTC housing constructed in troubled neighborhoods supports the policy goal of 
dispersal of voucher holders away from areas of concentrated poverty. Even further, 
analysis of national datasets across several housing programs revealed that vouchers were 
not helping renters locate in low-poverty areas any more effectively than were current 
project-based subsidies (McClure, 2008). 
While participating in the voucher program gives families an advantage over 
those in place-based subsidy program, the residential choice of voucher families are not 
significantly different from those of unassisted families. When compared with unassisted 
rental households, voucher participants were not much different in terms of their ability 
to avoid poverty concentrated neighborhoods (Newman & Schnare, 1997; Devine et al., 
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2003). Voucher families were only slightly more likely to live in high-poverty 
neighborhoods than unsubsidized tenants living in affordable units (Devine et al., 2003). 
There is a recent study supporting the evidence that vouchers were closed tied to 
neighborhood poverty (DeFilippis & Wyly, 2008). To examine the relationship between 
poverty and vouchers, they conducted the regression analysis. The result revealed that the 
link between housing assistance and neighborhood poverty was strongest for vouchers, 
not for project-based units. Based on the findings, they concluded that the voucher 
program clearly failed to break the link between neighborhood poverty if poverty was 
used as the indicator of program success, at least for the case of New York City. 
Different from the traditional approach reviewed above, recent efforts have 
considered the spatial pattern and location of clusters of voucher households (Oakley & 
Burchfield, 2009; Wang & Varady, 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Wyly & DeFilippis, 2010). 
As far as the policy goal is concerned, Wang et al. (2008) did not find enough evidence 
that the voucher program had contributed to poverty deconcentration. Using hot spot 
analysis in eight U.S. metropolitan areas, Wang et al. (2008) concluded that there was 
little evidence that the voucher program was promoting poverty or minority 
deconcentration. They failed to find the supporting evidence that the voucher program 
had contributed to promoting income and race diversity since the proportion of voucher 
households in high-poverty and high-minority block groups remained stable during the 
2000 to 2005 period. They also indicated that although voucher recipients were becoming 
less concentrated in hot spots in Chicago and Phoenix, the opposite was true in the other 
metropolitan areas, especially in New York, Cincinnati, and Baltimore. Based on their 
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findings, it is hard to confirm that HCVP has positively affected neighborhood diversity 
and contributed to deconcentration of poverty.  
Using spatial analytic techniques, Oakley and Burchfield (2009) analyzed the 
spatial pattern of voucher holders who relocated from public housing projects in Chicago. 
They identified significant spatial clustering of voucher holders, and this pattern 
negatively related with factors indicating neighborhood disadvantages, such as, poverty 
rate, unemployment rate, and minority composition. Their findings showed that voucher 
housing tends to be clustered in poor African American neighborhoods where the 
majority of relocated public housing residents settle.   
A more recent study in New York revealed disappointing results regarding how 
the voucher program fails to achieve poverty concentration. Wyly and DeFilippis (2010) 
analyzed three types of housing programs in New York including conventional public 
housing, project-based Section 8, and housing voucher holders. Contrary to program 
expectations, voucher holders are more likely to live in poverty stricken neighborhoods 
than public housing residents. More than 40% of voucher recipients live in 
neighborhoods where there is a significant spatial clustering of severe poverty, while less 
than 30% of public housing residents do so. A more rigorous analysis to disentangle the 
relative effects of different types of housing on neighborhood poverty confirms the 
spatial pattern of concentration. In this study, several models were utilized from ordinary 
least squares regression (OLS), through spatial models, to geographically weighted 
regression. Yet, all models confirmed that even after controlling for racial composition 
and spatial autocorrelation, vouchers had a stronger link to the neighborhood poverty rate 
than all the other types of housing projects. Specifically, voucher holders‟ location choice 
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was inevitably confined to the outlying parts of the city, implying that vouchers play a 
significant role in poverty reconcentration in these areas.  
On the other hand, even though clustering of voucher recipients is a cause of 
concern in several neighborhoods, national research suggests that clustering is not a 
widespread problem. Devine et al. (2003) indicated that vouchers are occupied in only a 
small portion of the total occupied housing stock. Similarly, Kingsley et al. (2003) stated 
that only a few sites witnessed the clustering, which means a large number of relocated 
households were living in the same census tracts as when they analyzed HUD 
administrative data. 
 
3.2.2.2 Race desegregation 
While many efforts have been devoted to finding out whether the voucher 
program helps poverty deconcentration, researchers have also been interested in the 
location outcomes of race. A recent study discovered that the voucher program helped 
prevent minority concentration in poor neighborhoods (McClure, 2008). An analysis 
using the national database of LIHTC and voucher holders indicated that race and 
ethnicity appeared to play a significant role in how well the voucher program promotes 
movement to low-poverty areas. Minority voucher households did not locate in low-
poverty tracts at the same rate as others. In this analysis, only 17% of black and 19% of 
Hispanic voucher households lived in low-poverty census tracts, which were well below 
the percentage of affordable units, total black households, and total Hispanic households: 
30%, 26%, and 29% respectively.   
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Also, a case study of Columbus, OH implied that racial desegregation has been 
successful in that area (Teater, 2008). The researcher analyzed the survey data of 
residential mobility and found that the mobility of voucher recipients did not predict a 
change in poverty, and a recipient‟s race did not predict a change in racial composition. 
The findings suggested that poverty deconcentration and racial desegregation had been 
achieved in the study area. 
Hartung and Henig (1997) compared location outcomes of the voucher programs 
and project-based programs in the Washington, DC area.  They reported a positive result. 
The authors found that voucher and certificate holders were less concentrated in poor and 
minority neighborhoods than residents of project-based public housing. They also 
specifically focused their research on whether vouchers promote racial integration and 
the dispersal of low-income residents throughout a metropolitan area. They discovered 
that both public housing and project-based subsidized housing were far more 
concentrated in the District of Columbia than certificates and vouchers. Vouchers were 
more evenly spread throughout the city and suburbs. 
Furthermore, nationwide study conducted by Newman and Schnare (1997) also 
provided a positive outcome. When neighborhoods were defined as segregated, more 
than 40% of households were headed by minorities, the vouchers appeared more 
integrated than public housings and other HUD subsidized units: 26.4%, 55.4%, and 
34.5% respectively. In a study of six metropolitan areas, Turner and Wilson (1998) also 
found that black and Hispanic voucher recipients are more likely to live in high-poverty 
neighborhoods than their white counterparts. 
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However, analyzing data from the experimental design study of the Effects of 
Housing Vouchers on Welfare Families, Gubits et al. (2009) reported that the voucher 
program had some effect on diminishing racial concentration by enabling African 
American families to move to more racially diverse neighborhoods. However, the effects 
were modest in size and concentrated among black families who started in the poorest 
and most racially segregated neighborhoods. Based on their findings the authors 
remarked that “we cannot rely on vouchers by themselves … to reduce racial 
concentrations” (p.3). 
Moreover, many research efforts have also shown that the voucher program did 
not work well in race desegregation. One of the studies found that minority voucher 
recipients were more likely to end up in high-poverty neighborhoods than nonminority 
recipients, even after controlling other factors (Basolo & Ngyuen, 2005). Based on the 
findings, they concluded that “the assumption that choice will result in deconcentrating 
poverty and minorities is not strongly supported by our data” (p.319). Similar result 
found in other site. DeFilippis and Wyly (2008) compared project-based and tenant-based 
housing assistance in New York City. They reported that the voucher program as a 
deconcentration mechanism, did not work better than project-based programs. The racial 
composition of each program‟s clients closely mirrored the neighborhoods in which they 
live. Combined together, those findings strongly suggest that the voucher program did not 
promote the deconcentration of poverty or the desegregation of people of color, relative 
to the project-based housing program.  
Furthermore, Polikoff (1995) found evidence that voucher recipients were simply 
relocating to neighborhoods with similar racial characteristics. Specifically, 7,500 
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voucher recipients in 19 public housing agencies were tracked and census data used to 
compare characteristics of their pre-program and post-program neighborhoods. The level 
of concentration at the neighborhood level did not change when pre-program and post-
program locations were compared.  
In addition, McClure‟s (2004) study showed that in Kansas City, voucher 
recipients did not use vouchers to move to areas of greater employment opportunity, but 
rather, remained in racially concentrated areas with fewer job prospects. Still, voucher 
concentrations were most likely to be found in predominantly minority communities with 
high proportions of poverty rate. Black and Hispanic voucher holders were more likely 
than White households to live in census tracts with poverty concentrations above 30% 
(Devine et al., 2003). Even though minority voucher holders were less likely to be found 
in low-poverty areas compared to the total minority population, the degree of fostering 
deconcentration was not an impressive amount (McClure, 2008). With an analysis of 
national databases, McClure (2008) concluded that the project-based LIHTC program has 
been more effective in deconcentrating low income households into low-poverty areas 
than the household-based voucher program. 
Despite conflicting results, the voucher program seems to perform relatively 
better than place-based housing programs in terms of poverty deconcentration and race 
desegregation. This is no surprise considering the origin and the characteristics of the 
voucher program; the program was developed to address the deep rooted problem of 
poverty concentration in public housing. The voucher program enables low-income 
households to move out of poor neighborhoods through portable vouchers allowing 
freedom of choice to reside. However, recent studies also identified the poor performance 
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of the voucher program in dispersing poor residents over a wider geographic area. 
Several factors were attributed to reasons why voucher holders tend to concentrate or 
inevitably choose to live in poor neighborhoods: voucher holder preferences (individual 
needs), the accessibility to public transportation, the availability of affordable housing, 
market conditions, and landlords‟ participation in the voucher program. These factors 
will be examined in the following section.  
 
3.2.3 Factors affecting voucher recipients’ location outcome  
As Tiebout (1956) implies, households sort themselves into communities with 
similar tastes and incomes. People tend to live in neighborhoods with similar socio-
economic characteristics and backgrounds. This natural tendency results in voluntary 
segregation, while barriers to enter specific neighborhoods cause involuntary residential 
segregation. Voucher holders have also experienced similar obstacles in locating 
appropriate residences. Although HUD has encouraged low-income families to relocate 
to more affluent areas, often this goal has not been achieved in many cases. Many 
voucher recipients make short-distance moves, often to areas of concentrated poverty 
with high proportions of minorities or to fragile neighborhoods experiencing racial 
change (Goetz, 2002; Khadduri, 2001; Popkin & Cunningham, 2000). Previous literature 
suggests that voucher concentrations are most likely to be found in predominantly black 
communities, in areas with high proportions of families in poverty, and in communities 
with abundant low-cost rental properties (Hartung & Henig, 1997).  
These locational outcomes and clustering reflect several factors including 
personal preference, market conditions, and discrimination. With personal preferences, 
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voucher holders may demonstrate an unwillingness to move away from friends, relatives, 
and accessible public transportation. Market conditions may be tight causing a lack in 
availability of affordable rental housing. Discrimination may occur through a 
combination of unwilling landlord participation, race, and voucher status (Goetz, 2003; 
Finkel & Buron, 2001; Penall, 2000; Popkin & Cunningham, 2000; Turner, 2003; Varady 
et al., 2001). The next section will discuss these factors affecting voucher holders‟ 
location outcomes.  
 
3.2.3.1 Personal preferences 
One of the main factors influencing residential choice is the desire to be close to 
family, friends, and/or services such as desirable schools. Voucher holders exhibit these 
same personal preferences when they search for housing. Since the voucher program 
explicitly leaves the final decision about location up to the particular families, their needs 
and preferences play a critical part in explaining patterns of geographic clustering. 
Varady et al. (2001) provided the survey results of voucher mobility in four cities: 
Baltimore, MD; Newport News, VA; Kansas City, MO; San Francisco, CA. They found 
that distance played an insignificant role in the neighborhood satisfaction of voucher 
recipients. The results showed that short distance moving decision were attributed to the 
proximity of friends, family members, schools, public transportation, and surrounding 
neighborhoods. Voucher recipients sought to remain in or close to their neighborhoods to 
be near friends and relatives and a familiar public transportation system. Thus, long 
distance moving toward suburban areas does not necessarily guarantee a high level of 
neighborhood satisfaction. According to this study, voucher recipients who made short-
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distance moves were just as likely to be satisfied as those who made longer-distance 
moves. Recipients making short-distance moves can be very satisfied with their new 
home because they know the neighborhoods, their children do not have to change schools, 
and they are close to friends, family, jobs, and public transportation, even though the new 
neighborhood is essentially the same as their former one.  
In addition, according to McClure (2001), voucher holders often made short-
distance moves, and as a result, lived in neighborhoods where the proportions of poor 
residents and minorities were only slightly lower than that at their previous location. 
Specifically, researchers discovered that the majority of recipients stayed within five 
miles of their original place of residence. This result came from the comparison of the 
preprogram and destination addressed for a one-year cohort of new Section 8 recipients 
in the District of Columbia and its suburbs (Cunningham et al., 1999). 
Focus group interviews in Chicago, Popkin and Cunningham (2000) also found 
that the lack of transportation acts as a barrier to searching for housing. Since many 
voucher holders had very low incomes and no cars, they inevitably relied on public 
transportation. Popkin et al. (2000) confirmed that voucher holders had concerns about 
lack of transportation or services in suburban neighborhoods. Thus, the availability and 
accessibility of public transportation plays a critical role in voucher holders‟ locational 
outcomes. 
 
3.2.3.2 Race factors 
Race plays a significant role in spatial patterns of voucher recipients. To some 
degree, locational outcomes of vouchers reflect the racial discrimination or preferences of 
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the same race. Studies on residential mobility indicated that minorities were less likely to 
move to predominantly White neighborhoods and more likely to move to minority or 
racially mixed neighborhoods (Stearns & Logan, 1986; South & Crowder, 1998). 
However, in another case, few Blacks expressed a preference for living in predominantly 
Black neighborhoods (Harris, 2001).  For Asians and Hispanics, voluntary ethnic 
clustering appeared to play a role in explaining neighborhood outcomes (Alba, Logan, & 
Stults, 2000). 
Personal preferences have been invoked as one of the factors that explain the 
patterns of racial segregation in cities (Clark, 1986). The preferences hypothesis argues 
that residential segregation reflects the different preferences of blacks and whites. 
According to this hypothesis, both races desire to live in neighborhoods where they are 
numerically dominant. Hence, blacks and whites would live in different neighborhoods 
even though they have similar incomes because of their different tastes not discrimination. 
Based on survey in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, Clark (1992) concluded that the 
expressed preference for own race/own ethnicity was likely to maintain present patterns 
of separation in U.S. metropolitan areas.  
Farley, Fielding, and Krysan (1997) confirmed that racial preferences affected 
residential choices. They analyzed the residential preferences of a sample of Blacks and 
Whites in four metropolitan areas, using several tests to evaluate preference for and 
comfort with neighborhoods of different racial makeup. They found that Whites‟ 
willingness to move into a neighborhood was inversely related to the density of Blacks 
living there. Black preferred integrated neighborhoods, but ones with a substantial 
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representation of Blacks. Only 35% of the Black was willing to move into an all-white 
neighborhood. 
While racial discrimination is often subtle, most voucher recipients expressed 
their fears of encountering discrimination when they began to search for housing. Using a 
focus group study in Chicago, researchers found that many voucher holders experienced 
discrimination when searching neighborhoods due to their race. Many families expressed 
concerns about potential discrimination if they were to move (Popkin & Cunningham, 
2000). Another research confirmed that voucher families seeking to move to low-
minority areas had to overcome several barriers including a fear of experiencing 
discrimination in predominantly white areas (Popkin et al., 2000). A mail survey of 
voucher holders in California revealed that voucher recipients faced significant budget, 
supply constraints, and most likely discrimination (Basolo & Ngyuen, 2005).   
At the same time, mixed with fear of possible racial discrimination, there was a 
personal preference and comfortability remaining near the same race. Although African 
Americans appear to prefer an integrated neighborhood to an all-black one, they also 
prefer an all-black neighborhood to a mostly white one. Even though racially integrated 
stable neighborhoods exist (Ellen, 1998), they are more the exception than the case 
(Pendall, 2000a). 
The severity of racial segregation also affects residential choices. Deng (2007) 
found that the more segregated an MSA, the more likely a voucher-assisted family is to 
live in a highly segregated neighborhood. In addition, the degree of racial segregation 
even outweighed the influence of weak market conditions in terms of voucher 
concentration (Deng, 2007). While the severity of racial segregation persisted, personal 
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preference, fear, and lack of information available to minority voucher holders also 
contributed to the concentration of minority voucher holders.  
 
3.2.3.3 Availability of affordable housing 
The geographic choice of voucher recipients has been limited by the availability 
of affordable housing. To some degree, location patterns of voucher units may simply 
mirror the geographic distribution of affordable rental housing. There are two aspects 
constraining a voucher holders‟ location choice: the voucher program itself and land use 
regulation. 
As far as the program requirements are concerned, there are several steps be for 
voucher holders can lease a unit: finding a unit under the specific rent level, landlord‟s 
willingness to accept vouchers, and ensuring housing quality standards for a unit. 
Qualified voucher families should find a unit at or below the local payment standard. 
Payment standards are set by local housing authorities and can range between 90 and 
110% of Fair Market Rent (FMR) by HUD. HUD releases FMR every year for 
metropolitan areas based on rent levels in the local housing market. Finding a unit at or 
below the local payment standard can be difficult in tight housing markets where 
landlords can lease their units for rents above the FMR. However, finding a unit below 
the FMR does not necessarily mean the voucher household can lease the unit. The 
landlord still has a choice whether to accept the voucher. Plus, the unit should pass the 
housing quality standards.  
Among those factors, availability of affordable housing units is crucial in locating 
voucher recipients. Turner and Wilson (1998) analyzed six metropolitan areas and found 
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that Section 8 recipients were significantly less widely dispersed geographically than the 
below fair market rent stock in four out of six metropolitan areas and that affordable 
housing is relatively more plentiful in the central city than in the suburbs. In the 
aggregate, the ratio of affordable housing to occupied housing units in central cities was 
about double what it was in suburban areas (Devine et al., 2003). Similarly, Ladd and 
Ludwig (1997) estimated that only 15% of the dwellings in suburban Baltimore have 
rents below the HUD-established limits, compared with 30% of dwellings in the city. 
However, the ratio of vouchers to all affordable housing units showed little difference 
when comparing the central city and the suburban areas, 6.2% in the former and 6.4% in 
the latter (Devine et al., 2003). Low-cost rental housing units are not always in desirable 
neighborhoods.  
On the other hand, many affluent suburbs have utilized zoning and land use 
regulations to limit the development of rental housing in order to maintain their property 
tax base and social homogeneity. As a consequence, the rental housing stock tends to be 
located in the central cities, older suburbs, and less- affluent neighborhoods. Thus, 
voucher recipients may be effectively excluded from some desirable neighborhoods by 
the absence of affordable rental housing in these communities (Turner & Cunningham, 
2000). In many cases, voucher holders are constrained to living in less-affluent 
neighborhoods.  
Pendall (2008) also argued that local land use regulations are critically important 
in the location of subsidized households because local governments have the authority to 
approve or disapprove sites for subsidized housing. Hence, families with vouchers cannot 
live in areas without rental housing and are unlikely to choose jurisdictions whose 
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policies have raised rents above fair market rents. A case representing these local land 
use regulations is Parma, OH. This large Cuyahoga County suburb was given a federal 
housing integration order in 1980 due to the patterns and practices of intentional racial 
discrimination. The court order required the city of Parma not to use its planning and 
zoning powers to exclude low- and moderate-income rental housing development 
(Keating, 1994).  
 
3.2.3.4 Market conditions 
Market conditions are another factor affecting voucher recipients‟ location 
outcomes. Families participating in the voucher program were more likely to find 
housing units in soft market conditions than in tight housing markets (Finkel & Buron, 
2001). However, soft housing markets did not necessarily guarantee the success of 
helping voucher holders find housing out of distressed neighborhoods (Pendall, 2000a). 
In a study of six MSAs, the soft market conditions did not grant voucher families more 
choices of quality neighborhoods. Specifically in Cleveland, persistent racial segregation 
diminished the positive outcome for voucher families (Deng, 2007).  
In general, voucher holders are expected to have more chances to search for 
housing in less poverty stricken neighborhoods when housing market conditions are not 
tight. However, Deng (2007) indicated that voucher holders in soft markets live in either 
very low or low income neighborhoods, and they are more likely to do so than the 
voucher families in the tight housing markets. To examine the local market environment, 
Deng (2007) considered two factors: rental vacancy rates and job-housing balance, which 
is the ratio of job growth to new housing construction.  
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Finkel and Buron (2001) used several indicators to determine local housing 
market conditions, including estimates of vacancy rates, PHA assessments of the local 
market, and local FMRs and payment standards. First, the vacancy rates consisted of two 
measures: the estimated vacancy rates and the census vacancy measure. The former 
included estimated vacancy rates in the portion of the market available to voucher 
holders; the latter was the census vacancy rates for metropolitan areas, using a three-year 
weighted average of the rental vacancy rate to smooth out the data. Their findings 
suggested that the tighter the market conditions, the harder it was for voucher recipients 
to find housing. Specifically, vacancy rate was the most significant indictor to predict the 
success of finding units by voucher recipients.  
 
3.2.3.5 Landlord’s participation 
Related to market conditions, landlord participation also limits or enlarges the 
choice of voucher location. The voucher program encourages landlords to participate in 
the program, benefiting stable payments and ensuring fair market rental rates. However, 
landlords who own rental property in desirable neighborhoods might not be motivated to 
participate in the voucher program, especially when the market demand is strong. In 
addition, some landlords report not wanting to join the program due to the bureaucratic 
procedures of public housing agencies (Turner & Cunningham, 2000).  
Many landlords either lack information about the voucher program or find 
participation unattractive. To rent a unit to a voucher recipient, the landlord must submit 
to unit inspection and other paperwork that would not be necessary to rent to an 
unsubsidized tenant. One of extensive surveys showed the attitudes of landlords toward 
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the voucher program.
7
 Only about one in six owners of single-family rental units was 
very familiar with the voucher program; however, owners of multifamily rental properties 
were much more aware of the program. The landlords who would not accept voucher 
tenants most often cited three reasons: “potential problems with tenants, too many 
regulations, and too much paperwork” (HUD, 1997, p.9). Likewise, based on focus 
groups with participating landlords, Kennedy and Finkel (1994) found that most 
participants ended up renting from the same set of landlords who are familiar with the 
Section 8 market and choose to rent to Section 8 recipients.  
Moreover, many of the landlords who participated in the voucher program 
reported that they made only part of their units available to voucher families, while other 
units were not available for vouchers. This pattern has been verified in the Washington, 
D.C. and Chicago areas (Cunningham et al., 1999). 
Generally, the landlord participation in the voucher program will be higher when 
the market condition is weak. As housing prices and rent have decreased, landlords have 
had difficulty finding tenants or leasing their units at market rate. In other cases, in weak 
market conditions homeowners have had difficulties selling or have been reluctant to sell 
their housing units, so they have decided to participate in the voucher program waiting 
for a market recovery since participating in the voucher program ensures fair market rent.  
Not much has been done to measure the degree of landlords‟ participation in the 
program as a predictor of voucher locations. Considering landlord participation in the 
voucher program, Finkel and Buron (2001) estimated the success rate of voucher 
                                               
7 U.S. Housing Market Conditions (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, February 1997) 
reported on information about the Section 8 tenant-based program collected in the Property Owners and 
Managers Survey (POMS) conducted for HUD by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
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recipients. Success rates were higher in markets where PHA staff assessed landlords‟ 
acceptance of the program was high. Most voucher holders were found in local market 
areas in which PHA staff thought there was a moderate degree of landlord acceptance of 
the program. Rate of success in finding an appropriate housing unit within specific time 
frames seemed to be high when more landlords participated in the program. However, 
there are two caveats of this result. First, the difference between the markets with high 
and moderate acceptance rates was not statistically significant. The proportion of 
households in the market with high and moderate acceptance was 30% and 68% 
respectively; the success rate of each group in each market was 73% and 67%, 
respectively. So, while fewer households lived in highly acceptable markets, the 
possibility of finding housing in them was higher than voucher households living in 
moderately acceptable market conditions. Second, the variable used in the regression 
model to represent landlord acceptance was based on personal judgment of staff in each 
public housing authority during a telephone interview. The survey instrument showed 
there are three options to this question: perception of landlord acceptance of Section 8 is 
“high”, “moderate”, and “little or no acceptance”. Only one out of 48 PHAs in the study 
answered this question as “little or no acceptance”. Even though the authors tried to 
consider the effect of the degree of landlord participation on vouchers, the results were 
not statistically significant and were not free from the generalization problems.  
 
3.2.4 Conclusion and limitations of previous research 
As reviewed earlier, there is growing literature on the distribution of voucher 
recipients. However, these studies showed mixed evidences on the success of vouchers 
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allowing poor households to move into neighborhoods which are less segregated and 
more affluent. To data, the voucher program appears to be less effective in promoting 
racial integration than in helping to deconcentrate poverty. Moreover, many of these 
research pieces have focused on national aggregations and there has been little 
consideration of spatial aspects of location outcome.  
Most of aforementioned studies have focused on the poverty rates and/or minority 
composition in a given geographic areas in order to show that voucher holders tend to 
live in less poverty stricken and less racially segregated neighborhoods over time (Devine 
et al., 2003; Hartung & Henig, 1997; Kingley et al., 2000;  Polikoff, 1995). In another 
case, comparisons between project-based programs and the voucher program made 
convincing arguments that the voucher program is successful to minority desegregation 
and poverty deconcentration (Newman & Schnare, 1997; Hartung & Henig, 1997). Both 
of these approaches are a-spatial, simply comparing non spatial cross tabulation across 
geographies. Recently, more researchers have been considering spatial aspects of voucher 
locations (Oakley & Burchfield, 2009; Wang & Varady, 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Wyly 
& DeFilippis, 2010). They have sought to determine whether there was spatial 
concentration and where the vouchers were clustered. Examining spatial aspects of 
voucher locations revealed that voucher holders still tended to cluster, to some degree, in 
specific neighborhoods depending on several factors. Hence, exploratory spatial data 
analysis is needed to identify the presence of spatial concentrations and the locations of 
clusters to uncover the spatial patterns of voucher holders‟ location outcomes over space 
and over time. This analysis also should be disaggregated by race and by income to 
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answer the questions regarding whether the voucher program helps race desegregation 
and poverty deconcentration.  
Several factors were identified in influencing the location outcome of voucher 
holders, including personal preferences, market conditions, and racial segregation. 
Residential segregation was caused by both voluntary and involuntary processes (Bourne, 
1981). Voucher holder‟s personal preferences and non personal barriers played 
significant roles in location outcomes. Often voucher holders chose their residence 
simply to gain proximity to family, friends, churches, and services (Varady et al., 2001; 
Varady & Walker, 2007). Likewise, their income level caused them to limit location 
choices to areas served by public transportation (Varady et al., 2001; Popkin & 
Cunningham, 2000). Race played a significant role in the spatial patterns of voucher 
recipients. To some degree, locational outcomes of vouchers reflect the racial 
discrimination or preference of the same race to cluster in neighborhoods. Many voucher 
holders revealed their fears of encountering discrimination when they began to search for 
housing (Popkin & Cunningham, 2000). In addition to race, market conditions limited or 
enlarged the choice of voucher location. Generally, weak markets tended to provide more 
opportunities to finding voucher housing in areas other than the central city (Finkel & 
Buron, 2001). Since weak markets slows housing sales prices, increases vacancy rates, 
and lowers rent levels, landlords have an incentive to participate in the program that 
ensures them stable rent based on the fair market rent, which would not be expected in 
stressed economic times. One of the most important factors influencing location pattern 
was the availability of affordable housing. The location patterns of voucher families tend 
to mirror the geographic distribution of affordable rental housing units. Several research 
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pieces confirmed the relationship between voucher location and the availability of 
affordable housing (Devine et al., 2003; Ladd & Ludwig, 1997; Turner & Wilson, 1998; 
Turner & Cunningham, 2000). 
As illustrated earlier, even though many research efforts found that the 
accessibility to public transportation played a critical role in voucher holders‟ location 
choice, no research has been conducted to estimate the effect on location outcomes. In 
addition, many researchers suggest that market conditions affect the choice of location 
for voucher families, but only part of them examined the statistical significance, so it was 
hard to exclude the confounding effects other than market condition factors (Finkel & 
Buron, 2001; Oakley & Burchfield, 2009; Pendall, 2000a; Wyly & DeFilippis, 2010). 
Also, previous research showed that there was no consensus of factors representing 
market conditions: vacancy rate, ratio of job growth to housing construction, affordable 
housing units under FMR, the absolute level of the FMR itself, PHA‟s assessment of the 
local market, adequacy of local payment standards are all used in the literature (Deng, 
2007; Pendall, 2000a; Finkel & Buron, 2001). Among those indicators, vacancy rates and 
availability of affordable housing at or below FMRs were the most commonly used as 
relevant variables to explain vouchers‟ location outcomes. 
Thus, this study will test the significance of several factors explaning voucher 
locations using the spatial regression model. This study will incorporate factors identified 
as influential to location outcome: the accessibility of public transportation, availability 
of affordable housing, vacancy rates, and racial composition. Furthermore, spatial 
regression and geographically weighted regression will account for spatial 
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autocorrelation and spatially varying relationships, which OLS regression analysis fails to 
capture when dealing with spatial data.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 Hypotheses and Model 
 
4.1.1 Research questions and hypotheses 
The purpose of this study is to examine how the voucher program works in terms 
of patterns and factors influencing spatial concentration in Cuyahoga County. There are 
two sets of research questions and hypotheses. The first set is to address the questions on 
spatial patterns of voucher recipients. The second set is to identify the factors affecting 
voucher holders spatial concentration. 
First, the voucher program is expected to achieve deconcentration of poverty by 
utilizing mobility of voucher holders. If the voucher program properly achieved its 
deconcentration and desegregation goals, voucher recipients would be shown in scattered 
patterns, not concentrated in specific neighborhoods. Thus, it could be hypothesized that 
88 
 
voucher recipients in Cleveland would not concentrate in poor neighborhoods. The first 
set of research questions and corresponding hypotheses are as follows. 
First, is there spatial clustering of voucher recipients?  
Ho: There is no spatial clustering of voucher recipients. 
Ha: Voucher recipients concentrate spatially. 
 
Second, is there spatial clustering of voucher recipients with different races, 
different ethnic backgrounds, and different income levels?  
Ho: There is no difference of spatial patterns of voucher recipients by different 
races, ethnic backgrounds, and income levels. 
Ha: Spatial patterns of voucher recipients vary by different races, ethnic 
backgrounds, and income levels. 
 
Third, are spatial patterns of voucher recipients changing over time?  
Ho: There is no difference of spatial patterns of voucher recipients over time. 
Ha: Spatial patterns of voucher recipients change over time. 
 
Exploring spatial patterns will be followed by specific questions pertaining to 
factors associated with location outcomes of voucher households. These factors include 
public transportation, affordable housing, market conditions, race, and poverty. 
Accessibility to public transportation plays a critical role in choosing residence for 
voucher recipients due to their low income level. Availability of affordable housing 
turned out pivotal elements to limiting or enlarging residential choice of voucher holders. 
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In addition, voucher recipients would have more choices in a weak market than in a 
strong one. Since the weak market shows high vacancy rate and low rent, landlords have 
an incentive to participate in the program. Thus, the regression model in this study will 
examine five hypotheses on which factors are attributable to spatial concentration of 
voucher holders. 
First, voucher recipients are limited their location choice by the availability of 
affordable housing whose rent levels do not exceed the Fair Market Rents (FMRs). I 
expect therefore a significant positive relationship between the proportion of voucher 
households and the proportion of affordable housing below FMRs in block groups. 
Research question and corresponding hypotheses are as follows: 
Does availability of affordable housing affect voucher holders‟ concentration? 
Ho: There is no relationship between concentration of voucher recipients and 
availability of affordable housing. 
Ha: Concentration of voucher recipients is related positively with the availability 
of affordable housing. 
 
Second, I expect that voucher holders‟ race will influence the spatial 
concentration. Preferences for the same race as well as racial segregation would affect 
minority concentration. Considering the fact that the majority of voucher holders are head 
by African American in Cuyahoga County, I expect a significant relationship between 
minority and voucher concentration in neighborhoods. If the relationship is statistically 
positive and significant, it would imply racial preferences and segregation influence the 
voucher concentration. Research question and hypotheses are posed as: 
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Does race affect voucher recipients‟ concentration? 
Ho: There is no relationship between concentration of voucher recipients and 
racial composition in neighborhoods. 
Ha: Concentration of voucher recipients are positively related with minority 
concentration in neighborhoods. 
 
Third, voucher holders‟ concentration is expected to relate positively with the 
rental vacancy rate. When a large proportion of the rental stock is vacant, tenants have 
more choices and landlords have fewer incentives to discriminate against voucher holders. 
In this situation, landlords have more incentives to participate in the voucher program. 
Hence, voucher recipients will have more chances to find housing units in neighborhoods 
showing higher vacancy rates. Thus, research question and null and alternative 
hypotheses are stated as follows: 
Do rental vacancy rates affect voucher recipients‟ locations? 
Ho: There is no relationship between concentration of voucher recipients and the 
rental vacancy rates. 
Ha: Concentration of voucher recipients are positively related with the rental 
vacancy rates. 
 
Fourth, concentrations of voucher recipients have related with neighborhood 
poverty rates. In general, low income households tend to live in high poverty 
neighborhoods. However, the voucher program subsidizes rents for low income 
households to live in less distressed neighborhoods, and the program tries to contribute to 
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poverty deconcentration. Considering those characteristics, if successfully implemented, 
the poverty rates and voucher concentrations would have a negative relationship. On the 
other hand, if the program is not successful to disperse low income voucher holders, the 
result would have a positive relationship between voucher concentration and 
neighborhood poverty rates.  
Does poverty rate affect voucher recipients‟ location? 
Ho: There is no relationship between concentration of voucher recipients and the 
poverty rate. 
Ha: Concentration of voucher recipients are related with the poverty rate. 
 
Finally, voucher recipients will locate residences where public transportation is 
accessible. Voucher holders are low-income households: the average income is $10,886 
as of 2009 in Cuyahoga County. Therefore, the chance of having a car is very low and 
their location choice is inevitably limited by the accessibility of public transportation. 
Thus, I expect a significant positive relationship between voucher holders and the 
accessibility of public transportation. Research question and a pair of hypotheses are as 
follows: 
Does the accessibility of public transportation affect voucher recipients‟ location? 
Ho: There is no relationship between concentration of voucher recipients and the 
accessibility to public transportation. 
Ha: Concentration of voucher recipients are positively related with the 
accessibility to public transportation.  
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4.1.2 Model 
How can we explain the concentration of voucher recipients? Here is a formal 
model based on the literature and theories discussed earlier for attempting to answer this 
question: 
uTRANPORTPOVERTYVACANCY
HISPANICASIANBLACKAFFORDHY


765
43210


 
Y represents the dependent variable, which is the percentage of voucher units among the 
total occupied housing units in a block group. AFFORDH is the proportion of rental 
housing units below FMRs in a block group. BLACK, ASIAN, and HISPANIC are, 
respectively, the proportion of Black, Asian, and Hispanic population. VACANCY is the 
rental housing vacancy rate, which is calculated as vacant dwelling available for rent 
divided by the total number of occupied rentals and vacant for rent dwellings. POVERTY 
is the proportion of persons living below the poverty level. TRANSPORT is the 
proportion of area accessible to public bus stops within a quarter mile distance, which is 
first defined by Clarence Perry (1929) in Neighborhood Unit concept as a desirable 
walking distance for daily-routine.
8
 
 
4.2 Data 
 
                                               
8
 Clarence Perry (1929) introduced a concept of “neighborhood unit” as an ideal residential neighborhood 
with school, churches, and recreational areas. The neighborhood unit design allowed residents to walk no 
more than a quarter mile to reach these community facilities and discouraged unwanted through traffic. 
School was placed in the center of the neighborhood so children could reach school within a quarter mile 
distance without crossing a major arterial street. Major arterial streets along the perimeter defined and 
distinguished the neighborhood. Since its inception, the neighborhood unit has widely served as the 
primary design concept for new residential development.  
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This study will investigate the voucher program‟s effect as a case study of 
Cuyahoga County. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) is the housing 
agency that administers the Housing Choice Voucher Program in Cuyahoga County. 
Chartered in 1933, CMHA is the first housing authority in the United States, and it is one 
of the ten largest housing authorities in the country. CMHA provided the voucher 
information of address, income, race, and rent level from 2005 to 2009. At the end of 
2009, a total of 14,043 vouchers were issued by CMHA in Cuyahoga County. 
  In addition to voucher information, 2000 census data at a block group level will 
be used in regression analysis to get neighborhood characteristics such as poverty rates, 
vacancy rates, minority proportions, and affordable housing units. The U.S. Census 
Bureau data is available at the block group level to account for neighborhood 
characteristic variables.  
Lastly, this study needs public transportation data which identify the routes and 
bus stops in Cuyahoga County. Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency 
(NOACA) provided the information as of 2009. Information from NOACA will be used 
to calculate the proportion of area in each block group that is accessible to public 
transportation within a quarter mile distance.  
   
4.3 Hotspot analysis 
 
To investigate the first set of questions pertaining to locational outcomes, this 
study will utilize spatial analyses, including dot mapping, density mapping, and hot spot 
analysis. First, the spatial pattern of voucher holders, over time, will be examined 
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employing hot spot analysis followed by geocoding voucher addresses. This analysis is 
useful to examine changes of voucher recipients‟ spatial concentration patterns for a 
particular area over time (Wang & Varady, 2005). Dot mapping and density mapping will 
show the difference of results and highlight the relevance of hotspot analysis. Getis-Ord 
G statistics will indicate the presence of spatial concentrations, measure the degree of 
concentrations, and identify the locations of hotspots where voucher recipients cluster. In 
order to answer the first set of research questions, this study will conduct hotspot analysis 
by race, by income, and by ethnicity from 2005 to 2009, analyzing the differences of 
spatial patterns by different characteristics of vouchers and the changing patterns over 
time.  
 
4.3.1 Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis 
Exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) is the method of exploratory data 
analysis that takes into account the spatial aspects of the data. Anselin (1999) defines 
ESDA as, “a collection of techniques to describe and visualize spatial distributions, 
identify atypical locations or spatial outliers, discover patterns of spatial association, 
clusters or hot spots, and suggest spatial regimes or other forms of spatial heterogeneity” 
(p.258). Hence, ESDA should focus on the analysis of spatial aspects of the data in terms 
of spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity.  
Contrary to traditional data that does not have spatial aspects, spatial data need 
special consideration due to the spatial dependence, which implies that the value of a 
variable is spatially associated with its value in neighboring geographic areas. Tobler‟s 
First Law of Geography captures this phenomenon as, everything is related to everything 
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else, but near things are more related than distant things (Tobler, 1970). There are two 
types of spatial effects: spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity. Spatial dependence, 
often referred to as spatial autocorrelation, results from Tobler‟s First Law of Geography. 
Due to the spatial clustering of observations, the results from the geographic data will not 
be independent. This violates the assumption of traditional multiple regression models 
that assume independent observations. Spatial heterogeneity is related to the intrinsic 
uniqueness of each location itself. None of the traditional tools of exploratory data 
analysis (EDA) are geared to dealing with spatial data. Many EDA techniques explore the 
correlation between variables that generate measures of fit and of significance. This 
becomes invalid in the presence of spatial dependence (Anselin, 1996).  
 
4.3.2 Global and Local index of spatial autocorrelation 
The magnitude of the spatial effects can be measured using a number of statistics 
of spatial autocorrelation. Two kinds of statistics, global and local, are utilized to capture 
the presence and the magnitude of the spatial structure. Global statistics can identify the 
presence of spatial structure such as clustering, autocorrelation, and uniformity; however, 
they do not identify where the clusters are, nor do they quantify how spatial dependency 
varies from one place to another. On the other hand, local statistics can quantify spatial 
autocorrelation and clustering within small areas (Jacquez, 2008). Clustering is a global 
aspect of the spatial pattern and is measured by a single statistic. In contrast, clusters are 
local in nature, which can identify specific locations where the values are more similar 
than usual (Anselin, 2005a). Many local statistics have global counterparts that often are 
calculated as functions of local statistics. Specifically, the sum of local indicator of 
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spatial associations for all observations is proportional to a global indicator of spatial 
association (Anselin, 1995). 
 
4.3.3 Getis-Ord G statistics 
The global and local Getis-Ord G statistics measure the presence and magnitude 
of spatial autocorrelation in dataset. The global form of the Getis-Ord G statistic (G) is 
also called general G statistic, for it deals with the entire study area rather than a localized 
area. In contrast, the local Getis-Ord G statistic (Gi*) identifies the location and degree of 
clusters. The global G statistic is expressed as: 
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where wij (d) is the spatial weight matrix with wij=1 when i and j are within a distance d 
from each other and zero otherwise, and the observations zi, zj are in deviations from the 
mean. Getis-Ord G statistics are calculated under the assumption of normality, which 
indicates the significant local spatial association for each observation. Getis-Ord G 
statistics can be easily implemented and visualized in GIS software. Moreover, these 
statistics are particularly useful in the detection of potential non-stationarity, such as the 
spatial clustering of similar values in a specific region of the study area. A positive Getis-
Ord G statistic means clustering of high values and a negative one indicates clustering of 
low values (Getis & Ord, 1992; Anselin, 1996).  
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The expected value of G and Gi* under Complete Spatial Randomness (CSR) is: 
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where n is the number of points or zones in the study area, and W is the sum of the 
weights. The equivalent expected value for the local variant is: 
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where n is the number of points or zones within the threshold distance for point or zone i. 
This produces the z-score, which allows the significance test of the global and local G 
statistics (De Smith, Goodchild, & Longley, 2009).  
 
4.3.4 Hotspot analysis 
Hotspot analysis is ArcGIS tool that identifies statistically significant spatial 
clusters of high values (hot spots) and low values (cold spots). By creating a new feature 
containing z-score and p-value for each feature, hotspot analysis determines whether the 
null hypothesis can be rejected or not. The z-score is calculated on the basis of 
randomization. The null hypothesis for the pattern analysis is complete spatial 
randomness (CSR). Under the CSR, the theoretical pattern is assumed that (1) objects are 
located independently of each other, and (2) a study area has an equal chance of receiving 
an object (Getis, 1999). Since p-value is a probability, a small p-value means low 
probability that the observed spatial pattern is the result of a random process. In this case, 
the null hypothesis of a random pattern can be rejected.  
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As a result of hotspot analysis, a high z-score and a small p-value indicates a 
spatial clustering of high values. On the contrary, a low negative z-score and a small p-
value indicate a spatial clustering of low values. The higher or lower the z-score, the 
more intense the clustering; however, a z-score near zero means no apparent spatial 
clustering.  
In order to find the patterns of voucher holders‟ spatial concentration, this study 
employs hotspot analysis utilizing Getis-Ord G statistics as a means of detecting spatial 
autocorrelation. There are several statistics to identify spatial autocorrelation such as the 
Moran‟s I, Geary C, and Getis-Ord G statistic. One of the frequently used statistics is 
Moran‟s I. Both Moran‟s I and Getis-Ord G statistics of global spatial autocorrelation 
indicate that there is spatial autocorrelation in voucher distribution in the study area. 
After detecting global spatial autocorrelation, the location of clusters should be searched 
to identify the locations of clusters. In this study, I employ the Gi* statistic and hotspot 
analysis to identify the locations of clusters, instead of using Moran‟s I statistic and LISA 
maps. First, both statistics allow the inference of local spatial autocorrelation. Second, the 
spatial clusters shown in the LISA cluster map only refer to the core of the cluster based 
on the comparison under spatial randomness. Unlike the Moran‟s I, the Getis-Ord G 
statistic identifies the degree to which high or low values cluster together. Third, hotspot 
analysis is useful to examine changes of spatial concentration patterns for a particular 
area over time (Anselin, 2005; Wang & Varady, 2005).  
The biggest difference between the two is that Moran‟s LISA map identifies both 
spatial clusters and spatial outliers while hotspot analysis focuses on spatial clusters 
rather than outliers. Considering the focus of the study with spatial clusters, the hotspot 
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analysis fits for serving the purpose of my study which is to identify the presence and 
locations of spatial concentration.  In addition, the study will examine not only the spatial 
concentration of voucher recipients, but also the change of spatial pattern over time, so 
hotspot analysis fits for purpose of this study. 
 
4.4 Spatial regression analysis 
 
4.4.1 Spatial autocorrelation and spatial regression analysis  
Regression analysis will be used to identify the factors affecting voucher 
concentrations. Spatial regression analysis will be considered to account for the spatial 
dependence of whether the presence of voucher holders in a block group increases the 
likelihood of voucher recipients in neighboring areas.  
Spatial regression deals with the incorporation of spatial effects (spatial 
autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity) in regression models (Anselin, 1988). As Can 
(1990) put, 
Spatial dependence refers to the possible occurrence of interdependence among 
observations that are viewed in geographic space, and violates the assumption of 
uncorrelated error terms … Spatial heterogeneity … refers to the systematic 
variation in the behavior of a given process across space, and usually leads to 
heteroskedastic error terms. (p.256) 
 
Any systematic patterns in the spatial distribution of a variable indicate the 
presence of spatial autocorrelation. If the value of nearby or neighboring areas are similar, 
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then it implies positive spatial autocorrelation. On the contrary, negative autocorrelation 
describes patterns when the values of neighboring areas are dissimilar. Spatial 
autocorrelation is important because the presence of spatial autocorrelation signifies the 
violation of assumption in traditional econometric models, which assumes that the values 
of observations in each sample are independent each other. Thus, if the observations are 
spatially clustered in some way, the estimates obtained from the ordinary least squares 
regressions (OLS) will be biased and cannot be precise because OLS estimators are based 
on the assumption that the observations have been selected randomly (Anselin, 1988; De 
Smith et al., 2009; Oakley & Burchfield, 2009). 
Statistically significant spatial autocorrelation implies that the regression model is 
not properly specified and that one or more new variables should be entered into the 
regression model (Getis, 1999). Anselin (2002) claimed that the essence of spatial 
regression models is the incorporation of spatially lagged variables in the regression 
specification. The new variables could be a dependent variable, a explanatory variable, or 
a regression error terms, depending on the spatial externalities (Anselin, 2005a).  
GeoDa is one of the most intensively used tools developed for dealing with spatial 
data. It starts with mapping and geovisualization, proceeds through ESDA and spatial 
autocorrelation analysis, and ends up with spatial regression. The core functionality of 
spatial regression in GeoDa is centered on diagnostics for spatial autocorrelation, 
maximum likelihood estimation of the spatial lag and spatial error model. The estimation 
and specification of spatial regression models in GeoDa are based on the maximum 
likelihood method (Anselin, 2005a).  
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Diagnostics for spatial autocorrelation and running the relevant spatial regression 
model are straightforward in GeoDa. First, statistically significant Moran‟s I indicates a 
problem with spatial autocorrelation. The Moran‟s I statistic has great power in detecting 
model misspecification, however, it is not useful to determine which model is appropriate. 
Second, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics decide the relevant model. There are five 
LM test statistics: LM-Lag, Robust LM-Lag, LM-Error, Robust LM-Error, and LM-
SARMA. When none of the LM statistics are significant, there is no need to run a spatial 
regression model; OLS results are appropriate and precise. On the other hand, when 
either of the LM-Lag or LM-Error statistic is significant, then the significant one is the 
model to be run. If the LM test shows that the LM-Lag statistic is significant, then the 
spatial lag model is the proper alternative; while if the LM-Error statistic is significant, 
the spatial error model should be considered. In the case where both statistics (LM-Lag 
and LM-Error) are significant, Robust LM diagnostics will be examined. Typically, one 
of the Robust LM statistics will be significant, or one will be more significant than the 
other in terms of the magnitude such as small p-value. The decision is straightforward 
that estimates the spatial regression model as matching the significant statistic or the most 
significant one (Anselin, 2005b).  
 
4.4.2 Spatial lag model and spatial error model 
A general multiple regression with incorporating spatial lags is formulated as: 
uXWyy          (Equation 1) 
y is an n×1 vector of observations on a dependent variable, X is an n×k matrix of 
observations on independent variables, β is k×1 vector of regression coefficients, u is an 
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n×1 vector of independent and identically distributed random error terms, and W is the 
n×n exogenous spatial weights matrix that specifies the assumed spatial structure or 
connections between the observations. Wy is the spatially lagged dependent variable to 
account for spatial dependence. The parameter  refers to spatial correlation or a spatial 
dependence parameter. The value of  is equal to zero in a traditional linear regression 
model.  Equation (1) for y is expressed as: 
   uWIXWIy 11 )()(         (Equation 2) 
I is the n×n identity matrix. Two inverse expressions in Equation 2 indicate spatial 
multipliers (Anselin, 2003). A spatial lag model is useful to account for spatial 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable and prevents a parameter estimate from bias and 
inconsistency that could happen in OLS regression.  
When spatial autocorrelation is present in residuals, a spatial error model 
specification is relevant to improve the precision of the estimated parameters. A general 
version of a spatial error model can be formulated as (Anselin, 2003): 
  Xy ,             where uW    
W is the weight matrix and λ (Lambda) is a spatial autoregressive parameter to be 
estimated jointly with the regression coefficients. The two vectors of errors are assumed 
to be uncorrelated. The above equation can be solved for ε and expressed as: 
uWIXy 1)(        (Equation 3) 
Inverse matrix in Equation (3), 1)(  WI  , is called a spatial multiplier. Equation 3 
indicates that the value of the dependent variable for each location is affected by the 
stochastic errors at all locations through the spatial multiplier.  
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4.5 Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) 
 
4.5.1 Spatial heterogeneity 
There are two types of spatial issues when dealing with spatial data: spatial 
autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity. While the spatial lag or the spatial error model 
is appropriate to deal with spatial autocorrelation, Geographically Weighted Regression 
(GWR) is utilized to account for spatial heterogeneity.  
OLS regression estimates regard each individual area independently of the values 
of its neighbors; however, in general, contiguous areas share similar social and market 
conditions than areas that are far apart. Therefore, the results from the OLS regression 
can only be interpreted as generating average parameter values for the study area as a 
whole. In this sense, estimates from OLS present a global characteristic of the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, & 
Charlton, 2002). Hence, OLS results cannot detect spatial variation or local differences. 
Contrary to conventional OLS, GWR allows coefficients to vary across space. 
GWR applies the linear regression model at the local level, so that local parameters are 
estimated. Instead of a global parameter in OLS, local parameters are estimated and 
present a way of accommodating spatial heterogeneity. For each point in the dataset, it 
uses a subset of the data surrounding the point of interest to estimate locally linear 
regression parameters. Thus, at each data point, GWR provides a different parameter 
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estimate and t statistics, allowing us to see how the relationship between dependent and 
explanatory variables change over space.
9
 
 
4.5.2 Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) model 
Fotheringham et al. (2002) provides a detailed description of GWR. A 
conventional multiple regression, so called global regression, can be presented as, 
 
k
iikk xy 0
      (Equation 4) 
where the prediction of the dependent variable (y) is obtained through a linear 
combination of the independent variables. k  is the parameter estimate for variable k, ikx  
is the value of the k
th
 variable for i, and i  is the error term. The OLS estimator takes the 
form of 
yXXX TT 1)(ˆ   
where ˆ  is the vector of estimated parameters, X is the matrix that contains the values of 
the independent variables, y is the vector of observed values, and (X
T
X)
-1
 is the inverse of 
the variance-covariance matrix.  
The global model estimates a single regression equation for all observations. 
Contrarily, GWR constructs a separate regression equation for each observation, and each 
equation uses different weighting of observations. The global model shown in Equation 4 
can be rewritten as GWR in Equation 5 
                                               
9 True spatial regression models should deal with both characteristics of spatial data (spatial autocorrelation 
and spatial heterogeneity). At present, no spatial regression methods are effective for both issues of spatial 
data. However, for a properly specified GWR model, spatial autocorrelation is typically not a problem 
(ArcGIS, 2010).  
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where 
0 is the intercept, ),( ii vu  indicates the coordinates of the i
th
 point in space, 
ikx is 
the value of the explanatory variable k (Fotheringham et al., 2002). The parameter 
estimates in GWR are taken from the weighting that is based on the spatial proximity to 
the specific location under consideration. Since the weighting of an observation is not 
constant over space, the GWR model can estimate the local variation of parameters. The 
estimator of the parameter vector for regression point i is: 
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ˆ 1     (Equation 6) 
where ˆ  is an estimate of  , X is a matrix of independent variables, W is a weighting 
matrix. Diagonal elements of W represent the geographical weighting of each observed 
data for regression point i, and off-diagonal elements of W equal to zero (Fotheringhan et 
al., 2002). 
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where win is the weights of the data point n in the calibration of the model for location i. 
The weighting matrix acts in a way that data near to location i are weighted more than 
data from observations far away. 
Charlton and Fotheringham (2009) propose two kernel types to determine the 
weighting matrix: fixed and adaptive kernel. A fixed kernel type is useful when the 
observations are regularly positioned in the study area, while an adaptive kernel type is 
appropriate when the observations are clustered, so that the density of observation varies 
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over space. For a fixed kernel with a Gaussian function, Wij is represented as a continuous 
function of dij that denotes Euclidean distance between observation i and j. 
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where b refers to a bandwidth, j represents a specific point in space at which data is 
observed, and i indicates any point in space for which parameters are estimated. 
Choosing a bandwidth b is important, for there is a trade-off between the bias and the 
variance in GWR estimation. A low bandwidth helps reduce the bias, but increase the 
variance because the sample size around each estimated coefficient will be low. On the 
other hand, a larger bandwidth provides more smooth results. An adaptive kernel that 
uses the bi-square function is expressed as 
 22)/(1 bdw ijij    if dij≤b, otherwise wij=0 
where j represents a point in space at which data are observed, i represents any point in 
space for which parameters are estimated, dij is the Euclidean distance between point i 
and j, and b is the bandwidth.  This function is called “adaptive” because the trace of the 
weight matrix is allowed to expand and contract, conditional upon a given location. 
The measure of goodness of fit in GWR is the corrected Akaike Information Criterion 
(AICc) score, given as  
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where n is the number of observations in the dataset, ˆ  is the estimate of the standard 
deviation of the residuals, and tr(S) is the trace of the hat matrix of the GWR, which is 
defined as 
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where y and yˆ is the vector of the dependent variable and the GWR estimated value, 
respectively. The AICc is advantageous in terms of taking into account the different 
degrees of freedom among models. In addition to comparison models with different 
independent variables, the AICc is useful to compare the global OLS model with a local 
GWR model. When the difference between the two AICc values is less than 3, then the 
two different models are considered to be equivalent (Charlton & Fotheringham, 2009).  
 
4.6 Summary  
 
The purpose of the dissertation consists of invoking two sets of research 
questions: patterns and factors of voucher holders‟ spatial concentration. In terms of 
spatial patterns of voucher holders, the presence and location of spatial concentration are 
examined by hotspot analysis through global and local indicators of spatial 
autocorrelation. Next, factors of influencing their location outcomes are identified by the 
regression analysis. OLS regression analysis will provide the degree of statistical 
significance of factors, such as availability of affordable housing, race, vacancy rates, 
poverty rates, and the accessibility of public transportation. Moreover, the spatial 
regression analysis will capture the presence and the effect of spatial autocorrelation on 
each factor identified in OLS regression. Finally, GWR will detect local variations of a 
factor, which could not present by either OLS or spatial model. Comparing results from 
OLS and GWR will shed light on the importance of spatial variation and local difference 
derived from the spatial heterogeneity.   
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CHAPTER V 
PATTERNS OF SPATIAL CONCENTRATION OF VOUCHER 
RECIPIENTS 
 
 
This chapter presents the findings from both a-spatial and spatial analysis. The 
demographic characteristics of voucher recipients from CMHA administrative data are 
reported, along with their neighborhood conditions in terms of income level, poverty 
rates, and racial composition. Followed by a-spatial description, the spatial analysis 
indentifies voucher holders‟ location and spatial concentration pattern by race, ethnicity, 
and income level from 2005 to 2009. This chapter concludes with the results from the 
hotspot analysis, showing significant spatial concentration of voucher recipients.  
 
5.1 A-spatial analysis 
 
5.1.1 Demographics of voucher recipients 
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5.1.1.1 Race, ethnicity, and housing type 
This study analyzes voucher information provided by Cuyahoga Metropolitan 
Housing Authority (CMHA) from 2005 to 2009. CMHA is the housing agency that 
administers the Housing Choice Voucher Program in Cuyahoga County. Charted in 1933, 
CMHA is the first housing authority in the United States, and it is one of the ten largest 
housing authorities in the country (CMHA, 2009a). CMHA provided the voucher 
information for this study including the address, race, ethnicity, income, and rent level 
from 2005 to 2009.  
During the five-year study period, a total of 68,515 vouchers were issued by 
CMHA. On average, 13,703 vouchers are issued annually. By race, the majority of 
voucher recipients are African American comprising 89.2%, white 10.3%, and other race 
less than 1%.  By ethnicity, Hispanic origin comprises of 3.4%. In terms of housing type, 
one half of voucher holders live in a single family house while the other half lives in 
either a multi-family or apartment type of dwelling. These characteristics are shown in 
Table 5-1 below.  
 
Table 5-1 Demographics of voucher holders 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 mean 
Total 
count % count % count % count % count % % 
13720 100 13095 100 14039 100 13618 100 14043 100 13703 
Race 
White  1458 10.6 1385 10.6 1410 10 1376 10.1 1416 10.1 10.3 
Black 12191 88.9 11644 88.9 12547 89.4 12167 89.3 12548 89.4 89.2 
AI/AN 31 0.2 28 0.2 31 0.2 30 0.2 31 0.2 0.2 
Asian 40 0.3 38 0.3 51 0.4 45 0.3 48 0.3 0.3 
Ethni-
city 
Hispanic 436 3.2 420 3.2 491 3.5 484 3.6 510 3.6 3.4 
Non 
Hispanic 
13284 96.8 12675 96.8 13548 96.5 13134 96.4 13533 96.4 96.6 
House 
Single Family 
House 
6497 47.4 6253 47.8 6496 46.3 7602 55.8 7674 54.6 50.4 
Multifamily 7223 52.6 6842 52.2 7543 53.7 6016 44.2 6369 45.4 49.6 
Source: Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) 
Note: AI/AN indicates American Indian/ Alaska Native populations 
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5.1.1.2 Income and rent level 
The income level of voucher recipients is extremely low, $10,737 on average. 
During the five year research period, income and rent levels have been stable: under 
$11,000 and around $650 respectively.  
 
Table 5-2 Average value of income and rent 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 mean 
Income $10,474 $10,650 $10,725 $10,950 $10,886 $10,737 
Rent $644 $641 $636 $649 $654 $645 
Source: Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) 
 
Based on the guidelines developed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD, 2007b), voucher holders‟ income levels can be grouped into four 
categories: extremely low, very low, low, and above low. The income levels correlate 
with less than 30%, less than 50%, less than 80%, and above of the area‟s median income. 
Poverty cutoffs are approximately 30% of area median income even though they cannot 
be compared directly to the Federal poverty line.
10
 Area median incomes in Cuyahoga 
County, collected from HUD for 2005 to 2009, categorize the income level of voucher 
recipients. Area median income level for 2005 was $60,200, and increases to $64,800 in 
2009.  
 
 
                                               
10 The poverty line for a family of four is approximately equivalent to 33% of Area Median Income. Based 
on this criteria, as of 2007, 46% of very low income households and 81% of extremely low income 
households were considered as poor (HUD, 2010b) 
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Table 5-3 Area median income level during 2005 to 2009 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Area Median Income $60,200 $61,400 $60,700 $62,100 $64,800 
Source: HUD (2010e)  
 
Table 5-4 illustrates that 83.3% of voucher recipients fall into the extremely low 
income group, while less than 0.1% of households have an income above 80% of the area 
median income. Income distributions reflect HUD‟s requirements for income targeting: at 
least 75% of the families should be extremely low-income, which equivalent for incomes 
below 30% of the AMI (HUD, 2001).  
 
Table 5-4 Income group of voucher recipients 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Income group count % count % count % count % count % % 
Extremely low 11458 83.5 10892 83.2 11603 82.6 11183 82.1 11905 84.8 83.3 
Very low 2012 14.7 1942 14.8 2142 15.3 2141 15.7 1907 13.6 14.8 
Lower 239 1.7 249 1.9 279 2 276 2 227 1.6 1.9 
Above Lower 11 0.1 12 0.1 15 0.1 18 0.1 4 0 0.1 
Source: Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) 
 
5.1.1.3 Central city proportion 
As Table 5-5 indicates, over half of voucher households live in the central city. 
This is a significantly high concentration when it compared to the proportion of 
households in Cuyahoga County as a whole. A third of households live in the central city, 
while over the half of voucher households reside in the city of Cleveland. When taking 
into account two neighboring cities of Cleveland (Euclid and East Cleveland), the 
proportion rises up to 75% in 2006, for example.  
112 
 
Table 5-5 Central city proportion of voucher households  
 Year Total Cleveland % 
Cleveland, Euclid,  
and East Cleveland 
% 
Voucher households 
 
2005 13,720 7,943 57.9 10,152 74.0 
2006 13,095 7,825 59.8 9,867 75.3 
2007 14,039 7,902 56.3 10,134 72.2 
2008 13,618 8,072 59.3 10,013 73.5 
2009 14,043 7,393 52.6 9,669 68.9 
Total Households  
 2000 571,457 190,638 33.4 226,201 39.6 
 2009* 520,657 181,779 34.9 214,029 41.1 
Source: 2000 household data is from Census 2000; 2009 household data is based on 2009 
estimated data from Geolytics. 
 
5.1.2 Distribution of voucher recipients 
 
5.1.2.1 Distribution by neighborhood income level 
Where do voucher recipients live in terms of neighborhood income level? Are 
they living in low income neighborhoods? If they turned out living in poor 
neighborhoods, it would be hard to say that the intended goal of the voucher program is 
achieved since the voucher program tries to deconcentrate poverty through the choice of 
residence. Answering this question requires neighborhood grouping whether the 
residences of voucher recipients are poor neighborhoods. In order to categorize 
neighborhoods by income level, HUD‟s (2007b) criteria is adopted, which is consistent 
with grouping voucher recipients‟ income group. In this case, block groups are 
considered as a neighborhood since block groups are a finer and smaller geographic 
entity used to obtain various socioeconomic data than the census tract, giving a rich and 
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detailed picture of neighborhoods.
11
 Block groups with a median income of less than 30% 
of HUD area median income (AMI) are defined as extremely low neighborhoods; block 
groups with a median income of 50 to 80 % of AMI are defined as low income 
neighborhoods; block groups with a median income of 80 to 100% of AMI are defined as 
moderate neighborhoods; block groups with a median income higher than 100% of AMI 
are defined as middle income neighborhoods.  
Two time periods of neighborhood income level is also considered: 2000 and 
2009. As of 2009, Census 2000 data is only available comprehensive data, but it seems 
too outdated. Recent data from a 2009 estimation provided by Geolytics is also 
considered in categorizing neighborhood income group in order to fill the gap between 
decennial census periods and also to mirror the present conditions of neighborhoods.  
Due to the differences of HUD area median incomes between 2000 and 2009, 
direct comparison between two years might not be appropriate until the new 2010 census 
is released. Rather, comparison of the share of vouchers‟ location from 2005 to 2009 
reflects how many vouchers reside in poor neighborhoods.   
As shown in Table 5-6, voucher recipients tend to live out of poor neighborhood 
during a five year period. Neighborhood income levels are categorized by comparing 
2009 HUD area median income and 2009 block group level median income. In 2005, 
almost 20% of voucher recipients lived in the extremely low income neighborhoods, but 
the proportion has lowered to 15.4% in 2009, with an average of 17.5% over five years. 
Also, voucher holders living in very low income neighborhoods have decreased from 
                                               
11
 Block groups generally contain between 600 and 3,000 people with an optimum size of 1,500 people. A 
census tract, which clusters of one to nine block groups, typically has between 1,500 and 8,000 people, 
with an average size of about 4,000 people (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008) 
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47.7% to 45.3%, in 2005 and 2009 respectively. The most promising changes have 
happened in low income neighborhoods, from 28.6% to 34.9% in the same period. 
However, proportions of living in moderate or middle income neighborhoods are almost 
consistent during the last half decade. This is quite surprising considering the fact that 
over 83% of voucher holders are extremely low income, almost 15% are very low income 
and less than 1% is of the moderate or middle income group.  
 
Table 5-6 Distribution of voucher holders by neighborhood income level (2009) 
2009 Neighborhood 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
 
count % count % count % count % count % % 
Extremely Low 2,659 19.5 2,396 18.4 2,431 17.5 2,252 16.6 2,160 15.4 17.5 
Very low 6,495 47.7 6,064 46.6 6,540 47 6,207 45.7 6,342 45.3 46.4 
Low 3,897 28.6 3,981 30.6 4,330 31.1 4,492 33.1 4,884 34.9 31.7 
Moderate 408 3 417 3.2 438 3.1 461 3.4 450 3.2 3.2 
Middle 169 1.2 156 1.2 177 1.3 167 1.2 166 1.2 1.2 
Total 13,628 100 13,014 100 13,916 100 13,579 100 14,002 100 100 
Note: Neighborhood types derived based on 2009 data from Geolytics 
 
Using 2000 census income data indicates a similar story with only a few 
differences. Neighborhood income level is constructed by comparing 2000 HUD area 
median income with 2000 block group level median income. If the neighborhood income 
level is constant during ten years and the proportion of voucher recipients in each 
neighborhood category changes, it would imply that the voucher holders have changed 
their residence to less poor neighborhoods. This shows more promising results than 
above. Proportions of vouchers living in extremely low income neighborhoods have 
decreased from 12.5% to 10.2%; proportions of vouchers living in very low income 
neighborhoods have also dropped from 42.7% to 36.0%. On the other hand, voucher 
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recipients living in low income neighborhoods have grown from 35.1% to 43.2%, and 
voucher recipients in moderate income neighborhoods have also increased.  
 
Table 5-7 Distribution of voucher holders by neighborhood income level (2000) 
2000 Neighborhood 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
 
count % count % count % count % count % % 
Extremely Low 1,707 12.5 1,549 11.9 1,582 11.4 1,460 10.8 1,430 10.2 11.3 
Very low 5,825 42.7 5,308 40.8 5,578 40.1 5,206 38.3 5,040 36.0 39.6 
Low 4,789 35.1 4,835 37.2 5,341 38.4 5,455 40.2 6,046 43.2 38.8 
Moderate 931 6.8 946 7.3 1,037 7.5 1,120 8.2 1,152 8.2 7.6 
Middle 376 2.8 376 2.9 378 2.7 338 2.5 334 2.4 2.6 
Total 13,628 100 13,014 100 13,916 100 13,579 100 14,002 100 100 
Note: Neighborhood types derived based on 2000 census data 
 
Comparing voucher holders‟ race with neighborhood types indicates that African 
American voucher holders are more likely to live in poorer neighborhoods than White 
voucher holders. Over one half of Black voucher users live in neighborhoods with very 
low income levels (extremely low or very low compared to AMI), while one third of 
White voucher users do. Both races have moved out of extremely low income toward low 
income neighborhoods during last five years (Table 5-8 and Table 5-9).  
 
Table 5-8 African American voucher holders by neighborhood income level 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Neighborhood N % N % N % N % N % % 
Extremely Low 1565 12.9 1439 12.4 1477 11.9 1371 11.3 1344 10.7 11.8 
Very low 5383 44.4 4905 42.4 5177 41.6 4825 39.8 4640 37.1 41.0 
Low 4063 33.5 4117 35.6 4597 37.0 4698 38.7 5249 41.9 37.4 
Moderate 806 6.7 825 7.1 901 7.2 981 8.1 1021 8.2 7.5 
Middle 296 2.4 291 2.5 287 2.3 261 2.2 259 2.1 2.3 
Total 12113 100.0 11577 100.0 12439 100.0 12136 100.0 12513 100.0 100 
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Table 5-9 White voucher holders by neighborhood income level 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Neighborhood N % N % N % N % N % % 
Extremely Low 137 9.5 108 7.9 100 7.2 84 6.1 84 6.0 7.3 
Very low 408 28.3 373 27.2 374 26.8 356 26.0 375 26.6 27.0 
Low 702 48.6 692 50.4 706 50.6 722 52.8 757 53.7 51.2 
Moderate 118 8.2 117 8.5 127 9.1 131 9.6 121 8.6 8.8 
Middle 79 5.5 82 6.0 88 6.3 75 5.5 73 5.2 5.7 
Total 1444 100.0 1372 100.0 1395 100.0 1368 100.0 1410 100.0 100 
 
In sum, the analysis of voucher location by neighborhood‟s income levels reveals 
the tendency of moving out of extremely poor neighborhoods toward less poor 
neighborhoods. Even though the proportions are slightly different between the two time 
periods (2000 and 2009), the overall story looks similar – voucher recipients tend to live 
in less poor neighborhoods.  
 
5.1.2.2 Poverty rate and voucher concentration in Cuyahoga County 
In the case of Cuyahoga County, most of the voucher recipients in suburban areas 
live in low poverty neighborhoods with less than 20% of poverty rate.
12
 At the same time, 
suburban voucher recipients living in high poverty neighborhoods are only 10.3%, while 
37.9% of voucher holders in the central city live high poverty areas with over 30% of 
                                               
12 With regard to poverty level, there is no absolute threshold above which poverty level can be said to 
adversely affect the welfare of all voucher families. Nevertheless, the 40% level has been frequently cited 
as a threshold for extreme poverty concentration and the 30% level as a threshold for moderate 
concentration. Families and neighborhoods are assumed to be negatively affected when poverty 
concentrations reach these levels. Therefore, the location of voucher families are described here in 
reference to the 30% and 40% poverty thresholds as well as to the entire continuum of poverty 
concentration (Jargowsky, 1997; Galster, 2002; HUD, 2007b). 
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poverty rate. Not surprisingly, as shown other research (such as Devein et al., 2003), 
suburban families are much less likely than central city families to live in high poverty 
neighborhoods. Finding suggests that the voucher program seems to achieve poverty 
deconcentration goal in the study area since over three quarter of voucher recipients 
avoid to live in high-poverty neighborhoods which are poverty rate over 30%.  
 
Table 5-10 Neighborhood poverty level and voucher concentration 
Poverty level Total vouchers   Cleveland Suburbs 
 
N % N % N % 
Under 10% 3475 24.8 611 8.3 2864 43.3 
10-20% 3798 27.1 1699 23.0 2099 31.8 
20-30% 3249 23.2 2279 30.9 970 14.7 
30-40% 2253 16.1 1740 23.6 513 7.8 
40% or higher 1218 8.7 1054 14.3 164 2.5 
Total 13993* 100.0 7383 100.0 6610 100.0 
Notes: Number of vouchers is 2009 data, poverty rate data is from 2000 Census data. 
*There are 9 missing information due to the availability of poverty rate in block 
group from 2000 Census data 
 
5.1.2.3 Distribution by neighborhood racial composition 
Where do voucher holders live in terms of racial makeup in neighborhoods? Do 
black voucher holders live in neighborhoods with the same color? Location Quotient 
(LQ) is used to investigate the distribution of vouchers by neighborhood racial 
composition. The LQ is calculated as the ratio between the share of race groups of all of 
the population in the block group and the similar share in the entire county. A LQwhite of 
more than 1 indicates that the white population is overrepresented in the block group 
when compared to the entire county. Conversely, a LQwhite of less than 1 implies that the 
white population is underrepresented in the block group when compared to the entire 
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County. The LQ value of 1 means a block group contains a fair share of race group when 
compared to the entire County. LQ is calculated as follows:  
LQwhite= 
 
(White population in block group) / (total population in block group) 
(White population in County) / (total population in County) 
 
LQblack= 
(Black population in block group) / (total population in block group) 
(Black population in County) / (total population in County) 
 
Based on the LQ calculation, neighborhoods are categorized as white, black, and 
mixed neighborhoods. A neighborhood is designated as white when LQwhite is equal to or 
greater than 1 and LQ black is less than 1; a black neighborhood is when LQblack is equal to 
or greater 1 and LQwhite is less than 1; a mixed neighborhood occurs when both LQs are 
either over 1 or less than 1. 
 
Table 5-11 Types of neighborhoods based on LQ 
 LQwhite ≥1 LQwhite<1 
LQblack≥1 Mixed neighborhoods Black neighborhoods 
LQblack<1 White neighborhoods Mixed neighborhoods 
 
Based on 2000 census data, the majority of voucher recipients live in black 
neighborhoods. On average, 69.8% of voucher holders reside in black dominant 
neighborhoods, however, the trend shows the proportion decreased over time from 72.4% 
in 2005 to 67.9% in 2009. Meanwhile, voucher recipients living in white dominant 
neighborhoods are growing from 23.5% to 28.2% during the same time. Mixed 
neighborhoods have only 4% of vouchers but the rate is consistent over time. 
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Table 5-12 Distribution of voucher holders by neighborhood racial type (2000) 
Neighborhood 
Racial type 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 average 
count % count % count % count % count % % 
Black 9,871 72.4 9,237 71 9,670 69.5 9,298 68.5 9,502 67.9 69.8 
Mixed 559 4.1 514 3.9 578 4.2 567 4.2 540 3.9 4.0 
White 3,198 23.5 3,263 25.1 3,668 26.4 3,714 27.4 3,953 28.2 26.1 
Total 13,628 100 13,014 100 13,916 100 13,579 100 14,002 100 100 
 
As of 2009, the picture of voucher location is not much different from 2000. The 
same approach divides neighborhoods into three types using 2009 race data: dominantly 
black, dominantly white, and mixed neighborhood. When comparing neighborhood 
proportions from 2000 data, Table 5-13 indicates that a slightly higher percentage of 
vouchers live in black dominant neighborhoods; at the same time, more vouchers reside 
in white neighborhoods as well. However, mixed neighborhoods only comprise 1% of 
vouchers, which is the biggest difference between the two tables using different time data.  
 
Table 5-13 Distribution of voucher holders by neighborhood racial type (2009) 
Neighborhood 
Racial type 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
count % count % count % count % count % % 
Black 9,945 73.0 9,304 71.5 9,746 70.0 9,382 69.1 9,595 68.5 70.4 
Mixed 150 1.1 136 1.0 170 1.2 166 1.2 155 1.1 1.1 
White 3,533 25.9 3,574 27.5 4,000 28.7 4,031 29.7 4,245 30.3 28.4 
Total 13,628 100 13,014 100 13,916 100 13,579 100 14,002 100 100 
 
When neighborhood racial composition is compared with voucher holders‟ race, 
the majority of voucher recipients tend to live in the similar type of neighborhood in 
terms of race. On average, 76.4% of African American voucher holders live in black 
dominant neighborhoods (Table 5-14) while 74.5% of white voucher holders live in 
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white neighborhoods (Table 5-15). The number of voucher holders living in 
neighborhoods of a different color indicates that African American vouchers tend to live 
more in white neighborhoods while white vouchers tend to live less in black dominant 
neighborhoods over time. Overall, 20.3% of African Americans live in white dominant 
neighborhoods, 15.3% of white vouchers live in black neighborhoods. Interestingly, 
black vouchers living in white neighborhoods are growing over time; conversely, white 
vouchers living in black neighborhoods are decreasing at the same time. In addition, 
white voucher holders are more likely to live in mixed neighborhoods than African 
American voucher holders. On average 20% of white, and 3.3% of black voucher 
recipients live in mixed neighborhoods.  
 
Table 5-14 Distribution of African American voucher holders by neighborhood racial 
type (2000) 
Neighborhood 
Racial type 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 average 
count % count % count % count % count % % 
Black 9,606 79.3 9,011 77.8 9,441 75.9 9,080 74.8 9,277 74.1 76.4 
Mixed 385 3.2 360 3.1 431 3.5 427 3.5 398 3.2 3.3 
White 2,122 17.5 2,206 19.1 2,567 20.6 2,629 21.7 2,831 22.6 20.3 
Total 12,113 100.0 11,577 100.0 12,439 100.0 12,136 100.0 12,513 100.0 100.0 
Note: Neighborhoods racial types are classified by LQ using 2000 census data 
 
Table 5-15 Distribution of White voucher holders by neighborhood racial type (2000) 
Neighborhood 
Racial type 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 average 
count % count % count % count % count % % 
Black 250 17.3 210 15.3 206 14.8 198 14.5 207 14.7 15.3 
Mixed 164 11.4 147 10.7 138 9.9 130 9.5 130 9.2 10.1 
White 1,030 71.3 1,015 74.0 1,051 75.3 1,040 76.0 1,073 76.1 74.5 
Total 1,444 100.0 1,372 100.0 1,395 100.0 1,368 100.0 1,410 100.0 100.0 
Note: Neighborhoods racial types are classified by LQ using 2000 census data 
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Based on the analysis of racial distribution, it is hard to confirm that the voucher 
program contributes to race desegregation since over 70% of voucher recipients live in 
the neighborhoods of the same color. However, the degree of race segregation tends to 
decrease over time. While the majority resides in the same color neighborhood, the more 
voucher recipients choose neighborhoods with different color from 2005 to 2009. 
Specifically, 20% of black and 15% of white voucher recipients live in neighborhoods 
that the other color is dominant.   
 
5.1.2.4 Affordable housing units and voucher distribution 
Voucher holders in Cuyahoga County occupy relatively higher shares of 
affordable units when compared with 50 MSAs as a whole. On average, 8.4% of 
affordable units are occupied by voucher holders, which is 2% point higher than 50 
MSAs in previous research. According to Devine et al (2003), the housing choice 
voucher program utilizes only a very modest portion of the affordable housing stock, just 
over 6%, within the 50 largest MSAs. The proportion of voucher holders to affordable 
housing is not very different between suburbs and the central city, which is 6.4% in the 
former and 6.2% in the latter (Devine et al., 2003). 
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Table 5-16 Affordable housing units and voucher concentration 
 
Total Central city Suburbs 
Total occupied units (2000) (A) 571,457 191,278 380,179 
Total affordable units (2000) (B) 166,036 86,361 79,675 
Total voucher units (2009) (C) 14,002 7,392 6,610 
Affordable units/occupied units (B/A) 29.1% 45.1% 21.0% 
Voucher units/ occupied units (C/A) 2.5% 3.9% 1.7% 
Voucher units/ affordable units (C/B) 8.4% 8.6% 8.3% 
Note: Central city indicates the city of Cleveland, and suburbs are the rest of the cities in 
Cuyahoga County 
 
Affordable rental units are estimated by comparing rent levels in 2000 census data 
with Fair Market Rents (FMRs), which indicate the rents that include units costing up to 
the 40th percentile of rents for the metropolitan area, controlling for bedroom size. As of 
2010, FMRs in the Cleveland metropolitan area are $735 for a two-bedroom unit. Based 
on this rent, affordable rent units are calculated by summing up the rental units under rent 
level $749 from the 2000 Census data, which is the most reliable and recent data 
available at the time of analysis.
13
  
Affordable rental units comprise about 30% of total occupied housing units and 
voucher holders utilize a moderate share (8.4%) of affordable housing. Interestingly, 
there is no significant difference between the central city and suburbs in terms of the 
proportion of voucher recipients to the affordable housing units. An 8.6% of affordable 
housing units in the central city and an 8.3% of those in the suburbs are occupied by 
voucher holders.  
 
                                               
13 However, the affordable rental units do not necessarily represent the total number of units available for 
voucher holders unless all landlords having affordable units participate in the voucher program. 
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5.2  Spatial Analysis 
 
5.2.1 Dot mapping 
 
5.2.1.1 Dot mapping results 
In order to identify the voucher locations, ArcGIS is utilized to geocode the 
addresses. The address matching function, which compared the street name and house 
number with voucher address point, identified the voucher holder‟s addresses. This 
process identified locations for 68,134 out of 68,515 addresses from 2005 to 2009, 
representing 99.4% match on average. 
 
Table 5-17 Address matching results by year 
year Total Matched addresses % of matching 
2005 13,720 13,627 99.3 
2006 13,095 13,014 99.4 
2007 14,039 13,916 99.1 
2008 13,618 13,577 99.7 
2009 14,043 14,001 99.7 
Sum 68,515 68,134 99.4 
 
Figure 5-1 shows the address matching result of vouchers from 2005 to 2009. 
Each voucher holder is represented as a point in an ArcGIS shapefile. As shown below, 
many vouchers look clustered in the middle of the county. However, it is hard to tell the 
differences between years. Although simple dot mapping has advantage to show spatial 
pattern geographically, dots on the same address cannot be shown because of overlapping. 
Thus, dot mapping can mislead to find the areas with high concentration of voucher 
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recipients. In order to improve understanding of spatial distribution of voucher recipients, 
it is necessary to investigate different approach taken density into account. 
 
5.2.1.2 Limitation of dot mapping 
Although the density variable has advantage representing the spatial distribution 
over simple dot mapping, it also has a limitation. Density, based on census tract or block 
group boundaries, is calculated by the number of vouchers divided by the area where they 
belong. Since the boundaries of each census tract or block group are artificially 
delineated, the density map could also be misleading. Census tract or block group 
boundaries usually correspond to streets (Wang & Varady, 2005). Vouchers concentrated 
across the street cannot be calculated in the same equation if they are designated into the 
different census tract or block group. In addition, the effect of clustering voucher houses 
on the side of the census tract will decrease because the density takes total area into 
account. Unless the voucher houses are evenly distributed over the census tract, the 
density should be considered in different way. Thus, density based on the same size of 
area will adjust the problem caused by areal unit.  
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Figure 5-1 Address matching results by year 
2005 
 
2007 
 
2009 
 
126 
 
 
5.2.2 Density mapping 
 
5.2.2.1 Method of density mapping 
In order to calculate the voucher density, Cuyahoga county area was divided into 
small grid cells of equal size. Points that fall within the search area are summed, and then 
divided by the search area size to get each cell‟s density value. Both cell size and search 
distance affect the result of density calculation.  
The cell size determines how coarse or fine the patterns will appear. The smaller 
the cell size, the smoother the surface will be. In general, cell size between 10 and 100 
cells per density unit is recommended (Mitchell, 1999). Based on this, cell size would be 
between 500 and 1,700 feet since the density unit is number of voucher units per square 
mile. Therefore, Cuyahoga County was divided into 500 by 500 feet cells.  
The size of the search area affects the level of generalization. The larger the 
search radius, the more generalized the patterns will be. A smaller search radius usually 
shows more local variation while it may not show broader patterns due to very low 
density values which derived from the small search radius (Mitchell, 1999). However, 
increasing the radius will not greatly change the calculated density values. Although 
more points will fall inside the larger neighborhood, this number will be divided by a 
larger area when calculating density. The main effect of a larger radius is that density is 
calculated considering a larger number of points, which can be farther from the center of 
cell. This results in a more generalized output (Allen, 2009; De Smith et al., 2009). After 
conducting a series of different search radii from a quarter mile to two miles, I found a 
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half mile radius to be an optimum choice large enough to show spatial pattern yet small 
enough to show details.  
In this process, the GIS defines a neighborhood based on a search radius specified 
around each cell center. Then, it totals the number of points that fall within that 
neighborhood and divides that number by the area of the neighborhood. That value is 
assigned to the cell. Next, it moves to the next cell and does the same thing until it is 
completed. This creates a running average of features per area, creating a smoothed 
surface (Mitchell, 1999).  
 
5.2.2.2 Result of density mapping 
Density calculation indicates that maximum density decreased from 729 
households per square mile in 2005 to 680 households per square mile in 2009. However, 
mean density is almost the same at 18 and 19 in 2005 and 2009 respectively. When it was 
compared to other places, as of 2005, overall voucher density in New York was 55 
households per square mile; Los Angeles was 13; and Baltimore was 8 (Wang et al., 
2008). 
The darkest areas represent the high density places which hold over 200 voucher 
units per square mile. The white part indicates no vouchers. In general, the vouchers‟ 
spatial pattern tends to become less concentrated during the study period. From 2005 to 
2009, the high concentrated areas have become less conspicuous in the east-northern side 
of the county while more places have been occupied by voucher recipients in the outer 
part of the county. Density maps of 2005 and 2009 show that voucher recipients tend to 
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live more in suburbs in 2009 than in 2005. The spatial pattern of vouchers, based on 
density, show a trend of spreading out of the central city into the rest of the county.  
 
Figure 5-2 Voucher density map by year 
2005 
 
2009 
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5.2.3 Hotspot analysis 
 
5.2.3.1Getis-Ord G statistics 
General and local G statistics identify the presence of clustering and the locations 
of clusters. The General G statistic measures concentrations of high or low values over 
the entire study area. It is termed “General” because it deals with the entire study area 
rather than a localized area. The distance is critical in seeing the compactness of the 
grouping, and will be used later in the hot-spot analysis. Running the analysis at various 
distances will determine the maximum z-score, confidence level, and distance band for 
clustering. The distance that produces the largest z-score will be the distance with the 
most significant clustering (Allen, 2009). In this case, the null hypothesis for the analysis 
is that the voucher locations are evenly distributed across the county.  
After Getis-Ord G statistic (General G) found out that there is a statistically 
significant clustering in the study area, then local Getis-Ord statistics (Gi*) will identify 
the hotspots that high values are clustered by high values. Hotspot analysis in ArcGIS 
spatial statistical tools is applied to show the hotspots and their changing patterns from 
2005 to 2009. The Hot Spot analysis tool in ArcGIS calculates the Gi* statistic for each 
feature. The Gi* statistic is given as:  
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where xj is the attribute value for feature j, wij is the spatial weight between feature i and j, 
n is equal to the total number of features and:  
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The Gi* statistic produces z-score, allowing to visualize which locations are significant at 
the given level of confidence interval (Allen, 2009; De Smith et al., 2009). 
To be a statistically significant hotspot, a feature will have a high value and be 
surrounded by other features with high values as well. The local sum for a feature and its 
neighbors is compared proportionally to the sum of all features; when the local sum is 
much different than the expected local sum, and that difference is too large to be the 
result of random chance, a statistically significant z-score will be provided. For 
statistically significant positive z-scores, the larger the z-score is, the more intense the 
clustering of high values (hotspot). Contrarily, for statistically significant negative z-
scores, the smaller the z-score is, the more intense the clustering of low values (coldspot).  
In sum, Getis-Ord G statistics test the null hypothesis that there is no clustering in 
a study area. Once clustering is found, the Global G index shows a significant level. This 
leads to questions of hot spot locations. Local Gi* statistic is utilized to answer this 
question. In this study, a hot spot analysis in ArcGIS was used to identify hot spots 
during the five year periods.  
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5.2.3.2 Process of hotspot analysis 
From the density mapping, it is hard to tell that the high clustered areas are 
statistically meaningful or significant. So the spatial statistical approach is required. 
Spatial autocorrelation detection has two steps. First voucher addresses are spatially 
joined after geocoding into block group layer in order to count vouchers in the block 
group. Then, the spatial weights matrix generates the weight in measuring the General G 
index. It is termed “General” because it deals with the entire study area rather than a 
localized area. Series of calculation indicate that there is less than 1% likelihood that the 
clustering of high values could be the result of random chance. Spatial weights matrix 
results in the highest z-score of 30.41 (p <0.001) among several options of spatial 
relationship which include inverse distance, inverse squared distance, and fixed distance. 
Choosing spatial weights matrix is reasonable to further hot-spot analysis, because the 
option that produces the largest z-score will be the one with the most significant 
clustering (Allen, 2009).  
Instead of using a grid cell of equal size to construct a polygon grid over the 
voucher locations, block group layer is used to analyze hot spot analysis. Using grid cell 
or fishnet is good to show the number of vouchers falling within each grid. However, it is 
not possible to get any socioeconomic data for each cell. The block group is 
geographically smaller than a census tract allowing socioeconomic data. This allows 
further investigation of relationships between the voucher clustering and the 
characteristics of the area. Employing block group level data will provide more detailed 
and richer outcomes compared to using a census tract level analysis. 
 
132 
 
5.2.3.3 Hotspot analysis results 
Voucher recipient‟s location pattern does not show even distribution. Global 
spatial autocorrelation statistics (General G) indicates a significant clustering during five 
years. General G index results are summarized in Table 5-15. High z scores and small p-
values imply that the clustering of voucher recipients are statistically significant, meaning 
that there is less than  1% likelihood that the clustering of vouchers could be the result of 
random chance. Results shown in Table 5-18 are calculated spatial weight matrix. Other 
spatial relationships to calculate General G index are also considered including inverse 
distance, inverse distance square, and fixed distance. These results are also similar in 
terms of significant spatial clustering (high z scores and small p-values), and presented in 
Appendix A.  
 
Table 5-18 General G index by year 
Year G index Z score P value 
2005 0.002 30.41 0.0000* 
2006 0.001 30.61 0.0000* 
2007 0.001 30.42 0.0000* 
2008 0.001 30.01 0.0000* 
2009 0.001 28.36 0.0000* 
Note: * indicates that there is less than 1% likelihood that the clustering of high values 
could be the result of random chance. 
 
Since Global G index shows significant spatial clustering, then local statistics 
(Gi*) will find the clusters of voucher recipients. Hotspot analysis based on Gi* 
calculation clearly indicates the concentration of voucher holders and their changing 
pattern over time. A Series of maps shown in Figure 5-3 presents hotspots of voucher 
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users. The dark areas represent clustering of high values, and the hatched areas and areas 
in dots represents clustering of low values, which are number of voucher recipients. 
This is a dramatic result having two significant implications. First, hot spots and 
cold spots are divided by the downtown area; vouchers are highly concentrated in the 
eastern part of the county while low values are clustered in the western part. Second, 
location patterns spread out from the central city from 2005 to 2009. The lower part of 
the hot spot is getting longer toward the south-east direction, and the upper part of the hot 
spot is stretching to the end of the county. This pattern clearly indicates that the 
concentration of vouchers still exists even though the locations of concentration spread 
out to the suburb.  
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Figure 5-3 Hotspot maps for total voucher holders by year 
a. 2005 
 
b. 2007 
 
c. 2009 
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Based on hotspot analysis employed Getis-Ord global and local statistics, the first 
research question on the presence of spatial clustering of voucher recipients can be 
rejected. The high z-scores and small p-values indicate the presence of spatial clustering 
of voucher holders during the study period from 2005 to 2009. In addition, hotspot 
analysis with local Gi* statistic identify the locations of voucher concentration. Clusters 
of high value (hotspot) are found in the eastern side of the study area, and they are 
moving toward the suburbs from 2005 to 2009.  
 
5.2.3.4 Hotspot analysis by race 
Getis-Ord G and Gi* statistics along with hotspot maps show the presence of 
spatial clustering and the locations of clusters over space during five years. First, Getis-
Ord global G index by race suggests that there is significant clustering of voucher holders 
by their race. Table 5-19 indicates that both races (White and African Americans) of 
voucher holders are clustering together. A small p-value in each year means that the 
chances are less than 1% that clustering is occurred by randomly.    
Identifying the presence of spatial clustering by race is followed by investigation 
of clusters by each race. Hotspot maps based on local Gi* calculation are presented in 
Figure 5-4. Hotspot analysis by race finds that White and African American voucher 
holders are living in different side of the county. White voucher holders concentrate in 
the west and the south part of the region, while African American voucher recipients 
cluster in the east and the north side of the study area. From 2005 to 2009, hotspots of 
both races have spread toward the suburbs.  
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Table 5-19 General G index by race 
Year Race G index Z score P value 
2005 White 0.002 13.99 0.0000* 
 African American 0.002 36.42 0.0000* 
2006 White 0.002 16.92 0.0000* 
 African American 0.001 36.34 0.0000* 
2007 White 0.002 17.01 0.0000* 
 African American 0.001 35.39 0.0000* 
2008 White 0.002 18.09 0.0000* 
 African American 0.001 34.90 0.0000* 
2009 White 0.002 19.28 0.0000* 
 African American 0.001 32.64 0.0000* 
Note: * indicates that there is less than 1% likelihood that the clustering of high values 
could be the result of random chance. 
 
Hotspot analysis enables us to answer the second research questions on the 
presence and the locations of spatial concentration by race. Global G statistic results in 
significant spatial clustering of voucher recipients by race; White and African American 
voucher holders are significantly concentrated. Local Gi* statistic and hotspot maps 
provide the locations and patterns of spatial concentration by race. Both races are 
clustered in different side of the county, and they tend to spread out to the suburbs over 
time. 
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Figure 5-4 Hot spot maps by race 
2005 
  
2007 
  
2009 
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5.2.3.5 Hotspot analysis by ethnicity 
Analyzing hotspot by ethnicity also indicates significant clustering and different 
hotspots by ethnic group. Hispanics tend to cluster in the central city while non Hispanics 
live in the northeast side of the county. However, spatial pattern of Hispanic group does 
not spread out from 2005 to 2009 as non Hispanic does. Table 5-20 and Figure 5-5 
illustrate the results of General G statistic and hotspots by ethnicity. Based on the General 
G statistic and hotspot analysis, it can be inferred that voucher recipients tend to cluster 
with the same ethnic group and non Hispanic voucher holders have spread out to suburbs 
from 2005 to 2009 while Hispanic voucher holders have concentrated in the central city. 
 
Table 5-20 General G index by ethnicity 
Year Ethnicity G index Z score P value 
2005 Hispanic 0.003 53.25 0.0000* 
 Non Hispanic 0.001 31.09 0.0000* 
2006 Hispanic 0.003 54.01 0.0000* 
 Non Hispanic 0.001 31.35 0.0000* 
2007 Hispanic 0.003 57.64 0.0000* 
 Non Hispanic 0.001 31.18 0.0000* 
2008 Hispanic 0.003 55.39 0.0000* 
 Non Hispanic 0.001 30.84 0.0000* 
2009 Hispanic 0.003 55.04 0.0000* 
 Non Hispanic 0.001 29.21 0.0000* 
Note: * indicates that there is less than 1% likelihood that the clustering of high values 
could be the result of random chance. 
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Figure 5-5 Hot spot maps by ethnicity 
2005 
  
2007 
  
2009 
  
 
Strong spatial concentration of Hispanic voucher holders is somewhat consistent 
with finding from HPS 2000 study that Housing discrimination against minority 
especially Hispanic renters has not declined over the decade (Turner & Ross, 2005).  In 
2000 the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) launched national 
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paired-testing study (shortened here to HPS 2000) to measure patterns of racial and 
ethnic discrimination in urban housing markets nationwide. This was the third time since 
the 1977 Housing Market Practices Study and the 1989 housing discrimination study 
conducted. HPS 2000 was designed to rigorously assess the extent of progress in the fight 
against housing discrimination. Findings indicate that African Americans and Hispanics 
still face significant discrimination in both rental and sales markets in metropolitan areas 
nationwide even though the degree of discrimination has generally declined since 1989. 
However, Hispanic renters are the only group that discrimination has not declined over 
the decade. In addition, while overall levels of discrimination against minority 
homebuyers are falling, there are still subtle ways of discrimination in geographic 
steering and unequal assistance with mortgage finance (Turner & Ross, 2005). 
 
5.2.3.6 Hotspot analysis by income level 
In order to investigate the question regarding whether voucher holders spatial 
patterns differ by income level, voucher recipients are divided into four groups, 
consistent with categories adopted in previous analysis. They are extremely low income, 
very low income, low income, and above low income group. These income groups 
correspond with less than 30%, 30-50%, 50-80%, and above 80% of the area‟s median 
income. Results of general Getis-Ord G statistic are presented in Table 5-21. Most 
income group shows spatial clustering during five years, except above low income group. 
Similarly to findings by race and ethnicity, clustering of different income groups happens 
with high probability.  
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Hotspot analysis is conducted for those three income groups: extremely low, very 
low, and low income group. Figure 5-6 shows how each income group clusters together; 
however, the spatial patterns do not clearly distinguished since those income groups 
clusters in the northeastern regions. Regarding research question and hypotheses, there is 
statistically significant spatial clustering by income group among voucher holders; 
however, spatial patterns are not clearly differentiated among different income group.  
 
Table 5-21 General G index by income group 
Year Income Group G index Z score P value 
2005 
Extremely low 0.00133 27.44  0.00000* 
Very low 0.00136 38.03  0.00000* 
Low 0.00131 12.46  0.00000* 
Above low 0.00139 0.91  0.36384  
2006 
Extremely low 0.00129 27.84  0.00000* 
Very low 0.00127 33.38  0.00000* 
Low 0.00141 15.59  0.00000* 
Above low 0.00134 0.91  0.36285 
2007 
Extremely low 0.00127 27.70  0.00000* 
Very low 0.00128 34.92  0.00000* 
Low 0.00127 14.56  0.00000* 
Above low 0.00121 0.89  0.37591 
2008 
Extremely low 0.00125 26.59  0.00000* 
Very low 0.00126 36.57  0.00000* 
Low 0.00131 13.79  0.00000* 
Above low 0.00139 1.370  0.17080 
2009 
Extremely low 0.00125 26.00  0.00000* 
Very low 0.00128 33.24  0.00000* 
Low 0.00123 10.30  0.00000* 
Above low 0.00000 -0.397  0.69164 
Note: * indicates that there is less than 1% likelihood that the clustering of high values 
could be the result of random chance. 
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Figure 5-6 Hot spot maps by income group 
2005 
   
2007 
   
2009 
   
 
5.3 Summary of findings 
 
A-spatial analysis of voucher recipients in Cuyahoga county shows that the vast 
majority of voucher recipients are in the lowest income group, of an African American 
racial profile, and live in the central city. In terms of neighborhood racial composition, 
voucher families are likely to live in neighborhoods that the same racial group is 
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predominant. Over 75% of African American voucher holders reside in dominantly black 
neighborhoods, White voucher holders are also likely to live in dominantly white 
neighborhoods. Both African American and White voucher users have moved into 
dominantly white neighborhoods over time. 
Many voucher recipients live in poor neighborhoods. Three quarters of voucher 
families do not live in neighborhoods that are at or above the moderate poverty thresholds, 
Black voucher families are more likely than White households to live in poor 
neighborhoods. However, families who live in suburban locations are much less likely to 
live in high-poverty neighborhoods. About one third of voucher recipients in the central 
city live in neighborhoods with a poverty level less than 20%, while almost two thirds of 
voucher holders in suburbs are living in the same neighborhood conditions in terms of 
poverty level. Both African American and White voucher recipients have moved out of 
extremely poor neighborhoods over time. Thus, voucher users have lived in poor 
neighborhoods, with neighborhoods of the same racial background; however, over time, 
they have moved into less poor neighborhoods and into white dominant neighborhoods.  
Spatial analysis allows testing the first set of research questions. The first research 
question asks if there is spatial concentration of voucher recipients. The hypothesis is that 
there is no spatial concentration of voucher recipients in Cuyahoga County. This question 
is important because the housing choice voucher program intends to de-concentrate and 
desegregate poor and minority families. Identifying spatial concentrations, which are 
statistically significant, assists in evaluating the program‟s goal achievement. Hotspot 
analysis answers the first research question on whether there is spatial concentration of 
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voucher users. Voucher recipients are likely to concentrate in specific locations such as 
the northeast part of the county, but they tend to scatter as time goes on.  
The second research question asks if there is any difference in spatial patterns 
between different races, different ethnic backgrounds, and different income levels. The 
hypothesis is that there is no difference of spatial patterns between these variables. If 
African American and/or low income families tend to cluster, it increases the necessity 
for further investigation into a relationship between voucher recipient characteristics and 
neighborhood characteristics. Spatial analysis suggests that African Americans tend to 
cluster in the northeast part of the county while White populations tend to live the west 
side of the downtown. A strong spatial concentration of Hispanic voucher holders was 
identified by hotspot analysis. They tend to cluster in the central part of the Cleveland. 
Spatial clustering was also found by different income levels; however, spatial patterns 
were not significantly different from other income groups.  
The a-spatial approach is good for a quick understanding of the general tendency 
of location outcomes, while it is hard to account for the real locations in which spatial 
clustering occurs. Hence, spatial approach overcomes the limitation of a-spatial 
description. Analysis of spatial distribution, including dot mapping, density map, and 
hotspot analysis, offers insight into the pattern of spatial concentration of voucher 
recipients; however, this is probably not the most effective research method for exploring 
factors contributing to spatial concentration of voucher recipients. Thus, in order to 
overcome the shortcomings of exploratory spatial data analysis, the next chapter will 
utilize spatial regression analysis in exploring factors influencing voucher concentration 
in Cuyahoga County. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH VOUCHER RECIPIENTS’ 
CONCENTRATIONS 
 
 
6.1 Model and variables 
 
6.1.1 Regression model 
Regression analysis is conducted to identify the degree of significance of factors 
explaining voucher recipients‟ location outcome. Previous literature and theories 
identified several factors such as the availability of affordable housing, race, vacancy 
rates, poverty rates, and the accessibility of public transportation.  
The regression model incorporating these factors is specified as follow. 




TRANPORTPOVERTYVACANCY
HISPANICASIANBLACKAFFORDHY
765
43210
 
Where,  
Y  = proportion of voucher recipients; 
AFFORDH  = availability of affordable housing; 
BLACK, ASIAN, and HISPANIC = proportion of each group of minority; 
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VACANCY  = rental vacancy rates; 
POVERTY  = poverty rates; 
TRANSPORT = accessibility to public transportation; 
β  = parameters to be estimated; 
ε  = error term.  
 
6.1.2 Descriptive statistics of variables 
In regression model, dependent variable (y) represents housing units that are 
occupied by voucher recipients as a proportion of total occupied housing units in a block 
group. As of 2009, a total of 14,043 vouchers were issued by CMHA. There are 1,261 
block groups in Cuyahoga County. ArcGIS is utilized to calculate the number of voucher 
holders in block groups through conducting geocoding and spatial join function. 
Geocoding is employed to identify every single address of voucher recipients in the study 
area. Then spatial join function allows us to count the number of vouchers in each block 
group layer. Results of geocoding address show a 99.7% match; 14,001 out of 14,043 are 
identified. Summing up all voucher holders in the block group is then divided by the total 
number of occupied housing units in order to get the proportion of voucher housing in 
each block group. The mean value of the dependent variable is 2.5 with a maximum of 
25.8. So, there is a block group where voucher users are one out of four households in 
neighborhoods. 
As an independent variable, AFFORDH represents the availability of affordable 
housing as the proportion of rental housing below FMR among all occupied housing units 
in the block group. Affordable rental housing unit is defined as renter occupied housing 
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units with cash rent under $749.
14
 So, availability of affordable housing is calculated as 
the affordable rental housing units divided by total occupied housing units in the block 
group. Availability of affordable housing below FMR is 29.1% on average. When using 
central city and suburbs dichotomy, only 21% of the dwellings in suburbs have rents 
below the FMR, compared with 45% of dwellings in the city of Cleveland.
15
 Accordingly, 
twice as many voucher holders are located in the central city than the suburbs among 
total occupied housing units (3.9% vs. 1.7%). In contrast, when considering affordable 
housing units below the FMR, voucher holders show a relatively even distribution 
between the central city and suburbs; 8.6% in the central city and 8.3% in the suburbs.  
 
                                               
14
 FMR for two-bedroom unit in Cuyahoga County changes from $619 to $752 during 2000 and 2010. 
Thus, threshold $749 might slightly overestimate the actual housing stock below FMR. So, it is hard to 
assert that rental units under rent of $749 reflect the exactly correct number of actual affordable housing for 
voucher holders. However, this is not a significant overestimate considering the fact that payment standard 
for rental subsidies is set up to 110% of FMRs. Furthermore, previous studies also have used similar 
criteria to estimate the number of affordable housing below FMR (Pendall, 2000a; Finkel & Buron, 2005).   
Year Efficiency ($) 1 bedroom ($) 2 bedrooms ($) 3 bedrooms ($) 4 bedrooms ($) 
2000 398 500 619 787 887 
2001 442 555 687 874 984 
2002 467 587 726 924 1040 
2003 481 603 748 951 1070 
2004 483 606 752 956 1075 
2005 508 578 703 916 980 
2006 488 566 682 874 929 
2007 502 583 702 900 956 
2008 518 602 725 929 987 
2009 496 576 694 890 945 
2010 526 610 735 942 1001 
Fair Market Rents by bedroom size in Cuyahoga County 
Source: http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/fmr.html 
15
 Ladd and Ludwig (1997) estimated similar finding in Baltimore study: only 15% of the dwellings in 
suburban Baltimore have rents below the HUD-established limits, compared with 30% of dwellings in the 
city. 
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Table 6-1 Availability of affordable housing and voucher distribution  
  Total Central city Suburbs 
Affordable units/total occupied units  29.10% 45.1% 21.0% 
Voucher units/ total occupied units  2.50% 3.9% 1.7% 
Voucher units/ affordable units  8.40% 8.6% 8.3% 
Note: Central city refers to the city of Cleveland; Suburbs mean the rest of cities except 
the city of Cleveland in Cuyahoga County. 
 
BLACK, ASIAN, and HISPANIC respectively indicate the proportion of each 
minority population among all population in the block group. On average, minorities 
comprised of 31.9% of African Americans, 1.7% of Asian, and 3.8% of Hispanic.  
VACANCY represents the rental vacancy rates which are calculated as the 
proportion of rental vacant housing units among all housing units in block group. There is 
an average 7.4% of rental vacancy rates in the study area. 
POVERTY represents the poverty rates in block group, which is the proportion of 
person living below the poverty level. In Cuyahoga County, almost 15% of the 
population is living under the poverty level.  
TRANSPORT represents the accessibility to public transportation, which is 
calculated as the proportion of area accessible to public transportation in a quarter mile 
distance divided by the total area of the block group. ArcGIS geo-processing tools create 
a buffer area from the public transportation line with the radius of a quarter mile. A 
quarter mile is adopted as a walking distance based on C. Perry‟s (1929) Neighborhood 
Unit concept. Perry organized the neighborhood unit around several physically oriented 
ideals such as location of school in the center of the neighborhood so that a child can 
walk to school without crossing a major arterial street. The distance for a child‟s walk to 
school is only about one-quarter of a mile. The area covered by a quarter mile buffer is 
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divided by the total area of the block group to get the accessibility of public 
transportation. On average, 76% of the area is accessible to public transportation. 
Descriptive statistics of variables for regression model is shown in Table 6-2.   
 
Table 6-2 Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
Variables Name  Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Voucher 0.00 25.81 2.81 3.37 
Independent 
AFFORDH 0.00 100.00 28.56 25.39 
BLACK 0.00 100.00 31.94 38.58 
ASIAN 0.00 57.89 1.65 3.83 
HISPANIC 0.00 59.86 3.77 8.06 
VACANCY 0.00 100.00 7.39 7.51 
POVERTY 0.00 100.00 14.95 15.67 
TRANSPORT 0.00 100.00 76.47 30.49 
 
6.2 OLS regression 
 
6.2.1 OLS base model results 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis is utilized to estimate the 
coefficient of each independent variable and to identify the statistical significance and the 
degree of effect. Base model refers to OLS regression model that specified previously, 
which includes seven independent variables (affordable housing, race, vacancy rates, 
poverty rates, and transportation).  The dependent variable is proportion of units occupied 
by voucher holders divided by total occupied housing units in a block group. In order to 
confirm the functional form of the dependent variable, several types are tested, including 
original raw data (number of voucher), logarithm (ln(number of voucher)), proportion 
(percentage of voucher among occupied housing units), density (number of vouchers per 
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square mile), and concentration (LQ of voucher, ((Vouchers in block group)/(Vouchers in 
County))/((Housing units in block group)/(Housing units in County))). As a result of 
testing various forms of the dependent variable, the form of proportion is selected as the 
most relevant and appropriate type of the dependent variable.   
Two regression models are considered with different time period of the dependent 
variables. The results of the previous chapter show that voucher holders are spatially 
concentrated and their locations are changing from 2005 to 2009. Thus, regressions with 
different time (the dependent variable in 2005 and 2009) would result in different 
coefficient estimates if voucher holders‟ locations have substantially changed. In this case, 
the different coefficients would reflect the changing relationship between voucher 
locations and neighborhood conditions. Also, analysis with 2005 voucher data decreases 
the time gap with 2000 census data. 
OLS base model results show that in both years all dependent variables are 
significant and have the same direction of effects. They are statistically significant at least 
at a 95% confidence interval, except the poverty rates in the 2005 model, which is 
significant at a 90% level. In both models, Asian population and poverty levels are 
negatively associated with voucher holders. Contrarily, availability of affordable housing, 
African American population, Hispanic population, vacancy rates, and accessibility of 
public transportation are positively associated with voucher recipients. For example, 
holding other constant, a 10% affordable housing increase is associated with a 0.17% and 
0.21% increase of voucher recipients in 2005 and 2009, respectively. A 10% increase of 
African American population is related with a 0.56-0.57% increase of voucher holders 
under the same condition of other variables. 
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Table 6-3 OLS base model results 
Base Model     2005         2009     
  Estimate Std Err t-value Prob sig Estimate Std Err t-value Prob sig 
Intercept -0.1176 0.2097 -0.5607 0.5756      0.0613 0.1999 0.3067  0.7591   
BLACK   0.0573 0.0027 20.9566  0.0000 ***   0.0557 0.0026 21.3882  0.0000 *** 
ASIAN -0.0608 0.0205 -2.9689  0.0030 *** -0.0396 0.0195 -2.0273  0.0428 ** 
HISPANIC   0.0623 0.0108 5.7783  0.0000 ***   0.0738 0.0103 7.1833  0.0000 *** 
AFFORDH   0.0174 0.0049 3.5808  0.0004 ***   0.0208 0.0046 4.4970  0.0000 *** 
POVERTY -0.0167 0.0088 -1.8836  0.0600 * -0.0474 0.0084 -5.6210  0.0000 *** 
VACANCY   0.0306 0.0133 2.3077  0.0212 **   0.0270 0.0127 2.1318  0.0332 ** 
TRANSPORT   0.0065 0.0029 2.2390  0.0253 **   0.0087 0.0028 3.1512  0.0017 *** 
Adjusted R2   0.4642         0.4239         
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
6.2.2 Regression diagnostics  
Multiple regression analysis is based on several assumptions known as Gauss-
Markov assumptions. These multiple linear regression (MLR) assumptions can be listed 
as follows: Assumption MLR.1 (linear in parameters); Assumption MLR. 2 (random 
sampling); Assumption MLR. 3 (no perfect collinearity); Assumption MLR. 4 (zero 
conditional mean); and Assumption MLR. 5 (homoskedasticity) (Wooldridge, 2006). 
Under Assumption MLR. 1 through MLR. 5, the OLS estimator is the best linear 
unbiased estimator (BLUE). Regression diagnostics are necessary to detect whether the 
regression coefficients are estimated under the above mentioned assumptions.  
First, residual analysis is conducted to check the possibility of whether there are 
variables suspect to suffer a misspecification problem. Examining residual plots implies 
that one independent variable in the 2005 model and four independent variables in the 
2009 model should be included as a form of square terms in each regression model since 
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their residuals show quadratic forms of distribution (refer to Appendix B). These are 
availability of affordable housing, poverty rates, vacancy rates, and accessibility of public 
transportation in the 2009 model and vacancy rates in the 2005 model. In order to address 
a model misspecification issue based on residual analysis, those variables are 
incorporated in the model along with square terms. Then, these variables are run through 
the regression equation. Including square terms in the model is verified by the residual 
plots which provide a relatively flat form compared the initial curved form (Appendix C).  
Second, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is calculated to identify the presence and 
degree of multicollinearity. The VIF measures the impact of collinearity among the 
variables in a regression model. In the 2005 model, the VIF for each variables is less than 
6, suggesting no multicollinearity issue (refer to Appendix D). In the 2009 model, the 
average VIF shows 10.81, implying some collinearity problems in this model (refer to 
Appendix E). However, Assumption MLR. 3 rules out perfect multicollinearity. Thus, 
there should be no exact linear relationship among independent variables. Regression can 
suffer collinearity to some degree; multicollinearity is a matter of degree. The VIF score 
of this model indicates no huge multicollinearity problem.  
Third, F tests are conducted to find out whether the model includes irrelevant 
variables. A series of restricted models are constructed and tested using the F statistic. 
None of the tests reveal statistically insignificant results (refer to Appendix F). Thus, 
there is no reason to drop any of the variables in the regression model. A significant p-
value of the F statistic and the Wald statistic indicate overall model significance (F 
statistic 133.7 and Wald statistic 888.2 are both significant at the 95% level in the 2009 
model, for example).  
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6.2.3 Revised model results 
The revised model contains relevant square terms based on regression diagnostics. 
Table 6-4 shows the results from the revised model. In both years, the revised model 
performs better than the previous base model. Regression coefficients are all significant 
at the 95% confidence interval, except two variables in the 2009 model. In the 2005 
model, poverty and vacancy rates increase their significance and magnitude of impact 
compared to the base model. Coefficient estimates of other variables tend to decrease 
more than the previous model. The adjusted R
2
 has slightly increased in the revised 
model.  
Similar to the results from the base model, several factors influence voucher 
concentration in a positive way: African American population, Hispanic population, the 
availability of affordable housing, vacancy rates, and transportation accessibility. 
Minority population is a good indicator of voucher concentration. African American and 
Hispanic populations are positively related with voucher holders‟ concentration, while 
the Asian population is negatively associated. So, voucher recipients tend to live in 
neighborhoods that minorities are concentrated in. This implies that the voucher program 
has not performed well in terms of race desegregation. Poverty rates show mixed results 
in both years. In the 2005 model, poverty rates reveal a negative relationship with 
voucher concentration, implying the voucher program has been successful to 
deconcentrate poverty in this study area. However, as shown on the right side of Table 6-
4, the 2009 revised model results in a quadratic relationship with poverty rates and 
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voucher holders. Until poverty rates reach 22%, the relationship is positive; however, 
when poverty rates in block groups are over 22%, then the relationship is reversed.
16
  
 
Table 6-4 Revised model results 
Revised Model      2005        2009      
  Estimate Std Err t-value  Prob Sig Estimate Std Err t-value  Prob Sig 
Intercept -0.3224 0.2107 -1.5304 0.1265    -0.5873 0.2735 -2.1476 0.0319 ** 
BLACK 0.0547 0.0027 19.9344 0.0000  *** 0.0471 0.0027 17.3601 0.0000 *** 
ASIAN -0.0598 0.0202 -2.9528 0.0032  *** -0.0431 0.0189 -2.2855 0.0224 ** 
HISPANIC 0.0552 0.0107 5.1444 0.0000  *** 0.0442 0.0105 4.2055 0.0000 *** 
AFFORDH 0.0116 0.0049 2.3567 0.0186  ** 0.0370 0.0115 3.2270 0.0013 *** 
POVERTY -0.0218 0.0088 -2.4813 0.0133  ** 0.0749 0.0190 3.9467 0.0000 *** 
VACANCY 0.1378 0.0236 5.8474 0.0000  *** 0.0451 0.0230 1.9656 0.0497 ** 
TRANSPORT 0.0065 0.0029 2.2696 0.0234  ** 0.0236 0.0104 2.2720 0.0231 ** 
SQ_VACANCY -0.0021 0.0004 -5.4752 0.0000  *** -0.0005 0.0004 -1.2846 0.1996   
SQ_AFFORDH  -  -  -  -   -0.0003 0.0001 -2.5846 0.0099 *** 
SQ_POVERTY  -  -  -  -   -0.0017 0.0003 -6.5232 0.0000 *** 
SQ_TRANPORT  -  -  -  -   -0.0002 0.0001 -1.9433 0.0520 * 
Adjusted R2 0.4767         0.4637         
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
The threshold effect should be mentioned since several variables in the 2009 
model show a quadratic relationship with the dependent variable. These quadratic form 
variables include public transportation, affordable housing, vacancy, and poverty rates. 
Based on the revised OLS model results, accessibility of public transportation is 
positively associated with voucher location until 59% of the area is accessible to public 
                                               
16 However, when square term of poverty rates are added in the 2005 revised model, the direction of 
coefficients are consistent with the results from the 2009 revised model. So, it is safe to say that the 
threshold effect is possible rather than asserting a linear relationship with voucher concentration and 
poverty rates. 
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transportation; however, after that point, the relationship between public transportation 
and vouchers is reversed. Similarly, the proportion of affordable housing stock and 
voucher holders are positively related until 62% of housing is affordable, and then the 
relationship is negative. Poverty rates affect voucher locations in a positive way to the 
point at which poverty rates reach 22%; however, the direction of association reverses 
past that point. Vacancy rates are also positively related with voucher holders until 
neighborhood vacancy rates reach 45%, and after that point the relationship turns 
negative. 
Positive association of public transportation with voucher location suggests that 
improving accessibility to public transportation in suburbs will contribute to spreading 
voucher holders to suburban areas. However, this is the case until public transportation 
serves 60% of the neighborhood area within a quarter mile distance.
17
 Similarly, vacancy 
rates, affordable housing, and poverty rates show the threshold like relationship. Vacancy 
rates are used as a proxy for landlords‟ participation in the program. Under the weak 
housing market conditions, vacancy rates are high and it is hard for landlords to find 
tenants, so they will consider participating in the voucher program that will ensure stable 
rents. The threshold might be 45%; however, the relationship would be interpreted as 
linear rather than quadratic considering the fact that the square term of vacancy rates is 
not significant and there is almost no observation that has vacancy rates over 45%.  
The threshold effect of poverty implies that the voucher program is useful to 
deconcentrate poor households with voucher subsidy. A positive relationship holds until 
                                               
17 This might be explained by the fact that most of the downtown block groups are covered by public 
transportation within a quarter mile distance. So, block groups near the downtown have 100% accessibility 
of public transportation. 
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poverty rates reach 22%, which means that voucher recipients are more likely to be found 
in areas with low poverty rates since the relationship turns negative after that point. In 
this regard, it can be inferred that the voucher program enables low-income households to 
live out of extremely poor neighborhoods by utilizing rental assistance. 
Abundance of affordable housing below FMRs does not necessarily attract 
voucher users after passing some point since the coefficient of affordable housing shows 
threshold point. Voucher holders are easy to find their house where there are plenty of 
housing under the certain rent level. However, voucher recipients are supported part of 
the rent by the government, they do not have to find an extremely low-rent house. As 
Figure 6-1 indicates, the east side of the Cleveland near down is abundant of affordable 
rental housing; over 60% of rental housing is below FMRs. However, not many voucher 
holders live that region as shown in previous chapter. Plus, regression results confirm the 
relationship is overturn when affordable housing comprises over 60% of total rental 
housing. As Figure 6-2 shows, the regions that are overcrowded with affordable housing 
is overlapped with the regions that are abundant of low rent level, such as rent level 
below $400.
18
 Even though voucher holders are in extremely low-income households, 
they are affordable to live in decent rental housing that meets their needs through rental 
subsidies. Thus, the threshold effect implies that the voucher program enables voucher 
families to live units that meet their housing needs regardless of their income level. 
 
                                               
18 Distribution of affordable rental below $300 shows similar patterns. 
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Figure 6-1 Distribution of affordable housing  
 
Note: Data for affordable housing are based on 2000 Census results 
 
Figure 6-2 Distribution of rental units below $400 
 
Note: Data for rental units below $400 are based on 2000 Census results 
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6.3 Spatial regression 
 
6.3.1 Spatial model diagnostics 
Estimation of the regression model with spatial data often violates the classic 
regression assumptions. One of the OLS assumptions, independence of observations, is 
not satisfied due to spatial autocorrelation in data. This leads to a biased estimation of the 
standard errors of parameters, consequently misleading significance tests (Anselin, 1988). 
In order to identify the types of spatial dependency, LM tests were conducted. As shown 
in Table 6-5, a significant Moran‟s I indicates the presence of spatial autocorrelation, 
subsequently requiring a spatial regression model to address the spatial autocorrelation 
issue.  
 
Table 6-5 Diagnostics for spatial dependence 
 2005 model 2009 model 
TEST MI/DF Value Prob MI/DF Value Prob 
Moran's I (error) 0.223417 14.1304 0.000000 0.236734 14.7020 0.0000000 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 189.4334 0.000000 1 197.6614 0.0000000 
Robust LM (lag) 1 11.3362 0.000760 1 9.9055 0.0016478 
Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 190.0554 0.000000 1 205.2978 0.0000000 
Robust LM (error) 1 11.9529 0.000544 1 17.5218 0.0000281 
Lagrange Multiplier (SARMA) 2 201.3916 0.000000 2 215.2033 0.0000000 
 
Proper spatial regression is selected by the results of spatial dependence 
diagnostics. OLS regression results show that both of the standard LM statistics are 
significant, so Robust LM statistics are examined. Both Robust statistics are significant at 
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the level of p<0.05. In this case, the magnitude of significance will be criteria to select 
the relevant spatial model. Following the rule addressed by Anselin (2005b), the spatial 
error model is selected as the appropriate model (the Robust LM statistic for error is 
significant p<0.0001 compared to p<0.001 of the Robust LM statistic for lag in 2009, for 
example).  
 
6.3.2 The spatial error model and spatial weight matrix  
Spatial autocorrelation happens when the value at any one point in space is 
dependent on values at the surrounding points. The coefficients estimated cannot be 
unbiased or efficient in the presence of spatial autocorrelation, because OLS assumes the 
independence among all variables. 
If there is spatial autocorrelation in residuals, it means that the model is 
systematically overestimating the observed values in some regions, and underestimating 
the observed values in others. Presence of spatial autocorrelation indicates that the model 
is not properly specified, thus the coefficients estimated by OLS are not unbiased. 
Anselin (1988) described model forms that deal with spatial autocorrelation. A spatial 
error model is appropriate when there appears to be a structure in the residual terms, 
while a spatial lag model is appropriate when a spatial structure is present in the variables 
in the model. Unbiased parameter estimates can be derived from both model types when 
maximum likelihood is applied as the fitting method. 
This study conducts the spatial error model based on the spatial diagnostics.  The 
spatial error model that includes a spatial autoregressive error term is specified as, 
  Xy ,             with uW    
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where y is a vector of observations on the dependent variable, W is the spatial weight 
matrix, X is a matrix of observations on the explanatory variables, ε is a vector of 
spatially autocorrelated error terms, µ is a vector of iid (independent and identically 
distributed) errors, and λ and β are parameters. Based on the above equation, the spatial 
error model for the study is written  
uWITRANSPORTPOVERTYVACANCY
HISPANICASIANBLACKAFFORDHy
1
765
4321
)( 



 
where 1)(  WI   is a spatial multiplier. 
There are several options to create a spatial weights matrix in the GeoDa software, 
which are contiguity-based, distance-based, and neighborhood-based spatial weights. A 
contiguity-based spatial weight matrix is used for a polygon shape file to include 
neighboring spatial entities with shared boundaries, and a distance-based spatial weight 
matrix is useful for a point shape file to calculate the distance between points. Plus, a 
neighborhood based spatial weight matrix, such as k-nearest neighbor criterion, ensures 
that each observation has exactly the same number (k) of neighbors (Anselin, 2005b).  
Since the base map for this analysis is a shapefile, a contiguity-based option is 
selected to create a spatial weight matrix. There are also two different options in 
contiguity-based spatial weights: rook contiguity and queen contiguity weight matrix. A 
spatial weight matrix with queen contiguity criterion can include all neighborhoods that 
do not have a full boundary in common, while rook criterion often eliminates those 
neighborhoods which have a full boundary segment in common. The queen criterion 
determines neighboring units as those that have any point in common, including both 
common boundaries and common corners. Therefore, the number of neighbors for any 
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given unit according to the queen criterion will be equal to or greater than that of using 
the rook criterion (Anselin, 2005b). Thus, this analysis will employ the queen contiguity 
type as constructing a spatial weight matrix because the queen method can include 
neighborhoods where full boundaries are not in common.  
 
6.3.3 Spatial error model results 
Estimates and measures of fit are given in Table 6-6, showing the results from the 
spatial error model. In the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation, the R
2
 listed in the 
results is a pseudo-R
2
, which is not directly comparable with the measure given for OLS 
results. The proper measures of fit are the Log likelihood, AIC (Akaike Info Criterion) 
and SC (Schwarz Criterion). AIC and SC are methods of comparing alternative 
specifications by adjusting the number of coefficients in the model and value of log 
likelihood.
19
 The higher the log likelihood, the better the model fit. On the contrary, the 
lower AIC and SC are, the better the model specification (Anselin, 2005b).  
Spatial error model estimation presents better performance in terms of Log 
likelihood, AIC, and SC. When compared with OLS results, we notice an increase in the 
Log-Likelihood from -3013 (for OLS) to -2942 in the 2005 year model. Compensating 
the improved fit for the added variable (the spatial autoregressive error term), the AIC 
(from 6044.94 to 5902.40) and SC (from 6091.19 to 5948.65) both decrease relative to 
OLS, suggesting an improvement of fit for the spatial error specification.  
 
                                               
19 In GeoDa software, AIC is calculated as AIC=-2L+2K, where L is the log likelihood and K is the number 
of parameters in the model. SC is measured as SC=-2L+Kln(N), where ln is the natural logarithm and N is 
sample size (Anselin, 2005b). 
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Table 6-6 Comparison of revised model performance between OLS and the Spatial model 
 
2005 model 2009 model 
OLS Spatial Error OLS Spatial Error 
R
2
 (Adjusted/ Pseudo) 0.4767 0.5569 0.4641 0.5580 
Log likelihood -3013.47 -2940.46 -2920.76 -2836.84 
Akaike info criterion  6044.94 5898.91 5865.52 5697.67 
Schwarz criterion 6091.19 5945.17 5927.19 5759.35 
 
Table 6-7 shows the results of the Maximum Likelihood estimation of a spatial 
error model of voucher concentration. The spatial autoregressive coefficient is estimated 
as 0.4565 and 0.5039 in 2005 and 2009 respectively, and both are highly significant 
(p<0.0000). The results confirm a strong positive and significant spatial autoregressive 
coefficient. Relative to the OLS results, the coefficient for POVERTY (in the 2005 model) 
has become insignificant. This implies that inferences based on OLS estimates may be 
misleading because OLS cannot account for spatial autocorrelation. The value of the 
coefficient estimates is slightly smaller in terms of the absolute value relative to the OLS 
results, except for VACANCY (in the 2009 model), where the change occurs from 0.0451 
to 0.0557.  
The threshold effect still remains in the spatial error model. In the 2005 model, 
vacancy rates (VACANCY) are associated with voucher concentration in a positive way 
until vacancy rates reach 30.4%, and then the relationship reverses.
20
 In the 2009 model, 
AFFORDH and POVERTY show the quadratic relationship with voucher concentration. 
The affordable housing and poverty rates affect positively on voucher location until 
                                               
20 This threshold for OLS model is estimated 32.8%. The difference reflects the consideration of spatial 
autocorrelation in model estimation.  
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affordable housing reaches 50.2% and poverty rates reach 23.3%, and reverse impact past 
that point. As is the case in the 2005 model estimation, the 2009 spatial error model 
results in slightly different coefficients from ones estimated by OLS. For the 2009 model, 
OLS regression presents that four variables (AFFORDH, POVERTY, VACANCY, and 
TRANSPORT) have the threshold effect. The threshold point is estimated differently. For 
example, the threshold of affordable housing decreases from 61.7% (OLS) to 50.2% 
(spatial error model), while the threshold of poverty rates increases from 22.0% (OLS) to 
23.3% (spatial error model).  
  
Table 6-7 Spatial error model estimation 
Spatial Model 2005 Spatial Error Model   2009 Spatial Error Model   
 Estimate Std Err z-value Probability Sig Estimate Std. Err z-value Probability Sig 
Intercept -0.1579 0.2736 -0.5771 0.5639  -0.3655 0.3171 -1.1527 0.2490  
BLACK 0.0508 0.0036 13.9619 0.0000 *** 0.0448 0.0036 12.5950 0.0000 *** 
ASIAN -0.0490 0.0211 -2.3165 0.0205 ** -0.0390 0.0196 -1.9938 0.0462 ** 
HISPANIC 0.0521 0.0137 3.7972 0.0001 *** 0.0344 0.0131 2.6218 0.0087 *** 
AFFORDH 0.0087 0.0048 1.8004 0.0718 * 0.0301 0.0110 2.7249 0.0064 *** 
POVERTY -0.0087 0.0086 -1.0038 0.3155  0.0560 0.0177 3.1623 0.0016 *** 
VACANCY 0.1033 0.0221 4.6690 0.0000 *** 0.0557 0.0210 2.6471 0.0081 *** 
TRANSPORT 0.0066 0.0032 2.0554 0.0398 ** 0.0182 0.0104 1.7519 0.0798 * 
SQ_VACANCY -0.0014 0.0004 -3.9258 0.0000 *** -0.0004 0.0003 -1.1842 0.2363  
SQ_AFFORDH      -0.0003 0.0001 -2.2144 0.0268 ** 
SQ_POVERTY      -0.0012 0.0002 -5.1396 0.0000 *** 
SQ_TRANSPORT      -0.0001 0.0001 -1.3231 0.1858  
Lambda 0.4734 0.0359 13.1536 0.0000 *** 0.5039 0.0349 14.4535 0.0000 *** 
Pseudo R
2
 0.5569     0.5580     
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Moran scatter plots for the spatial error model are visualized as shown below. For 
residuals of the spatial error model, the Moran‟s I test statistic is -0.0146 (in the 2005 
model) and -0.0127 (in the 2009 model), showing essentially zero. This indicates that 
including the spatially autoregressive error term in the model has eliminated all spatial 
autocorrelations. 
  
Figure 6-3 Moran scatter plots for residuals from OLS and Spatial error models  
Moran‟s I = 0.2229  
(OLS, 2005) 
 
Moran‟s I = -0.0146  
(Spatial error model, 2005) 
 
Moran‟s I = 0.2367  
(OLS, 2009) 
 
Moran‟s I = -0.0127  
(Spatial error model, 2009) 
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6.4 Geographically weighted regression (GWR) 
 
6.4.1 GWR analysis 
Coefficient estimates from the OLS regression do not incorporate spatial effects. 
Spatial regression analysis accounts for spatial autocorrelation; however, it still assumes 
that spatial effects are constant over the study area. So, coefficient estimates from the 
spatial regression indicate the mean value that does not vary over space. Contrarily, 
GWR is relevant to capture spatially varying relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables.  
The GWR model to identify the factors influencing voucher location is specified 
as follows: 
iiiiiiiii
iiiiiiiiii
vuTRANPORTvuPOVERTYvuVACANCYvuHISPANIC
vuASIANvuBLACKvuAFFORDHvuvuy




),(),(),(),(
),(),(),(),(),(
7654
3210  
where β0 is the intercept, (ui,vi) is the coordinates of the i
th
 point in space, and β1 through 
β7 are the parameter estimates changing across the space. 
GWR statistical software (GWR 3.0) developed by Fotheringham et al. (2002) 
provides locally varying parameter estimates and their significance based on a Monte 
Carlo test. There are several options to conduct GWR estimation: choosing kernel type, 
bandwidth, and type of significance test. An adaptive kernel, a corrected Akaike 
Information Criterion (AICc) minimization methods, and a Monte Carlo significance test 
are adopted to conduct GWR. When choosing kernel types, there are two types such as 
fixed or adaptive. An adaptive kernel is utilized to provide the geographic weighing in 
the model. If the observations are regularly distributed in the study area, a fixed kernel is 
appropriate. However, if the observations are clustered so that the density of observations 
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varies over the study areas, then an adaptive kernel is appropriate. In this regard, the 
adaptive kernel type is relevant for this study, since voucher recipients show spatial 
concentration over the study area. Also, the AICc method finds the bandwidth which 
minimizes the AICc value. The AICc method is recommended due to interaction between 
the bandwidth and the complexity of the model. Finally, Monte Carlo tests are utilized to 
determine the significance of the spatial variability in the local parameter estimates. 
Testing individual parameter stationarity is essential to determine whether the observed 
variation is sufficient to reject the hypothesis that the parameter is globally fixed. As a 
consequence, if the results of Monte Carlo tests on the local estimates are significant, this 
indicates that there is significant spatial variation in the local parameter estimates for the 
variable (Fotheringham et al., 2002; Charlton & Fotheringham, 2009). 
 
6.4.2 GWR model performance 
GWR provides better performance than OLS. Diagnostic information is listed in 
Table 6-8. In both year models, GWR provides a significantly low value of the residual 
sum of squares, which is the difference between an observed y-value and its estimated 
value returned by the GWR model. AICc is useful to compare the measure of model 
performance. The model with the lower AICc value provides a better fit to the observed 
data because AICc is a measure of spatial collinearity within the model data. GWR 
models show significantly better performance level in terms of AICc, indicating a 
decreasing value from 380 (2005 model) to 160 (2009 model). These big differences are 
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strong evidence of an improvement in the fit of the model to the data.
21
 More intuitively, 
an adjusted R
2
 confirms a substantial improvement of GWR compared to OLS. 
Specifically, in the 2005 model, it increases from 0.4762 to 0.7103, indicating that the 
OLS model explains less than a half of the variance of the data while the GWR explains 
over 70% of the variance.  
 
Table 6-8 GWR model performance 
  
  
2005 2009 
OLS GWR OLS GWR 
Residual sum of squares 8788.99 3866.60 7587.30 6216.90 
Effective number of parameters 9 265 12 55 
Sigma 2.65 1.97 2.46 2.27 
Akaike Information Criterion 6047.09 5666.10 5867.81 5707.22 
Adjusted r-square 0.4763 0.7103 0.4637 0.5449 
 
Table 6-9 Results of ANOVA test for GWR over OLS 
 Year  2005 2009 
Source SS DF MS F SS DF MS F 
OLS Residuals 8789.0 9.0     7587.3 12.0     
GWR Improvement 922.4 255.9 19.2346   1370.4 42.8 32.0063   
GWR Residuals 3866.6 996.1 3.8818 4.9551 6216.9 1206.2 5.1542 6.2098 
 
ANOVA results also reports that the GWR model improves significantly over the 
OLS counterpart. The ANOVA tests the null hypothesis that the GWR model represents 
no improvement over a global model (Fotheringham, et al., 2002). High F-values in 
Table 6-9 suggest that the local model has a significant improvement over the global 
                                               
21 As a rule of thumb, if the AICc difference between two models is less than 3 to 4, then there is no 
significant improvement and there is little evidence to choose one over the other.  
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model in determining the relationship between voucher concentration and the various 
factors. 
 
6.4.3 GWR results 
Table 6-10 and Table 6-11 summarize the results of OLS and GWR analysis. The 
Monte Carlo test calibrated for the GWR model finds that most of explanatory variables 
displayed significant spatial non-stationarity in the case of 2005 model. Seven 
independent variables (BLACK, ASIAN, HISPANIC, POVERTY, VACANCY, and 
TRANSPORT) turn out to be significant in terms of spatial variation. These variables are 
also significant in OLS analysis; however, the significant local parameters indicate that 
the locally varying impact of these independent variables on the dependent variable. Thus, 
in some areas the influence of the variable might be stronger than in other areas.  
Furthermore, the 2005 GWR model explain 71% of the variance, so GWR 
provides better explanatory power than the global OLS model (Adjusted R
2
=0.4763). The 
local R
2
 of each individual GWR model ranges from 0.1064 to 0.9305, with a mean of 
0.5465. Only about 35% of the local R
2
 values are lower than the global OLS value, and 
over 60% are higher than 0.5. Based on the GWR results, it can be inferred that the 
relationship between voucher concentration and factors affecting voucher holders‟ 
location choice is better captured by the GWR model in the study area. 
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Table 6-10 GWR results (2005 model) 
  OLS GWR 
  Estimate Std Err t Sig Min Median Max p-value Sig 
Intercept -0.3224 0.2107 -1.5304   -6.8339 -0.0040 14.7082 0.0000 *** 
BLACK 0.0547 0.0027 19.9344 *** -0.2245 0.0338 0.1461 0.0000 *** 
ASIAN -0.0598 0.0202 -2.9528 *** -1.0737 -0.0264 1.7689 0.0000 *** 
HISPANIC 0.0552 0.0107 5.1444 *** -0.6815 0.0357 0.7152 0.0000 *** 
AFFORDH 0.0116 0.0049 2.3567 ** -0.0862 0.0035 0.1910 0.2300   
POVERTY -0.0218 0.0088 -2.4813 ** -0.1389 0.0100 0.4744 0.0000 *** 
VACANCY 0.1378 0.0236 5.8474 *** -1.9763 0.1212 1.1364 0.0000 *** 
TRANSPORT 0.0065 0.0029 2.2696 ** -0.1455 0.0013 0.0688 0.0000 *** 
SQ_VACANCY -0.0021 0.0004 -5.4752 *** -0.0361 -0.0048 0.1530 0.0000 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.4763       0.7103         
Note: Significance ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
          GWR Significance based on Monte Carlo test for spatial non-stationarity 
 
Table 6-11 GWR results (2009 model) 
  OLS GWR 
  Estimate Std Err t Sig Min Median Max p-value Sig 
Intercept -0.5873 0.2735 -2.1476 ** -0.9464 -0.4455 0.2939 0.4300   
BLACK 0.0471 0.0027 17.3601 *** 0.0229 0.0438 0.0719 0.0000 *** 
ASIAN -0.0431 0.0189 -2.2855 ** -0.2301 -0.0389 0.0811 0.0000 *** 
HISPANIC 0.0442 0.0105 4.2055 *** 0.0061 0.0448 0.1037 0.0700  * 
AFFORDH 0.0370 0.0115 3.2270 *** 0.0024 0.0331 0.1409 0.0300 ** 
POVERTY 0.0749 0.0190 3.9467 *** -0.0587 0.0900 0.1508 0.1100   
VACANCY 0.0451 0.0230 1.9656 ** -0.0917 0.0592 0.1595 0.5700   
TRANSPORT 0.0236 0.0104 2.2720 ** -0.0202 0.0219 0.0928 0.0100 *** 
SQ_VACANCY -0.0005 0.0004 -1.2846   -0.0055 -0.0010 0.0097 0.1600   
SQ_AFFORDH -0.0003 0.0001 -2.5846 *** -0.0015 -0.0003 0.0004 0.1400   
SQ_POVERTY -0.0017 0.0003 -6.5232 ** -0.0032 -0.0016 0.0003 0.3500   
SQ_TRANPORT -0.0002 0.0001 -1.9433 * -0.0008 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0100 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.4637       0.5449         
Note: Significance ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
          GWR Significance based on Monte Carlo test for spatial non-stationarity 
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The 2009 model also shows similar results regarding model performance and 
spatial non-stationarity of variables. The explanatory power of the model has been 
improved from 0.4637 (OLS) to 0.5449. Six out of eleven independent variables turn out 
to be significant in terms of spatial variation. These variables include race variables, 
affordable housing, and public transportation. Thus, the influence of these variables over 
space might be varying locally, which is contrary to the results from OLS that assumes a 
constant estimate over the study area.  
 
6.4.3.1 Local R
2
 variation 
Local R
2
 in the 2005 model ranges from a minimum of 0.1064 to a maximum of 
0.9305. Local R
2
 indicates how well the local regression model fits the observed y-value. 
Very low values indicate that the local model is performing poorly, while high values 
report that the local model fits well. The local R
2
 map reveals a local variation in the 
performance of the model across space. The 2005 GWR model explains at least 50% of 
variation in the north regions and the eastern part of the county. These cities include 
Euclid, Richmond Heights, Cleveland Heights, Garfield Heights, Shaker Heights, 
Warrensville Heights, and Mayfield Heights. However, the model fits poorly in the area 
around the east side of Cleveland and southwestern suburbs, such as Parma and 
Strongsville. These local variations cannot be detected by the OLS and Spatial error 
model estimations. 
Local R
2
 in the 2009 model indicates spatial variation of model fitness; however, 
it has a different pattern when compared to the 2005 model. Local R
2
 in the 2009 model 
ranges from 0.3664 to 0.6518. The model fits well in the south suburbs such as Parma 
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and Parma Heights. Also, the model explains more than half of the variation in the east 
and the west suburbs. Spatial variation of the local R
2
 in the 2005 and 2009 models is 
mapped in Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5. 
 
Figure 6-4 Spatial variation of local R
2
 (2005 GWR model) 
 
Figure 6-5 Spatial variation of local R
2
 (2009 GWR model) 
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6.4.3.2 African American population 
Local coefficient estimates for BLACK are shown in Figure 6-6 through Figure 6-
9. The coefficient estimate of BLACK in the 2005 global model was 0.0547, with a 
standard error of 0.0027. The map of the local coefficients variation reveals that the 
influence of the BLACK variable in the 2005 GWR model varies considerably over 
Cuyahoga County. The influence of black population on voucher concentration is strong 
on the east side of the county such as in East Cleveland, South Euclid, Cleveland Heights, 
University Heights, Shaker Heights, Garfield Heights, Lyndhurst, Mayfield, Mayfield 
Heights, Bedford, and Bedford Heights. In these areas, voucher holders‟ concentrations 
are positively related to African American population. Except those areas and the west 
part of the Cleveland near Brooklyn, the relationship is not significant at a 95% 
confidence interval, as shown in Figure 6-7.  
Figure 6-8 presents the BLACK parameter distribution in the 2009 model. The 
global estimate of BLACK is 0.0448 with a standard error of 0.0036 in the 2009 revised 
OLS. The local coefficients vary from 0.0229 to 0.0719 and show significant spatial 
variation based on the Monte Carlo test. The northeast and the southwest part of the 
regions have larger coefficient estimates than the regions in the middle; however, the t-
value map discovers that the BLACK parameters are significant in all regions at the 95% 
level. Thus, it can be inferred that black population significantly influences voucher 
locations, and impacts are stronger in suburban regions.  
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Figure 6-6 BLACK parameter variation (2005 GWR model) 
 
 
Figure 6-7 BLACK t-value variation (2005 GWR model) 
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Figure 6-8 BLACK parameter variation (2009 GWR model) 
 
 
Figure 6-9 BLACK t-value variation (2009 GWR model) 
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6.4.3.3 Asian population 
GWR analysis shows how the relationship between Asian population and voucher 
holders varies over space, while the global OLS model shows the relationship is linear 
and negative. The 2005 GWR model indicates that several cities have a negative impact 
of Asian population on voucher locations, such as part of Euclid, Cleveland, and 
Richmond Heights. Few areas have a positive effect of Asian population in the 2005 
GWR model.  
The 2009 GWR model exhibits a different pattern of effect. Many of the eastern 
regions show a significant negative relationship, implying that increase of Asian 
population is negatively associated with voucher holders‟ location outcomes.  
 
Figure 6-10 ASIAN parameter variation (2005 GWR model) 
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Figure 6-11 ASIAN t-value variation (2005 GWR model) 
 
 
Figure 6-12 ASIAN parameter variation (2009 GWR model) 
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Figure 6-13 ASIAN t-value variation (2009 GWR model) 
 
 
6.4.3.4 Hispanic population 
Hispanic variable is significant in the 2005 GWR model, and it shows significant 
t-values in several regions. A positive impact exists in the middle of City of Cleveland, 
Brooklyn, and part of Cleveland Heights. On the contrary, a negative effect is found in 
the north part of City of Cleveland, the west side of Shaker Heights. 
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Figure 6-14 HISPANIC parameter variation (2005 GWR model) 
 
 
Figure 6-15 HISPANIC t-value variation (2005 GWR model) 
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6.4.3.5 Affordable housing below FMRs 
The Monte Carlo test for spatial non-stationarity shows that there is significant 
spatial variation in the local parameter estimates for the variable AFFORDH in the 2009 
model. As expected, voucher holders‟ locations are positively related with the availability 
of affordable housing, which is rental housing whose rent level is below the FMRs. Based 
on GWR model, the relationship is especially significant in the northeast regions, such as 
the east side of the City of Cleveland, East Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, Richmond 
Heights, and Euclid. Spatial variation of local parameters and significance are shown in 
Figure 6-16 and Figure 6-17 for the 2009 GWR model. 
 
Figure 6-16 AFFORDH parameter variation (2009 GWR model) 
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Figure 6-17 AFFORDH t-value variation (2009 GWR model) 
 
 
6.4.3.6 Poverty rates 
The 2005 GWR model confirms the local variation of poverty variable. The 
global estimate of the poverty variable was -0.0218 with the standard deviation of 
0.0088; GWR parameter ranges from -0.1389 to 0.4744. As shown in Figure 6-19, the 
relationship between voucher concentration and poverty rates are negative in some areas 
near City of Cleveland. In these areas, voucher recipients tend to live in low poverty 
neighborhoods, implying that the voucher program works relatively well in terms of 
poverty deconcentration. In contrast, there is a different type of story in suburban areas. 
Poverty rates influence voucher concentrations in a positive way in the north regions 
(Euclid and Richmond Heights) and the south regions (Bedford, Bedford Heights, 
Warrensville, and Maple Heights). In these suburbs, the poverty coefficient is estimated 
positively significant, suggesting that voucher recipients tend to live in high poverty 
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neighborhoods, which is contrary to what is expected to be achieved through the voucher 
program. In general, the voucher program in Cuyahoga county has achieved the poverty 
deconcentration goal based on the 2005 global model, since it shows negative 
relationship. However, it is hard to assert that poverty deconcentration has achieved in all 
areas because the GWR model results show substantial variation both in local coefficients 
and t-values. Based on both global and GWR model, it can be inferred that voucher 
holders living in or near the central city tend to find their house in neighborhoods with 
low poverty rates; however, voucher holders in suburbs are likely to end up 
neighborhoods with high poverty rates, even though the absolute level of poverty rates in 
suburbs are significantly lower than those of in the central city. 
 
 Figure 6-18 POVERTY parameter variation (2005 GWR model) 
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Figure 6-19 POVERTY t-value variation (2005 GWR model) 
 
 
6.4.3.7 Vacancy rates 
Vacancy rates have a positive effect on voucher concentration and their impacts 
vary over space. Vacancy rates in the 2005 global model had a significant positive impact 
on voucher concentration with the coefficient of 0.1378. The map for the local 
coefficients of the variable indicates that the influence varies significantly. The 
relationship between voucher concentration and vacancy rates are negative and 
significant in the north suburbs such as Euclid and Richmond Heights. Contrarily, several 
regions reveal a positive relationship. These areas include the east side of the Cleveland, 
East Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, the southern part of Shaker Heights, and Bedford 
Heights. 
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Figure 6-20 VACANCY parameter variation (2005 GWR model) 
 
 
Figure 6-21 VACANCY t-value variation (2005 GWR model) 
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Vacancy rates in this model are incorporated to account for landlords‟ 
participation in the program. Research found that landlords have more incentives to 
participate in the voucher program where vacancy rates are high, so they have difficulty 
in finding tenants. Local parameter variation of vacancy rates implies that location choice 
of voucher holders in and near the central city is positively influenced by vacancy rates 
(or landlords‟ participation, or weak market conditions). However, vacancy rates and 
voucher holders are positively related in the north suburbs.  
The comparison of global (OLS) and local (GWR) models provides enhanced 
understanding of the relationship between voucher locations and vacancy rates. Based on 
the global model (2005 revised OLS), vacancy rates affect voucher holders location 
outcomes in a positive way until vacancy rates reach 32.8%; after that point, the 
relationship is negative. The 2005 GWR model identifies the place where the relationship 
is positive or negative.  
  
6.4.3.8 Accessibility to public transportation 
Accessibility to public transportation has a different degree of influence across the 
study area. The 2009 GWR model shows distinct patterns. In general, areas more 
accessible to public transportation have more voucher holders living in them. This 
phenomenon is especially true for the northeast regions, such as the east side of the 
Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, South Euclid, Euclid, Shaker Heights, and University 
Heights. Also, the voucher location is explained well by the accessibility of public 
transportation in the south suburbs, such as Maple Heights, Bedford, and Bedford 
Heights.  
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Figure 6-22 TRANSPORT parameter variation (2005 GWR model) 
 
 
Figure 6-23 TRANSPORT t-value variation (2005 GWR model) 
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Figure 6-24 TRANSPORT parameter variation (2009 GWR model) 
 
 
Figure 6-25 TRANSPORT t-value variation (2009 GWR model) 
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6.5 Summary of findings  
 
A series of regression analyses are conducted to identify the factors explaining 
voucher location outcomes. The OLS regression model, spatial regression model, and 
GWR model are considered in order to find the relevant functional forms, to incorporate 
spatial autocorrelation, and to account for spatial heterogeneity. OLS regressions point 
out the threshold effect of several variables such as affordable housing, poverty, vacancy, 
and public transportation. Analyzing spatial data requires spatial diagnostics to prevent 
biased estimates. Spatial diagnostics show that the error model is relevant for this study. 
Incorporating the spatial autoregressive error term confirms the results obtained by OLS. 
Also, it eliminates all of the spatial autocorrelation issues noticed in the OLS models. In 
addition, the GWR model is adopted to deal with spatial heterogeneity issues. The Monte 
Carlo tests confirm that spatial patterns of several variables vary significantly over space. 
Comparing and contrasting the findings from GWR (local model) with OLS 
(global model) sheds light on the local variation of influential factors on voucher location. 
The global model results are only average across the study areas and can hide many 
interesting spatial variations in a relationship that is illuminated in the local analysis. The 
results of the OLS model are hard to visualize and give a global parameter estimate for 
each variable that is applied to every point in the study area regardless of location. This is 
an issue when relationships between variables change over space. In this regard, the 
GWR model is appropriate in terms of estimating local fit in multiple locations and of 
visualizing the local variation.  
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With regard to policy implication, a statistically significant global variable that 
has little local variation informs region-wide policy. On the contrary, statistically 
significant global variables that exhibit strong regional variations suggest local policy 
(Charlton & Fotheringham, 2009). As results from the global model show, all 
independent variables are statistically significant; however, there are significant local 
variations of the variable. 
The 2005 GWR model substantially improves the explanatory power compared to 
global OLS model (from 0.4763 to 0.7103). Most of the factors identified as significant 
in the global OLS model are also found out to be significant and show a spatial non-
stationarity. Local variation of explanatory power in the 2005 GWR model is mostly well 
explained by the variable BLACK. Poverty rates account for the local variations in the 
north and the southeast suburbs, and vacancy rates fit well in regions from the east side of 
the central city to the north suburbs. Explanatory power of the accessibility of public 
transportation also varies over the study area.  
The 2009 GWR model also increases the ability of explaining variation compared 
to global OLS (from 0.4637 to 0.5449). Several factors turn out to be significant in terms 
of spatial variations, which include minority population, affordable housing, and public 
transportation. The 2009 GWR model fits relatively better in the east and the south part 
of suburban regions. African American population is positively and significantly related 
with voucher outcomes. Spatial variations of affordable housing availability are well 
aligned with regions stretched from the center to the north end of the Cuyahoga County. 
Also, public transportation plays a positive role in locating voucher holders in the area 
from the northeast to southeast part of the study area.  
189 
 
Considering policy goal achievement, the results are mixed in terms of poverty 
and race deconcentration through the voucher program. Minority populations are a 
significant predictor of voucher concentration, which implies that the voucher recipients 
tend to live in neighborhoods with the high proportion of minorities (African American 
and Hispanic, but not Asian). In this case, it is hard to assert that the voucher program has 
contributed to race desegregation considering the facts that the majority of voucher 
holders are minorities and they tend to live in predominantly minority neighborhoods. In 
terms of poverty deconcentration, however, the voucher program has contributed to 
dispersing poor households with rental subsidies. The poverty rates variable is a 
significant and meaningful predictor of voucher concentration and has a threshold point 
of 23%. Poverty rates of suburban areas are usually less than 23%. This implies that the 
voucher recipients are more likely to live in low poverty neighborhoods and less likely to 
live in high poverty ones since the relationship between voucher holders and poverty 
rates are positive until the threshold point of 23%.  
The availability of affordable housing and vacancy rates are positively related 
with concentration of voucher recipients. The voucher program allows voucher recipients 
to find a house whose rent levels are below the FMRs. Therefore, the positive 
relationship between the availability of affordable housing and voucher concentration has 
confirmed the fact that voucher holders‟ location choice is limited by the local housing 
market conditions in terms of affordable housing. Vacancy rates also result in a positive 
relationship with voucher concentration. The higher the vacancy rates, the more choices 
for tenants to find a house. In this situation, landlords would have more incentives to 
participate in the voucher program and fewer incentives to discriminate against voucher 
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holders. Based on the findings, weak housing markets provide voucher users with more 
chances to find their housing units. 
Public transportation plays a less important role than expected in explaining 
voucher holders‟ location outcomes. OLS reveals a positive effect of public 
transportation; however, when considering spatial autocorrelation, the effect is significant 
at a 90% level. The positive effect of public transportation confirms the fact that voucher 
holders‟ housing choice is dependent on the accessibility to public transportation due to 
their low income level. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
7.1 Importance of the topic 
 
Nearly one out of four renters, 18.6 million households as of 2008, face severe 
cost burdens that spend more than half of their incomes on housing (Joint Center for 
Housing Studies of Harvard University, 2010). Voucher holders in Cuyahoga County live 
with less than $11,000 income on average. At this level, their monthly housing costs 
would have to be no more than $275 in order to meet the affordability standard, which is 
30% of income toward housing cost. Regardless of their extremely low income levels, 
voucher holders have lived in decent quality houses whose rent levels are around $650 
since the differences have been subsidized. In this way, the Housing Choice Voucher 
Program contributes to decreasing the income-housing cost mismatch for low-income 
renters who otherwise struggle to meet their housing needs.  
The voucher program is the single largest housing subsidy in the nation, serving 
almost two million low-income households. Using the household‟s choice, the program 
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intends to disperse minority and low-income households in neighborhoods where they 
could have better living environments such as safety, schools, employments, and public 
services. Thus, there has been an increasing interest in the voucher program achievements, 
whether it has contributed to deconcentrating the poor and minorities. At the same time, 
growing concerns have been raised on voucher recipients‟ concentration in poor 
neighborhoods and re-concentration in less-poor neighborhoods. However, not much has 
been investigated in the Cleveland area where poverty and minority segregation remains 
strikingly high. Therefore, Cleveland is the place that needs the program the most to 
promote racial and economic integration in its neighborhoods. In these regards, 
identifying locations of individual voucher recipients and examining spatial distribution 
over space are critical to evaluate the program performance. Where have voucher 
recipients lived? Are spatial patterns of voucher recipients different by their race, income, 
and over time? What factors have influenced their spatial concentration? Do relationships 
between variables vary across space? This dissertation explored these questions by 
analyzing data of voucher recipients from the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority. 
This dissertation makes a contribution to the literature because it is the first work 
conducted in the Cleveland area and to incorporate various spatial statistical approaches 
in identifying spatial concentration and influential factors. Contrary to most previous 
research that adopted a-spatial analysis, this study considered both a-spatial and spatial 
aspects by utilizing spatial analyses such as hotspot analysis, spatial regression, and 
Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR).  
Methodological improvements should be mentioned. Limited knowledge has been 
reported among previous works that examined the relationship between voucher 
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concentration and neighborhood characteristics. Only a handful of studies dealt with 
spatial autocorrelation issues in regression analysis. Among others, GWR is a relatively 
new methodology that accounts for spatial heterogeneity in spatial data. GWR enables 
researcher to capture spatially varying relationships over space and make it visualize by 
using maps. With improved methodology, this dissertation not only examined the 
relationships between variables, but also visualized local variations that cannot be 
identified by OLS nor spatial regression models. Policy implications can be drawn based 
on local differences of effects, whether region-wide policy or local policy would be 
appropriate for addressing voucher concentration.  
 
7.2 Summary of key findings 
 
7.2.1 Patterns of voucher recipients’ locations 
This study aims to find patterns of voucher holders‟ spatial outcomes 
incorporating both a-spatial and spatial analysis. In terms of a-spatial approach, 
descriptive analysis presents that voucher users tend to move from extremely poor 
neighborhoods to less poor neighborhoods from 2005 to 2009. However, over half of the 
voucher recipients still live in very poor neighborhoods where a median income level is 
less than 50% of the area median income. Regarding racial makeup in neighborhoods, the 
majority of voucher users are living in neighborhoods where African American 
population is dominant. At the same time, the trends show that voucher holders are 
moving toward neighborhoods that the majority population is white. Even though 
descriptive statistics provide general understanding of voucher holders‟ living 
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environments, it is hard to identify where they live, whether they are concentrated, and 
whether the concentrations are statistically significant. Spatial analysis is necessary to 
answer the above questions. 
Hotspot analysis shows that voucher recipients are concentrated and they are 
moving toward suburban areas from 2005 to 2009. Hotspot analysis is useful to detect 
spatial concentration and to examine changes of concentration patterns for a particular 
area over time. Voucher recipients tend to cluster in the east side of the county. African 
American voucher holders are especially concentrated in the northeastern areas while 
white voucher holders are clustered in the western regions. Spatial patterns of both racial 
groups have spread toward suburban areas from 2005 to 2009. Hispanic voucher holders 
are also concentrated in the Cleveland. Investigating spatial patterns by income levels 
show spatial clustering; however, spatial clusters by income levels are not significantly 
different from other income groups. This might be attributed to the fact that the majority 
of voucher holders are extremely low income households and they tend to move from 
extremely poor neighborhoods to ones that are less poor. 
Combining the a-spatial description and spatial analysis provides better 
understanding on how voucher holders are distributed over space. The a-spatial approach 
is good for a quick understanding of the general tendency of location outcomes while 
hard to identify the place where spatial clustering occurs. The spatial analysis is useful to 
test statistical significance whether the clustering is significantly different enough to 
reject the null hypothesis. The spatial approach overcomes the limitation of a-spatial 
description, and suggests that voucher holders are clustered in specific areas and their 
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clusters have changed over time. Moreover, spatial concentrations of voucher holders are 
significantly different by race and ethnicity but not by income level.  
 
7.2.2 Factors associated with voucher recipients’ spatial concentration 
A series of regression analyses explored which factors related to voucher holders‟ 
spatial concentrations. Starting from traditional OLS, spatial regression analysis was 
utilized to account for spatial autocorrelation. In addition, GWR was conducted in order 
to incorporate spatial heterogeneity and to provide spatially varying relationship. 
Several factors were tested their significance on voucher concentrations, these 
factors included availability of affordable housing, minority populations, poverty rates, 
vacancy rates, and accessibility to public transportation. Consistent with previous 
research, minority populations were significant predictors for voucher concentrations. 
This finding implies that voucher holders tend to live in minority neighborhoods. Based 
on this result, it is hard to assert that the voucher program is successful to make 
neighborhood diverse in terms of racial composition. On the other hand, poverty rates 
turned out to be significant and showed the threshold point. Based on this relationship, it 
can be inferred that the voucher program has contributed to dispersing poor households 
into better neighborhoods in terms of poverty rates. As expected in hypotheses, 
availability of affordable housing, vacancy rates, and public transportation are 
significantly associated with voucher concentration. OLS and spatial error model 
estimation confirmed that several variables showed a threshold effect on voucher 
concentration. The thresholds were at 50%, 23%, and 30% of affordable housing, poverty 
rates, and vacancy rates, respectively.  
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GWR results account for spatial heterogeneity, providing local variation of 
significant factors on voucher locations. The GWR model substantially improved the 
explanatory power compared to the OLS model. Most of the factors identified as 
influential in global OLS model were also found out to be significant and showed a 
spatial non-stationarity by Monte Carlo tests. Significantly different local variations were 
found in minority populations, affordable housing, poverty, vacancy rates, and public 
transportation. Spatial variations of affordable housing availability were well aligned 
with regions stretched from the central city to the north; poverty rates accounted for the 
local variation in the north and the southeastern suburbs; vacancy rates fitted well in 
regions where cover from the east side of the central city to the north part of suburbs; 
public transportation explained well in areas from the northeast to southeast suburbs. 
 
7.3 Policy implications 
 
Results presented here on patterns and factors of voucher concentration provide 
several policy implications. Consistent with previous findings, this study also shows that 
the voucher program has played a substantial role in poverty deconcentration based on 
the fact that the voucher recipients tend to live in less poor neighborhoods over time from 
the extremely low income neighborhoods. This is important considering the fact that the 
majority (over 80%) of the recipients is in the extremely low income group. Thus, the 
findings reflect that the voucher program performs well in terms of dispersing poor 
tenants. Furthermore, statistical analysis finds that poverty rates are meaningful 
predictors of voucher location outcomes but the effects vary across space. The 
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relationship with voucher locations and poverty rates is positive until poverty rates reach 
23%, and the relationship turns negative. Places with lower poverty rates (below 23%) 
correspond with suburban communities and higher poverty areas are found in areas near 
the central city. Considering both findings from regression analyses and distribution of 
neighborhood poverty rates, it can be inferred that the voucher program has been 
successful to disperse extremely low-income households toward suburbs. Voucher 
holders are more likely to find their housing units in areas with low poverty rates.  
Desegregating minority population seems to be hard to achieve through the 
voucher program. Voucher users were found in neighborhoods where minorities are 
predominant. African American and Hispanic populations were positively associated with 
voucher users‟ concentrations. Spatial analysis confirmed their clustering in specific 
neighborhoods, but they tend to move into suburbs during last five years. Descriptive 
analysis also showed that voucher holders tend to move from black neighborhoods to 
white neighborhoods. These findings reflected promising trends that voucher holders are 
concentrated in specific neighborhoods but they have moved into suburban 
neighborhoods where white are majority. Therefore, it can be inferred that the voucher 
program has potential to desegregating minority with some limitations.  
Overcoming spatial concentration of voucher holders will involve in encouraging 
landlord‟s participation in the voucher program. Voucher holders have a limited choice 
when landlords do not accept vouchers and rent levels are over FMRs. Vacancy rates as 
proxies for landlords‟ participations reveal significant effects on voucher locations. 
Landlord‟s participation will increase voucher recipients‟ choice, and subsequently 
contribute to disperse them. Previous survey (US Census, 1998) found that landlords‟ 
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were reluctant to be in the program because of bureaucratic process, paper works and/or 
unfamiliarity with the program itself. Thus, the federal and local agencies for the voucher 
program should consider the way to inform landlords the merits and procedures of the 
voucher program, especially for those who have housing units in suburban areas.   
In addition, it is worth noting that making neighborhoods accessible to public 
transportation will broaden voucher recipients‟ location choices. Voucher holders‟ 
location choices were increasing until a point that almost 60% of area in a neighborhood 
is accessible to public transportation. This is especially well explained in the northeast 
and the southeast regions of the study area. Thus, if policy makers have expected voucher 
deconcentration to suburbs, they should consider making neighborhoods accessible to 
public transportation. 
 
7.4 Limitations and implications for future research 
 
This dissertation explores how voucher recipients have utilized their choices in 
the Cleveland area in terms of spatial patterns and limiting factors. This study identified 
meaningful findings; however, there remain limitations and further research areas. 
Outdated neighborhood data should be mentioned. Due to the time gap of census data, 
neighborhood characteristics are hard to reflect the most recent changes that might occur 
during ten years. Thus, analysis with newly released 2010 ACS (American Community 
Survey) data will be necessary to confirm the findings obtained this study.  
Analysis with disaggregated data will give an insight for the program 
performance. This study used aggregated data at the level of block groups. If public 
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housing agencies had had records on previous locations of voucher recipients, researcher 
could conduct study on mobility patterns and motivations. Changes of address will show 
individual movement from place to place over time, so the mobility pattern will be 
clearly demonstrated. Once mobility patterns are identified, researchers should consider 
investigating factors that cause voucher recipients‟ residential choice. They might choose 
to stay in their old neighborhoods simply because of the proximity to their acquaintances. 
On the other hand, they might move their residence because of racial factors, accessibility 
to public transportation, or the desire to live in a safe neighborhood. Conducting surveys 
will help to understand whether the motivation lies in a personal or structural reason. 
Motivation and mobility analysis will contribute to investigating how the program 
operates at the individual level. 
Moreover, tracking studies of voucher recipients will play a significant role in 
understanding and evaluating the performance of the voucher program. Research efforts 
related to dispersal programs have been devoted to compare the living conditions of the 
underprivileged either by providing information on several sites simultaneously or by 
tracking the locations of the former public housing tenants over time. For example, the 
Gautreaux program developed the metropolitan-wide mobility program in Chicago, in 
order to address discriminatory practices in public housing. Researchers have compared 
mobility outcomes, both in personal benefits and neighborhood conditions, before and 
after relocating residents, which inspired Congress to initiate MTO experiments. With 
rigorous research designs and restrictions, the MTO program has helped scholars 
investigate causal links in neighborhood conditions and the benefits gained, through the 
comparison of experiences at several sites. On the other hand, HOPE VI programs have 
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provided more systematic evidences through panel and tracking study. Compared to 
Gautreaux and MTO program, HOPE VI is larger both in scale and in scope; it has been 
implemented nationwide, involved more sites, and affected more residents and 
neighborhoods. The HOPE VI Tracking Study has provided a snapshot of the living 
conditions and well-being of former tenants of eight different sites. More importantly, 
HOPE VI Panel Study provides comparative analyses with longitudinal data from five 
sites. Thus, this panel study enables researchers and policy makers to evaluate the long 
term effects of relocating former residents from their neighborhood conditions, physical 
and mental health, and socioeconomic outcomes. However, panel data for voucher 
recipients have not been available thus far, resulting in a lack of information on how 
extremely low families fare with rental subsidies. Not much has been reported about the 
long term effects of the voucher recipients on their living conditions and benefits that are 
expected, while nearly one out of five voucher holders have stayed in the program for 
more than ten years. At the local level, constructing systems that require PHAs identify 
the former residences of voucher users is essential to understand the mobility pattern of 
the beneficiaries. At the same time, comparing and contrasting the similarities and 
differences from several sites will provide comprehensive and systematic information on 
the performance of the voucher program. Given the significance of the program and the 
potential benefits for the residents, it is critical to understand what has happened to these 
vulnerable households since they chose their locations of residence. 
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APPENDICIES 
 
Appendix A. General G index results  
Year Conceptualization of spatial relationships Observed G Expected G Variance Z score P value 
2005 
Inverse distance 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 21.44992 0.00000 
Inverse distance square 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 18.32121 0.00000 
Fixed distance 0.10701 0.05007 0.00001 20.93612 0.00000 
Spatial weight matrix 0.00133 0.00079 0.00000 30.41131 0.00000 
2006 
Inverse distance 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 20.41566 0.00000 
Inverse distance square 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 17.25876 0.00000 
Fixed distance 0.10165 0.05007 0.00001 20.01762 0.00000 
Spatial weight matrix 0.00128 0.00079 0.00000 30.60887 0.00000 
2007 
Inverse distance 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 19.44786 0.00000 
Inverse distance square 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 16.59800 0.00000 
Fixed distance 0.09835 0.05007 0.00001 18.99722 0.00000 
Spatial weight matrix 0.00127 0.00079 0.00000 30.41952 0.00000 
2008 
Inverse distance 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 18.07948 0.00000 
Inverse distance square 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 15.30544 0.00000 
Fixed distance 0.09431 0.05007 0.00001 17.70703 0.00000 
Spatial weight matrix 0.00125 0.00079 0.00000 30.00792 0.00000 
2009 
Inverse distance 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 15.72959 0.00000 
Inverse distance square 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 13.06455 0.00000 
Fixed distance 0.09018 0.05007 0.00001 15.53380 0.00000 
Spatial weight matrix 0.00125 0.00079 0.00000 28.35731 0.00000 
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Appendix B. Residual plots for regression model 
Affordable housing (2009 model) 
 
Poverty (2009 model) 
 
Vacancy (2009 model) 
 
Public transportation (2009 model) 
 
 
 
229 
 
Appendix C. Residual plots after adding square terms 
Affordable housing (2009) 
 
Poverty (2009) 
 
Vacancy (2009) 
 
Public transportation (2009) 
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Appendix D. VIF in 2005 model  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)  Sig VIF 
Intercept -0.3222 0.2107 -1.529 0.1265 
 
 ---------- 
BLACK 0.0547 0.0027 19.934 0.0000 *** 2.0083 
ASIAN -0.0598 0.0202 -2.954 0.0032 ** 1.0767 
HISPANIC 0.0552 0.0107 5.144 0.0000 *** 1.3433 
AFFORDH 0.0116 0.0049 2.356 0.0186 ** 2.8044 
POVERTY -0.0218 0.0088 -2.48 0.0133 ** 3.4059 
VACANCY 0.1377 0.0236 5.845 0.0000 *** 5.6192 
SQ_VACANCY -0.0021 0.0004 -5.473 0.0000 *** 3.5897 
TRANSPORT 0.0065 0.0029 2.269 0.0234 ** 1.3695 
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Appendix E. VIF in 2009 model  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) Sig VIF 
Intercept -0.5873 0.2735 -2.1473 0.03195 ** -------- 
BLACK 0.0471 0.0027 17.3631 0.00000 *** 2.2745 
ASIAN -0.0431 0.0189 -2.2862 0.02239 ** 1.0804 
HISPANIC 0.0442 0.0105 4.2085 0.00003 *** 1.4870 
AFFORDH 0.0370 0.0115 3.2262 0.00130 ** 17.5949 
SQ_AFFORDH -0.0004 0.0001 -2.5830 0.00990 ** 14.0668 
POVERTY 0.0748 0.0189 3.9413 0.00009 ** 18.3229 
SQ_POVERTY -0.0017 0.0003 -6.5179 0.00000 *** 11.5517 
VACANCY 0.0451 0.0230 1.9645 0.04969 ** 6.1622 
SQ_VACANCY -0.0005 0.0004 -1.2835 0.19956  3.9113 
TRANSPORT 0.0236 0.0104 2.2737 0.02314 ** 20.8296 
SQ_TRANSPORT -0.0002 0.0001 -1.9450 0.052 * 21.5775 
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Appendix F. F test results  
Explanatory variables in restricted model F value Pr(>F) 
AFFORDH+Sq_Affordh+BLACK+ASIAN+HISPANIC 
+VACANCY+Sq_Vacancy+POVERTY+Sq_Poverty 
+TRANSPORT+Sq_Tranport 
100.2 < 2.2e-16 
AFFORDH+Sq_Affordh+BLACK+ASIAN+HISPANIC 
+VACANCY+Sq_Vacancy+POVERTY+Sq_Poverty 
121.4 < 2.2e-16 
AFFORDH+Sq_Affordh+BLACK+ASIAN+HISPANIC 
+VACANCY+Sq_Vacancy+TRANSPORT+Sq_Tranport 
110.6 < 2.2e-16 
AFFORDH+Sq_Affordh+BLACK+ASIAN+HISPANIC 
+POVERTY+Sq_Poverty+TRANSPORT+Sq_Tranport 
121.7 < 2.2e-16 
AFFORDH+Sq_Affordh+VACANCY+Sq_Vacancy 
+POVERTY+Sq_Poverty +TRANSPORT+Sq_Tranport 
71.44 < 2.2e-16 
BLACK+ASIAN+HISPANIC+VACANCY+Sq_Vacancy 
+POVERTY+Sq_Poverty+TRANSPORT+Sq_Tranport 
120.3 < 2.2e-16 
 
 
 
 
